FINAL ISSUE

Run 5

Issue 25

How to Install Your Scenarios

IBM

Waterloo: Copy the Waterloo files to the DB directory

Gibraltar: Copy the Gibraltar files into the scenario subdirectory of CCAW. Copy the Planes files into the planes subdirectory of CCAW. Copy the Ships files into the ships subdirectory of CCAW Copy the ordsgibr.pck file into the picts subdirectory of CCAW.

Korea: From the W2Deluxe directory type Install <enter>, click on 'Librarian', then click on 'source'.click on the appropriate drive (usually A:) then click on the icon 'Korea.scz', click on unpack and when the scenario has unpacked click okay, done and exit as prompted.

MAC

Waterloo: Copy the Waterloo scenario into your DB folder.

Arras: Copy the Arras scenario into your Rommel, Panzer Battles, Halls of Montezuma or MacArthur's War folder.

Gibraltar: Copy the Gibraltar folder into your Carriers at War folder. I you are playing CAW from the Total War CD then create a CAW folder on your Hard Drive.

Korea: Copy the Korea file into the Scenarios folder in your Warlords II folder.

EDITOR'S CHANCE

RUN 5 IS DEAD: LONG LIVE RUN 5

The first issue of *Run 5* was published in January 1986. You are now looking at Issue #25. In all that time, *Run 5* has retained its essential nature as the house magazine for SSG games, and has been sold to a select and committed audience. This has not been entirely our choice. We would have liked to have broadened the magazine's readership and appeal, but readership has remained at the levels that it reached in the first few issues.

Now we have reached the situation where the costs of producing *Run 5* far outweigh the revenue from subscriptions and scenario disk sales. Most publications in this position simply close down, with a tearful farewell from the editors, if time and money allow. Thankfully this will not be the case with *Run 5*.

Our alternative to extinction is to launch *Run 5* onto the Web, as part of SSG's website: http://www.ssg.com.au. This issue will be the last printed issue, and refunds will be made for the unfulfilled portions of all subscriptions.

There are numerous advantages to Web publishing. These include the following:

* *Run 5* gets to stay alive, since costs are much lower.

* *Run 5* will now be free

* *Run 5* scenarios will now be free

* *Run 5* articles will cover a greater range of subjects

* Articles, letters and other features will not suffer space constraints

* Interaction with readers will be easier and faster

and last but definitely not least

* The editor gets to keep his job

The one disadvantage, which we acknowledge, is that you won't get a

beautifully printed magazine, but that approach is simply no longer viable. We are printing this final paper issue, even though this is a loss making proposition.

This issue will go up on our Web site after the paper version has been distributed, and new issues should appear faster than our current somewhat dilatory schedule.

The online *Run 5* will be a new experience, and we encourage all of you to contribute any ideas and suggestions. Electronic publishing has the great advantage of flexibility, so don't hold back. The Editor's e-mail address is shand@ssg.com.au, make use of it. As well as us welcoming suggestions there will be a page of letters, or rather e-mails, to the editor in the new *Run 5* online.

We'd also like to thank all subscribers and readers for their many years of support. We like to think that *Run 5* is one of the things that makes SSG special, and we're sure that, with your continued support, that it will not only survive, but thrive in its new medium.

IN THIS ISSUE

The big feature of this issue is my discussion of the Waterloo campaign. In fact it's so big we have been unable to fit much else in. If you hate Napoleonics then I apologise. There have been so many two dollar articles on Waterloo, I wasn't going to write another one. We have had a running joke about this article being War and Peace without the peace. Seriously, I hope that you enjoy the article. As always, if you like what you see, write, or from now on, e-mail. If you don't like what you see e-mail me too. In any case, I doubt I will be in too much of a hurry to write another article of this size.

Also featured are Korea for *WarlordsII Deluxe* and Gibraltar for *Complete Carriers at War* (or *Total War*). Korea deals with the unification of the Peninsula, not the war 45 years ago. The way movement is channelled by the terrain makes this an interesting scenario.

Gibraltar postulates a German attempt to capture the famous rock, backed by the Italian Navy. This is a fascinating scenario because it includes the Vichy French Navy. If you thought that *Complete Carriers at War* was a game of uncertainties, wait till you're unsure whether the Vichy French fleet will come out to help you. We strongly recommend that people playing the Axis in this scenario leave the Vichy French under computer control. That way you'll never be sure what's happening, whichever side you're playing.

IN THE PIPELINE

Work continues apace on *The Last Blitzkrieg*, our simulation of the Battle of the Bulge. By the time you receive this magazine it should be finished. Three years in the making, this is our best game yet. With a number of innovative design features we have carried the top down computer wargame further from its table top origins than any previous computer wargame. The integrated move/fight system is a joy to use and the fiendish computer opponents are the triumphant culmination of 15 years of AI design by Roger Keating. We are finding it hard to stop playing this game and we hope you will feel the same way about it. *The Last Blitzkrieg* will be Windows 95 only and will require a minimum of a 486 DX2/66 with 8MB of Ram and a 2x speed CD Rom drive.

WARLORDS III AND REACH FOR THE STARS

These two classic games are about to get even better.

Strategic Studies Group has announced that it will be publishing the next version of its classic space game, *Reach For The Stars*, through Microsoft and the next instalment in the Warlords series through Broderbund. Both games are due for release in the second half of 1997.

Book of the Quarter

This issue I'm going a bit off the beaten track in my choice of the Book of the Quarter. In fact the 'Book' is a poem, one of the greatest poems ever written, *The Song of Roland*.

The Song of Roland was written down sometime during the first quarter of the 12th century and deals with the ambush by Basques of King Charlemagne's rearguard as the army made its way back into France through the pass of Roncevaux. In command of the rearguard was Roland, a noble who apparently held the Breton Marches as a vassal of the King.

Three hundred and fifty years after the ambush a poem was written down which purported to tell us the story of Roland and his comrades. Actually it tells us far more about the attitudes towards warfare that were prevalent fifty years after the Battle of Hastings.

The story of Roland is simple. Charlemagne has been campaigning in Spain and has conquered the entire country with the exception of Saragossa, in which the Saracen King Marsile is holed up. Marsile offers to make peace and despite Roland's arguments Charlemagne sends the treacherous Ganelon to make terms.

Ganelon, who hates Roland arranges for Marsile to ambush the rearguard. This is done and a great battle ensues. Roland refuses to sound his horn and call back Charlemagne until only a handful are left alive. All of the Franks and most of the Saracens are killed (even though the Christians are outnumbered five to one). Charlemagne returns and pursues the Saracens who are all killed. Finally Ganelon is found out and suffers a horrible and ignoble death.

A stirring piece of fantasy, but what does the poem tell us about the values of the people who wrote it. Quite a lot actually, and from what we can tell, the

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

To the Editor of Run 5,

Have read your article 'The Supremacy of the Longbow: A Military Myth', and found it to be generally quite excellent. I do not though, agree with all that you say in it (Ed. How did I know you were going to say that?). You are quite correct in saying that the longbow was not the ultimate weapon of the period. It was not even the most common missile weapon! Even in England, the crossbow was, for much of the period, more common than the longbow. You are also correct in saying that the victories of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt were more that of a well-trained and well-lead, professional force, over an ill trained, largely leaderless rabble (Ed. Too many leaders surely. To paraphrase the Little old lady who lived in a shoe they had so many leaders they didn't know what to do). In all three battles the French went out of their way to do exactly what the English wanted them to do.

This said though, I feel that you may be underestimating the value and impact of the Longbow, to the same extent that the enthusiasts have overestimated it. I suspect this is due to the 20th century mentality, which totally misunderstands the effectiveness, and role, of projectile weapons prior to the 18th century. Projectile weapons, whether javelins, bows or even the early handguns were largely incapable of defeating an enemy by themselves. This was because they were not effective enough at inflicting losses. They were therefore largely auxiliary weapons. Their purpose was to demoralise and disorganise an opponent, prior to the inevitable melee. This should not be dismissed since, as Napoleon noted, the psychological is more important than the physical. An enemy who thinks he is going to lose invariably does.

This now brings me back to the longbow. As you yourself noted, it had a

Waterloo

A Close Run Thing

June 18th, 1815

A Scenario for the Decisive Battles Game System

by Stephen Hand

A hundred days after the Emperor had landed in Southern France the Armée du Nord was a shattered wreck and Napoleon was finished. Only three days before, the army had crossed into Belgium to the consternation of both Allied commanders. From being "Humbugged" on July 15th Wellington and Blucher recovered to deal a death blow to Napoleon's hopes of retaining the throne of France. The greatest general in history had suffered his final defeat; but it had indeed been a close run thing.

Return from Elba

Napoleon had said that he would return with the violets and so it was that on March 1st 1815 the Emperor set foot, once again on the soil of France. At first the reinstated Bourbons were not unduly concerned. After all Napoleon had only 1,000 men, members of the Old Guard to be sure, but, nonetheless only 1,000. Louis XVIII's son the Comte d'Artois led an army south and Marshal Ney promised to bring his Emperor to Paris "in an iron cage". Artois was no general and his lack of haste gave the time that was needed for men to flock to the Emperor's banner. By the time Ney confronted his old master it was easier to submit and avoid the battle which would have propelled France into Civil War. Twenty days after landing in the south Napoleon entered Paris as the ruler of France.

It was at this point that the real problems began for the Emperor. His letters to the sovereigns of Europe, in which he renounced all claims to territories beyond the borders of France were scorned. The one sent to the Prince Regent of Britain was returned unopened.

As early as March 12th arrangements were being made by the Allies to raise over half a million men and crush Napoleon once and for all. However, it would take both sides time to raise new armies. A race was now on to see who could strike first. It was not the sort of race that the Emperor was capable of losing.

Two months after entering Paris Napoleon's Army was half a million strong. Contrary to the assertions of the Allies the French people supported the Emperor to an extraordinary degree.

Opposing the French concentration the Allies had moved slowly. The Austrians and Russians were not in any immediate danger and were taking their time. The Prussians, English and Dutch on the other hand had been prompt in their mobilisation.

Blücher was on the Sambre and Meuse with 120,000 men and 312 guns. The only man ever to have beaten Napoleon in more than one battle, Leipzig in 1813 and La Rothiere in 1814, Blucher

The Duke of Wellington
One of history's few undefeated generals

Napoleon at Grenoble
After a taste of the restored Bourbon monarchy both soldier and civilian alike flocked to follow Napoleon

was 72 in 1815. Accompanying the old firebrand was Lieutenant-General Count von Gneisenau, the Prussian Chief-of-Staff. Unlike his foreign counterparts Gneisenau was effectively the joint commander of the Prussian Army. Under extreme circumstances he could even countermand Blücher. The combination of Blücher and Gneisenau was a fortunate one. The old hussar was less afraid of Napoleon than any other man in Europe but he lacked the thoughtfulness and finesse of Gneisenau.

The Prussian Army was less homogenous than has been supposed. Before the opening of the campaign 14,000 Saxons were disarmed after they mutinied. Many troops from the Confederation of the Rhine had recently fought for the Emperor and after the first reverse of the campaign they too left.

The core and the bulk of Blucher's Army were his Prussians but even here the quality of units varied dramatically. The basic unit of manoeuvre in the Prussian Army was the brigade. A Prussian brigade was approximately the size of a French or British division and contained three regiments of varying competence. Usually a brigade contained one veteran regiment, a newly raised regiment and a landwehr or militia regiment. The cavalry was a similar mixture of experienced and raw units but was of a generally better quality.

The Duke of Wellington was unique amongst the experienced Allied generals of 1815 in that he had never been beaten by the French. Although many ascribed this to the fact that he had never faced the Emperor, Wellington had beaten men of the calibre of Soult and Massena and had perhaps the highest reputation of any coalition general.

Considering the size of the British contingent it could only have been Wellington's reputation that secured for him the command of the northernmost of the five Allied Armies which coalition plans envisaged attacking France. Since Napoleon's first abdication much of Wellington's Peninsula Army had been sent to fight in America. Consequently the so-called British Army at Waterloo contained only some 25,000 British. While these were generally of very high quality some of the cavalry in particular was poorly officered and lacked experience.

Nominally British was the Kings German Legion, composed of men from the Electorate of Hanover. Although of the highest quality the Legion was only 6,000 strong. The additional 15,000 Hanoverians were of dubious quality, so much so that Wellington hid twelve battalions of them in garrisons. There were, however twice that number remaining in the field army.

The Dutch-Belgians were the most numerous contingent of the Anglo-Allied Army, numbering just under 30,000 men. Like some of Blucher's Germans the Dutch had recently fought on the side of the French. As it turned out they remained loyal to their new King despite dire predictions. Their commander was the Prince of Orange, alternatively known as 'Slender Billy' or 'The Young Frog'. The Prince was an amateur and despite his capable advisers had the potential to be a dangerously loose cannon.

The Allied Army was completed by slightly less than 7,000 Brunswickers and marginally more Nassauers. The Duke of Wellington could not speak the native tongues of the majority of his army. Curiously the only language most of the Allies had in common was French.

Wellington got around the difficulties of his mixed command by creating three corps. Orange was given the First Corps, Hill the second and Wellington himself retained control of the third.

The Dutch, in particular were split between First and Second Corps. Orange was given command of some British Divisions, notably the Guards, and Hill gained some of the Dutch. This prevented the problem of having a separate Dutch Army only nominally under British command. The Dutch Divisions under Hill would do as they were told and at a pinch Wellington could undercut the authority of the Prince with the British troops in First Corps.

On the French side of the border preparations for war were proceeding apace. Napoleon called upon his marshals to return to the colours with mixed results. Mortier was given the Guard, his customary command. Marshal Ney was out of favour as a result both of his

actions in 1814 and his unfortunate "iron cage" remark. He was sent on a tour of inspection, mainly to give Napoleon time to warm to him once again.

Grouchy, the brilliant cavalry general was created the 26th and last marshal and given Murat's traditional command of the horse. Murat was the finest cavalry commander in Europe and despite his availability Napoleon chose to leave him behind.

In late April the King of Naples had advanced up the Italian Peninsula, threatening the Austrians. Faced by superior forces and with his army divided Murat retreated south. Despite winning a tactical victory at Tolentino in early May Murat was forced to surrender Naples and flee to France. Napoleon was furious.

Far from achieving the desired dissipation of Austrian strength Murat's failure had freed a considerable part of the Austrian Army to attack France over the Alps. The Emperor's anger was understandable. Less so was his refusal to make use of Murat's proven ability.

Perhaps the most indispensable of Napoleon's marshals was Berthier, sometimes called 'the Emperor's wife'. The Chief-of-Staff had been living in Saxony and he was prevented by the Allies from crossing into France. His subsequent fatal plunge from a window has been called suicide but was almost certainly murder.

Napoleon had lost his right arm. For twenty years the Emperor had relied on Berthier to translate his stream of consciousness into clear orders. There was no staff system to soften the blow. Napoleon had always centralised, relying on his own inexhaustible brilliance and Berthier's attention to detail.

To replace Berthier Napoleon chose Soult. Soult was one of Napoleon's most capable field commanders. In 1814 he had skilfully defended southern France from the advancing British Army. But Soult was also Louis XVIII's Minister of War. Before the return of the Emperor Soult had helped to crush a group

Blücher
The only man in Europe who was not afraid of Napoleon. Consequently the only man ever to beat Napoleon more than once (he did it three times)

of his fellow generals who had been plotting a coup. Among those condemned to death were d'Erlon, Reille and Vandamme, destined to be corps commanders in the upcoming campaign. When Napoleon landed Soult issued a proclamation declaring the Emperor a madman.

Despite the case against him Soult chose to offer his services once again to Napoleon. Under normal circumstances he would have been a perfect candidate for independent command. However, Soult could not be trusted. Napoleon decided to keep him close at hand and so offered Soult the job of Chief-of-Staff.

Many writers have suggested that Marshal Suchet would have been the best suited man for Berthier's job. One of the most intelligent of the marshalate, Suchet had been unique in his ability to suppress the Spanish guerrillas. Napoleon had said that if he had two Suchets he would have been able to hold Spain indefinitely.

The Position of the Three Armies Before Dawn on June 18th

Undoubtedly Suchet would have been a good choice as Chief-of -Staff but Napoleon was not blessed with unlimited numbers of capable generals. Suchet was given the important job of defending the Alps against the Austrians. He was supported by the old Marshal Brune who defended the Mediterranean coastline.

Without doubt the most capable of Napoleon's marshals was Davout. Earlier in his career the Emperor had treated Davout slightly churlishly. After the marshal's brilliant victory at Auerstädt Napoleon appears to have been suspicious of Davout. It was not simply the fact that he came closest to rivalling his master in talent but Davout was a man without apparent weaknesses. By 1815 Napoleon had come to realise that the Iron Marshal was also

absolutely loyal. Although he would have been invaluable on campaign Davout's ability and loyalty made him the obvious choice to control Paris behind the Emperor. The importance of this position, Davout was made Minister of War, has been played down by some writers but after the problems during previous campaigns, 1814 in particular, Napoleon was taking no chances with the loyalty of France behind him.

Marmont, Augereau and Victor may have been available but Napoleon stripped them of their titles as a punishment for their poor performance and disloyalty. Of the other marshals Macdonald, Oudinot and St-Cyr chose not to come forward and most of the rest were too old to do more than watch from the sidelines.

For the first time in years Napoleon would have to choose corps commanders who were not marshals. After all a marshal was simply a general who had been promoted. Seeing the elevation of Grouchy the men whom the Emperor chose to accompany him on campaign no doubt saw their own opportunity. Comte d'Erlon was given I Corps and Reille II. Both had faced Wellington in Spain, doing as well, or as badly, as any of the marshals. Vandamme commanded III Corps, Gérard IV Corps and Lobau VI. The cavalry was divided into four small corps collectively under Grouchy. Together with the Guard this force comprised the Armée du Nord, Napoleon's field army for the upcoming campaign.

WATERLOO - Map

Mont St Jean

Braine L'Alleud

Papelotte

Hougoumont

La Haye Sainte

La Belle Alliance

Plancenoit

Rossome

OPEN   WOODS   RIDGE

BUILDINGS   ROAD   FRONT LINE

The Game is Afoot

Rather than fighting a defensive campaign Napoleon chose to attack and destroy the right flank of the assembling Allied armies. In order to achieve this the bulk of the armies of France were deployed defensively, either in the border fortresses or in one of the several armies which would engage any force which broke through into France. A quarter of the men under arms, a quarter containing the Guard and the bulk of the veterans, made up Napoleon's field army. It was with this instrument, the Armée du Nord, that the Emperor would go to war.

The plan was classic Napoleon. The Armée du Nord would move rapidly across the Belgian border, separating the armies of Wellington and Blücher. While the two Allied armies were in close proximity their lines of communications snaked back in opposite directions. Blücher drew supplies from the east, whereas Wellington depended on the Belgian ports to the northwest. A defeat would push the Prussians away from Wellington. Above all the Emperor was anxious to knock Britain out of the land war and unlike Blücher the Iron Duke had no space to retreat.

With Wellington crushed and Blücher humbled Napoleon could move east in pursuit of the Prussians. This would place the Armée du Nord behind the right flank of the Austrians and Russians. At this point the remaining Allied armies would have to retreat or risk having their communications cut by Napoleon advancing south.

Napoleon hoped that, faced with the inevitability of a protracted war the British would be unprepared to once again become the paymasters of Europe. In the absence of British money he hoped the coalition would collapse, or at least come to favourable terms.

Napoleon's strategy was made possible by the deployment and command arrangements of the two Allied armies. Both the Anglo-Dutch and the Prussians were spread out across Belgium. Wellington suspected that Napoleon might make a pre-emptive strike and, like most commanders he imagined all the terrible things which the Corsican Ogre could do to destroy his command.

The worst case for the British would be if the French advanced along the coast, seizing the ports through which Wellington's supplies were arriving. While this would have had a devastating effect on the British it would hardly have troubled the Dutch or the Prussians. It would also have forced Wellington back on his allies, the reverse of the circumstance which Napoleon usually strove for.

Wellington also feared an attack through Maubeuge and Mons to Brussels. This was a possibility as it would attack into the guts of the scattered Anglo-Dutch Army. Wellington would be forced to concentrate well to the west of Blücher. However, the Emperor no doubt expected the impetuous Prussian to be quicker in coming to the aid of Wellington than the reverse.

And so the attack was planned to fall on the outposts of Ziethen's I Prussian Corps at Charleroi. The left wing would move up the Brussels road, occupying the crossroads of Quatre Bras and severing the main link between the two Allied armies.

If the Prussians retreated the French right wing would follow them, while if they concentrated forward Napoleon would personally intervene with his reserve to smash Blücher's Army. Whether the Prussians gave battle or not the Emperor would soon be free to turn on Wellington with his full force.

The disposition of the Allies was such that Napoleon's strategy had every chance of success. It was not that Wellington and Blücher had not seen the possibility of Napoleon coming between them.

A plan existed should the French attack the junction of the two armies. Wellington would concentrate around Gosselies, between Charleroi and Quatre Bras on the Brussels road, and Blücher would concentrate on Fleurus on the other main road running north out of Charleroi.

Both sides evidently underestimated the speed at which the other could move. Napoleon estimated that it would take six days for the Allied armies to concentrate.

As is evident from their planned areas of concentration it appears that Wellington and Blücher were expecting to receive warning of a French attack. They imagined they would catch Napoleon with his army astride the River Sambre.

Napoleon was too wily a campaigner to make his concentration obvious. Playing to Wellington's fears of an advance along the coast the garrisons near Lille demonstrated and gave the impression of a strong force concentrating.

Wellington had no idea what was occurring beyond the French border because no cavalry patrols were being sent into France. War had been declared on Napoleon, not on France, so it was deemed important not to violate the border. French patrols which were captured were escorted back to France.

Even at this late stage the Allied commanders thought that the likelihood of an attack was remote. On June 12th Gneisenau wrote 'The danger of an attack has almost vanished'.

Believing that they, rather than Napoleon would be the attackers Wellington and Blücher refused to blow the bridges over the River Sambre.

More significantly Wellington changed the numerical designations of his divisions to bring them back into line with his Peninsula War usage. Some degree of confusion was inevitable and surely such a reorganisation would not have been made if Wellington had thought that the start of the campaign was imminent.

Some hint of Napoleon's preparations inevitably reached the Allies and many junior commanders increased the readiness of their men.

Among these commanders was General Rebecque, the Prince of Orange's chief-of-staff and Perponcher, commanding the second Dutch-Belgian Division. Perponcher's position, astride

the Charleroi-Brussels road at Quatre-Bras was to prove critical.

The Emperor left Paris in secrecy during the night of June 11-12. As he passed through Laon he discovered that Grouchy had not been ordered to move up to the front. Soult had made his first mistake. Luckily for the French Grouchy showed extreme energy in moving his reserve cavalry into position by the night of June 14th. At this time the entire Armée du Nord was ready to move.

On the left were the two corps of Reille and d'Erlon. They were to be commanded by Marshal Ney. The Prince of Moskowa had been at his home in the country when he received a message from the Emperor requesting his presence for the opening battles of the campaign.

Ney rushed to the front where he was received cordially by Napoleon. The Emperor, however, did not confide his plans to Ney, evidently the trust between the two men had not been entirely restored. The day before the campaign was due to open Ney had no idea of his role. This ignorance was to have serious consequences.

In the months prior to the Waterloo campaign Wellington's intelligence chief Colonel Grant had been inside France working with French royalists. He had been ordered not to send any message unless an attack was imminent. Now that Napoleon was poised to strike, Grant sent one of his agents across the border.

The agent encountered Major-General Dornberg, the Hanoverian cavalry commander who had been in French service until as late as 1813. Grant's man gave the positions of the French corps as well as that of the Emperor himself. Rather than passing the message on verbatim Dornberg wrote a rather selective letter to Wellington. He omitted the vital element that his informant came from Colonel Grant.

The Prussians had taken more notice of their intelligence than the Anglo-Dutch. Ziethen was concentrating his I Corps around Fleurus and Gneisenau had is-

sued orders for the remaining three corps to converge on Ziethen. Before the first Frenchman had crossed the border the Prussians at least were already concentrating.

This information was being sent to Wellington, as tradition has it by the fattest man in the Prussian Army. If the Iron Duke could concentrate rapidly then Napoleon's chances of catching the Allies unawares would be very slim indeed.

Humbugged!

The first Frenchman of the Armée du Nord crossed the frontier at 3.30 AM on June 15th. Already things were beginning to go wrong. Whereas Berthier had always sent multiple messengers Soult only sent one to each of the corps commanders. Furthermore Berthier's complicated systems of verifying the receipt of an order had disappeared.

It was no surprise that when the messenger to Vandamme broke his leg confusion followed. The commander of III Corps was unaware that a message had even been sent and Soult assumed that it had been received. As a result Vandamme remained in place. Lobau's VI Corps was prevented from moving further forward as they ran into the rear of III Corps.

On the French right Gérard's IV Corps had started but had come to an abrupt halt. Before the campaign opened Marshal Davout had urged the removal of the Comte de Bourmont from command of a division on the grounds of his Bourbon sympathies. However, on the recommendation of Gérard, Bourmont had been allowed to stay.

On June 15th, IV Corps was spearheaded by Bourmont's 14th Division. Once across the border the general and his entire staff rode ahead of the division to reconnoitre. He never returned.

Several hours later de Bourmont rode into Prussian lines and was taken to see Blücher. While Gneisenau was happy to receive information on the French advance Blücher could not conceal his disgust at a traitor. Referring to de

Marshal Ney
The bravest of the brave, but was he the smartest of the smart?

Bourmont's white Bourbon cockade he shouted "Cockade be damned! A dirty dog is always a dirty dog!".

Regardless of Blücher's views the Prussians had received vital intelligence. The concentration was hastened, with all corps except Ziethen's, the corps in the path of the French army, moving towards Sombreffe.

The consequence of Bourmont's defection to the French was to create anger amongst the rank and file of the Armée du Nord. Gérard was forced to spend a considerable part of the day calming the men of 14th Division.

At around 5AM the first skirmishing began. Ziethen had chosen to leave his outposts unsupported in an attempt to gain time for his withdrawal. The Prussian commander had the delicate task of retreating before a superior enemy.

When he received the information from de Bourmont it became clear that Napoleon's attack was concentrating on the area occupied by a single brigade. Ziethen ordered the brigade commander, Pirch II to defend a series of positions before joining the main I Corps defensive line at Fleurus. Charleroi was held till 11AM when

WATERLOO - Brigades

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Maitland	Byng	MacDonnel	C.Halkett	Ompteda	Kielsmanse	Bylandt	Kruse	Bernard	Ditmers	D'Aubreme
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Mai	Byn	Mac	C.H	Omp	Kie	Byl	Kru	Ber	Dit	D'A
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	9,10	8,11	8,13	10,10	12,9	11,9	15,9	10,9	18,9	3,9	2,10
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	3	4	4
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	23	24	20	26	25	31	31	31	31	31	31
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	0	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	0	3	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	6	4	5	4	3	3	3	3	3
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	7	7	7	5	6	5	3	3	3	3	3
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	3	4	4	6	5	3	5	6	6
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Adam	Du Plat	W.Halkett	Mitchell	Kempt	Pack	Vincke	Lambert	Best	Rauschen'	Buttlar
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Ada	Du	W.H	Mit	Kem	Pac	Vin	Lam	Bes	Rau	But
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	7,9	7,10	8,8	6,12	14,9	17,7	19,7	15,5	18,8	9,8	9,7
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
DIVISION	0-39	5	5	5	0	6	6	6	7	7	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	29	18	28	21	28	25	28	29	29	7	30
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	5	4	5	5	3	5	4	4	3
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	6	3	5	5	5	3	5	3	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	4
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Specht	Somerset	Ponsonby	Dornberg	Vandeleur	Grant	Vivian	Arentschi	Trip	De Ghigny	Merlen
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Spe	Som	Pon	Dor	Van	Gra	Viv	Are	Tri	DGh	Mer
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	8,7	12,8	14,8	9,9	21,5	8,10	22,5	11,8	11,6	14,6	10,7
CORPS	0-15	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
DIVISION	0-39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0
TROOP STREN.	0-31	23	14	14	15	14	15	15	10	14	13	11
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	3	3	0
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	3	3	1	3	4	3	3	2	2	3	2
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	6	6	5	5	4	4	5	3	3	3
REGIMENTS	0-7	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

Brigades (Cont.)

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Papellott	KGL	Reserve	1HA	2HA	3HA	1Art	1/Steinme	2/Steinme	3/Steinme	1/Von Pir
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Pap	KGL	Res	1HA	2HA	3HA	1A	1/S	2/S	3/S	1/P
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	20,10	13,10	13,5	11,7	12,7	14,7	13,7	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	10
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	15	16
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4
SMALL ARMS	0-31	4	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	6	10	12	3	3	3	3	31	31	30	31
MOVEMENT	0-15	0	0	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	0	0	0	7	7	7	9	3	2	0	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	6	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	2/Von Pir	3/Von Pir	1/Von Jag	2/Von Jag	3/Von Jag	1/Von Hen	2/Von Hen	Treskow	Lutzow	1/Von Ts	2/Von Ts
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	2/P	3/P	1/J	2/J	3/J	1/H	2/H	Tre	Lut	1/T	2/T
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,3	26,12	26,12
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	10	10	11	11	11	12	12	13	13	14	14
ARRIVAL	0-95	16	16	17	17	17	17	17	14	14	17	17
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	6
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	31	21	31	31	13	31	22	9	14	31	31
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	2	0	3	2	0	3	0	3	3	3	2
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	3/Von Ts	1/Von Kra	2/Von Kra	3/Von Kra	1/Von Bra	2/Von Bra	3/Von Bra	1/Von Lan	2/Von Lan	3/Von Lan	Thumen
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	3/T	1/K	2/K	3/K	1/B	2/B	3/B	1/L	2/L	3/L	Thu
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12	26,12
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	14	15	15	15	16	16	16	17	17	17	18
ARRIVAL	0-95	17	17	17	17	18	18	18	18	18	18	16
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	6	6	6	6
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
ARTILLERY	0-31	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	13	31	31	9	31	31	6	31	31	7	17
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Schul'ber	Sohr	1/Von Hac	2/Von Hac	3/Von Hac	1/Von Rys	2/Von Rys	3/Von Rys	1/Von Los	2/Von Los	1/Von Hil
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Sch	Soh	1/H	2/H	3/H	1/R	2/R	3/R	1/L	2/L	1/H
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	26,12	26,12	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	18	18	19	19	19	20	20	20	21	21	22
ARRIVAL	0-95	16	16	12	12	12	12	12	12	11	11	11
UNIT TYPE	0-3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	6	6	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
SMALL ARMS	0-31	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	12	22	31	31	8	31	31	14	31	31	31
MOVEMENT	0-15	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	3	3	2	0	3	2	0	3	2	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	2/Von Hil	Sydow	Schwerin	Watzdorf	Friant	Roguet	Morand	Michel	Duhesme	Barrois	Lefebvre
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	2/H	Syd	Sch	Wat	Fri	Rog	Mor	Mic	Duh	Bar	Lef
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	26,18	26,18	26,18	26,18	13,19	15,19	13,20	15,20	13,21	15,21	19,17
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
DIVISION	0-39	22	23	23	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	11	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	31	10	16	11	26	19	27	24	23	19	23
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	7	6	7	6	6	7	7
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Guyot	Quiot	Bourgeois	Schmitz	Aulard	Noguez	Grenier	Pegot	Brue	Bruno	Gobrechet
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Guy	Qui	Bou	Sch	Aul	Nog	Gre	Peg	Bru	Bru	Gob
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	9,19	17,13	17,14	15,14	16,14	18,13	18,14	19,12	19,13	21,12	22,13
CORPS	0-15	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	0	24	24	25	25	26	26	27	27	28	28
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	2
ARTILLERY	0-31	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	19	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	16	18
MOVEMENT	0-15	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Husson	Campi	Baudouin	Soye	Gauthier	Jamin	Pire	Domon	Simmer	Jeanin	Subervie
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Hus	Cam	Bau	Soy	Gau	Jam	Pir	Dom	Sim	Jea	Sub
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	12,16	13,15	5,16	6,16	8,16	7,15	4,16	15,17	13,17	13,18	16,18
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	12	12	0
DIVISION	0-39	29	29	30	30	31	31	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	3
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	26	26	26	26	26	26	19	11	20	20	14
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3	0	0	3
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	L'Heriter	D'Hurbal	St Alph	Delort	7th Huss'	Teste	Noury	G.Bat.1	G.Bat.2	G.Bat.3	G.Bat.4
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	L'H	D'H	StA	Del	7th	Tes	Nou	GB1	GB2	GB3	GB4
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	9,18	7,18	19,15	17,16	23,13	12,17	12,18	15,13	16,13	17,12	18,12
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	12	12	0	12	12	0
DIVISION	0-39	32	32	33	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	3	3	3	3
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
ARTILLERY	0-31	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	18	18	14	15	6	20	3	3	3	3	3
MOVEMENT	0-15	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	3	3	3	2	0	15	11	11	11	11
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	6
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

Napoleon personally directed an attack on the barricaded bridge.

Once the cavalry was across the Sambre they raced ahead, trying to find a gap in the Prussian lines which they could exploit. Against orders General Steinmetz withdrew his 1st Brigade north along the Brussels road rather than keeping contact with Pirch II. This had two effects. Firstly it saved the Corps from being enveloped around its right flank. Secondly it slowed the French advance towards Quatre Bras and Brussels, giving Wellington time to react.

It was 3 PM before the first Prussian messenger arrived in Brussels. That the French were attacking in force was sure, but Wellington still believed that the attack on Charleroi may have been a feint. At 5PM the Prince of Orange arrived to announce that he had heard gunfire from the direction of the Prussians. More news of the attack was also received from Ziethen at this time. The Duke was still unsure where the main force of the attack would fall but sent orders to all units to prepare to move. Napoleon's deceptions had worked. Even after hearing of the French attack the Anglo-Dutch Army remained stationary.

By 4.30PM Reille's entire II Corps was across the Sambre and d'Erlon had begun to move. Despite the Emperor's intentions Marshal Ney had not yet arrived to take command of the left wing. After his arrival at Army headquarters Ney had dispatched his carriage. Lack of communication between him and the Emperor resulted in the marshal being left in Avesnes without any horses. Ney was forced to commandeer a peasant cart and did not manage to obtain a horse until he encountered Marshal Mortier who was suffering from (possibly politically induced) sciatica and was unable to ride with Napoleon.

At some point in the afternoon of June 15th, Ney rode into Charleroi and was

WATERLOO - Corps

CORPS NUM.	1-39	1	2	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
CORPS I.D.	[9]	Orange	Hill	Brunswick	Uxbridge	V'Zieten	Von Pirch	Von Bulow	Guard	D'Erlon	Reille	Lobau
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	10,8	6,10	7,6	16,7	26,3	26,12	26,18	14,20	18,15	9,17	14,18
TYPE	0-1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	14	16	11	0	0	0	0
ORDER	0-2	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	1
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	3	10	0	0	4	6	8	0	4	0	7
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	0	0	0	0	2	3	13	0	2	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-15	6	7	6	8	8	6	8	8	8	7	7
DAILY COMM.	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	3	4	4	3	5	4	5	5	5	4	4
STAFF	0-7	4	5	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	5
STRENGTH	0-7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

greeted by the Emperor with the news that he was to advance to the cross-roads of Quatre Bras, there to receive further orders. The Guard light cavalry division of Lefebvre-Desnouëttes was attached to Ney for the operation. Riding with the Guard cavalry towards Reille's Corps Ney dispatched riders to inform his new subordinates of the change in command and to gauge the situation.

The situation was that Steinmetz's 1st Prussian Brigade was in position blocking the Brussels Road at Gosselies. The first French cavalry to encounter the Prussians were repelled but more men came up and drove the Prussians out of the town. In a skilful rearguard action Steinmetz withdrew away from the Brussels road in the direction of Fleurus.

On the direct road from Charleroi to Fleurus Pirch II was defending the town of Gilly with around 7 500 men. Just as Napoleon had given command of the left to Ney he now gave Grouchy the right.

It soon became clear, however, that the last of the Marshals needed closer supervision than Le Rougeaud. The Emperor advised Grouchy to launch one of Vandamme's infantry divisions in a frontal assault while Exelman's dragoons turned the Prussian flank. Just as Ney had been ordered to take Quatre Bras, Grouchy was now ordered to capture Sombreffe on the same east-west road.

Grouchy's inaction over the next two hours should have alerted Napoleon to the fact that he had promoted the cavalry general beyond his level of competence. When Napoleon returned from the rear Grouchy was arguing with Vandamme over the correct method of attack. The Emperor at once took command and sent three columns forward under cover of a massive cannonade.

The Prussian rearguard retired with heavy casualties.

Napoleon released the dragoons of the Guard in pursuit and two Prussian battalions were ridden down. The remainder of Pirch II's Brigade fled in the direction of Fleurus. The commitment by Ziethen of all his remaining cavalry forced the French to break off the pursuit. By the time Vandamme's infantry came up they were exhausted and a decision was made against further action.

After the defection of de Bourmont, IV Corps had resumed its advance. However, the delay prevented Gérard from placing any pressure on the left flank of the retreating Prussians. By the evening of June 15th IV Corps had still not been in action and only one of its divisions was on the north bank of the Sambre.

Marshal Ney was now in charge of the left wing. While he came to terms with the situation he halted the bulk of Reille's II Corps. One division under Girard pursued Steinmetz to the east while Bachelu's division continued up the Brussels road. The divisions of Foy and Jérôme were halted at Gosselies as they came up.

The vanguard of the left wing was the light cavalry of the Guard. They advanced to Frasnes, two miles south of Quatre Bras where they were fired on by enemy cannon. This was a Dutch horse artillery battery which was supported by a battalion of Nassauers. The French lancers were checked and by the time Bachelu's infantry arrived night was falling. Seeing a strong force

WATERLOO - Armies

SIDE	N/S	SOUTH	NORTH
COMMANDER	[9]	Wellington	Napoleon
SECOND I.C.	[9]	Blucher	Ney
ARMY I.D.	[11]	Allied	Armee Du
	[11]	Armies	Nord
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	13,6	14,21
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0
OFF. OBJ. #1	0-23	0	3
OFF. OBJ. #2	0-23	0	1
DEF. OBJ. #1	0-23	3	0
DEF. OBJ. #2	0-23	1	0
MOVEMENT	0-15	8	8
STAFF	0-7	6	6
STRENGTH	0-7	2	2
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	7

WATERLOO - Divisions

DIV. NUMBER	1-39	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
DIVISION I.D.	[9]	Cooke	Alten	Perponche	Chasse	Clinton	Picton	Cole	Dutch	Steinmetz	Pirch II	Von Jagow
CORPS	0-15	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	5	6	6	6
TYPE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ORDERS	0-2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	10	14	3	11	14	15	4	0	4	4	4
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	5	3	3	5	5	5	3	5	5	4
STAFF	0-7	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	5

DIV. NUMBER	1-39	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
DIVISION I.D.	[9]	Von Henke	Von Roder	Von T'Sk'	Von Kraff	Von Braus	Von Lange	Von Jurg'	Von Hacke	Von Rysse	Von Losth	Von Hille
CORPS	0-15	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8
TYPE	0-1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
ORDERS	0-2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	8	8	8	8
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	2	3	3	7	14	2	3	10	11	3	10
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
STAFF	0-7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

DIV. NUMBER	1-39	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
DIVISION I.D.	[9]	William	Quiot	Donzelot	Marcognet	Durutte	Jacquinot	Bachelu	Jerome	Foy	Kellerman	Milhaud
CORPS	0-15	8	10	10	10	10	10	11	11	11	0	0
TYPE	0-1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
ORDERS	0-2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	8	15	3	15	4	5	0	10	0	8	5
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	13	2	2	2	2	15	0	0	0	9	2
LEADERSHIP	0-7	3	5	5	5	5	6	5	4	5	6	5
STAFF	0-7	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5

of French infantry advancing the Nassauers retreated to Quatre Bras. It was too late for a pursuit.

Meanwhile the Duke of Wellington had ordered that I Corps, including those units at Quatre Bras should concentrate on Nivelles, seven or eight miles to the west.

The commander at Quatre Bras was Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Upon hearing shots from Frasnes the Prince deployed his men at the crossroads and in the failing light had them fire rapidly on the advancing French. This gave an impression of a larger number of men than were actually present.

Ney reconnoitred the position himself and was apparently unsure as to the size of the Allied force in front of him. Both sides settled down for the night.

Bernhard reported to Perponcher, his divisional commander and Perponcher went to General Rebecque the chief-of-staff. Rebecque took it upon himself to redirect the remainder of Perponcher's Division to Quatre Bras and duly informed the Prince of Orange of the

decision. Orange, who was at the Duchess of Richmond's ball, informed Wellington of the situation. The Duke ordered Orange back to his headquarters and called for a map. As the Duke examined the map he succinctly summed up the events of the day; "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God! he has gained 24 hours' march on me."

Ligny and Quatre Bras

Even with the reality of the French in front of Quatre Bras Wellington was reluctant to fully commit his army to concentrate on the crossroads. The Reserve Corps was ordered from Brussels to Mont-St-Jean from where it could move south or west as circumstances dictated.

The event which finally goaded the Duke into irreconcilable action was the arrival in Brussels of General Dornberg. After constant reminders that he was to inform Wellington the moment a message from Colonel Grant arrived, Dornberg realised that he had made a

mistake. He had neglected to tell his commander that the message received the previous day had been from one of the intelligence chief's agents. The effect of this information on Wellington was instantaneous. He gave orders for the entire army to concentrate on Quatre Bras.

It had taken nearly a day for Wellington to act decisively. To make matters worse his delay made Blücher's risky decision to concentrate forward seem almost suicidal. Napoleon's calculations had been correct. Blücher was reacting impetuously and was putting his army in danger while Wellington's circumspection had given the French a great opportunity to exploit the Prussian decision.

The Emperor could scarcely believe that the Prussians would offer themselves up to him. The first orders issued by Napoleon on the morning of June 16th suggest that he expected Blücher to retire from his exposed position around the towns of Ligny and St Amand. He would then press forward

WATERLOO - Objectives

OBJ. NUMBER	1-23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
OBJ. NAME	[11]	Mont St J'n	M.S.J. Farm	La Haye St.	Papellotte	Ter La Haye	Frisch'mont	La Belle Al	Rossomme
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	12,4	13,6	13,10	20,10	22,11	24,12	14,16	14,21
START (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (N)	1-95	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	10	5	5	3	1	1	0	0
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	50	50	25	15	15	15	5	5
MANEUVER (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
START (S)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (S)	1-95	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	1	1	5	3	2	3	5	10
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	5	5	25	15	10	15	25	50
MANEUVER (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OBJ. NUMBER	1-23	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
OBJ. NAME	[11]	Plancenoit	Hougoumont	Braine L'al	To Brussels	To Paris	Ridge 1	Ridge 2	Ridge 3
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	19,20	8,13	2,9	11,0	14,26	10,10	15,9	6,5
START (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (N)	1-95	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	1	5	3	10	0	3	3	3
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	5	25	15	50	5	15	15	15
MANEUVER (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
START (S)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (S)	1-95	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	5	3	1	0	20	2	2	2
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	25	15	5	5	50	15	15	10
MANEUVER (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

up the Brussels road either driving Wellington into headlong retreat or bringing him to battle before turning to finish the Prussians.

The Emperor placed a greater than normal emphasis on the capture of a geographical objective, Brussels, both because of its political importance and the probability that its capture would force Wellington into an uneven battle to re-establish his lines of communications.

As always, however, Napoleon was willing to allow his actions to be dictated by circumstance. Corps which had spent the night of June 15th spread out along various roads were concentrated forward while the forces in front of each wing where reconnoitred.

The Anglo-Allied force was still quite weak when Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras sometime around 10AM.

Something over 7,000 men and 16 guns were facing the 20,000 men of Reille's Corps. Already the defenders were under pressure. In the absence of clear orders to attack, Ney had nevertheless sent out several waves of skirmishers which took a steady toll of the Dutch defenders. Still there was no immediate danger so Wellington rode the eight miles or so to the Prussian positions at Ligny.

Throughout the morning both Napoleon and Blücher had received reinforcements. With Vandamme and Gérard's Corps, Pajol and Exelmans' cavalry Corps and the knockout punch of the Guard the French were in position to bring on a fight. On the Prussian side Ziethen's I Corps had been reinforced by the II and III Corps under Pirch and Thielemann respectively.

Blücher chose to deploy along the Ligny brook a significant obstacle but pass-

able to infantry and cavalry. The strong points of the Prussian line were a series of towns and hamlets along the brook. These were heavily defended. The line was seven miles long, quite considerable given that it was defended by only 84,000 men. The military doctrine of the period called for each mile of front to be held by 20,000 men.

At approximately 1PM Wellington rode up to converse with Blücher and Gneisenau. "At this moment" wrote Ziethen's chief-of-staff, "we noticed in the distance a party of the enemy, and Napoleon was clearly distinguishable in the group. Perhaps the eyes of the three greatest military commanders of the age were directed on one another."

Wellington had grave misgivings about the Prussian deployment on the forward slope. He said so. "Everybody knows their own army best; but if I were to fight here, I should expect to be

beat." Gneisenau replied, "My men like to see their enemy". Clearly the Prussians did not appreciate the advantages of the reverse slope against Napoleonic tactics.

Writing later Wellington stated of the Prussians that, "The marshy banks of the stream made it out of their power to cross and attack the French, while the latter on the other hand, though they could not attack them, had it in their power to cannonade them and shatter them to pieces, after which they might fall upon them by the bridges at the villages."

The Prussians were anxious to receive support from the Duke who took care not to commit himself unconditionally. "Well I will come" he stated, "provided I am not attacked myself". It was a statement which, despite being clear, left far too great a level of uncertainty given the enormity of the stakes.

Back at Quatre Bras Ney was in a quandary. He had been ordered to capture Quatre Bras and hold it with six of his seven remaining infantry divisions (Girard's Division of Reille's Corps had been seconded by the Emperor for use at Ligny) and throw the seventh division up the Brussels road to Genappe.

The problem was that until d'Erlon arrived, Marshal Ney had only the three remaining divisions of Reille's Corps. While he could take the crossroads with the forces available it would be a different matter to hold them against, presumably the entire Anglo-Allied Army.

The last thing that Ney wanted to do was to risk his command when Napoleon would be entirely committed elsewhere.

It was not therefore until d'Erlon was within supporting distance of Reille that Ney ordered II Corps forward. No doubt the Prince of Moskowa later regretted his dilatoriness. But then everyone including Wellington assumed that the bulk of the Allied Army would reach the battlefield well before it actually did.

When Ney finally gave his orders they were sound. Reille was to capture the crossroads with his three divisions. D'Erlon was to hold three divisions in reserve at Frasnes while the fourth was to move to the town of Marbais behind the inside flank of both Allied armies. At 2PM as the Duke of Wellington was riding back from the Prussian positions he heard the first cannonade against his tiny force.

It is unlikely that any of the French commanders at Quatre Bras expected the Anglo-Allied Army to take as long as it did to concentrate. Reille argued with Ney when the Marshal wanted to attack before the entire Corps was present.

The II Corps commander suggested that the English might be deployed behind visual obstacles and might appear at the moment of apparent French victory as they had done repeatedly in the Peninsula. Wellington's tactics in Spain had made him a bogeyman to all

except the Emperor. Napoleon's Marshals and generals were seeing concealed masses of men even in the most unlikely of places.

Ney had originally intended to attack the Bois de Bossu on the Allied right but Reille had placed a seed of doubt in his mind. The Marshal now ordered the attack to concentrate on Wellington's left around the farm of Piraumont and the town of Thyle.

Capture of Thyle would cut the Nivelles-Namur road, the main link between the Anglo-Allied and Prussian Armies. As the supporting force, Ney was correctly acting to place himself between the two enemy armies and to force them further apart.

The French ended up attacking in echelon. The first assault was by Bachelu's Division on the right and resulted in the capture of Piraumont Farm. Then Foy advanced in the centre pressing the Dutch back to the farm of Gemioncourt. Foy's second brigade advanced on Pierrepont but received accurate artillery fire, causing heavy casualties before counter battery fire silenced most of the Dutch guns. The French then drove in the skirmishers defending the farm and advanced into the Bossu Wood.

The Dutch had fought stoughtly but were outnumbered along the line. Reserve battalions were thrown in to stabilise the situation until only two remained. As Bachelu and Foy regrouped their successful units Jerome came up

WATERLOO - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN #	0-31	0	1	2	3	4	5
TERRAIN NAME	[11]	-	-	Woods	Ridge	Buildings	Open
SIGHTING VAL.	0-7	0	0	4	4	2	0
MOVEMENT	0-7	0	0	2	1	1	1
COVER VALUE	0-7	0	0	3	2	6	0
FORT VAL. (N)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0
FORT VAL. (S)	0-7	0	0	0	2	2	0

WATERLOO - Small Arms

SMALL ARMS #	1-31	1	2	3	4
SM. ARMS I.D.	[11]	Musket	Sabre	Lance	Rifle
RANGE	0-1	1	0	0	1
FIRE VALUE	0-7	2	0	0	4
MELEE VALUE	0-7	5	6	7	5

WATERLOO - Artillery

ARTILLERY #	1-31	1	2
ARTILLERY I.D.	[11]	12lb	6lb
RANGE	0-5	5	3
RATE OF FIRE	0-7	3	4
EFFECT'NESS	0-7	5	3
PENETRATION	0-7	2	1

on the left with his entire division, as many men as the Dutch had started the battle with. The French skirmishers moved out again to maintain the pressure while a second attack was prepared. It was 2.45PM and the battle had been raging for under an hour. At this rate Wellington's tiny force would be brushed aside in a matter of minutes.

At 3PM Wellington rode up to Quatre Bras. He was appalled to discover that no reinforcements had arrived in his absence. The entire Anglo-Allied Army was on the move but confusion was king. Whole battalions and regiments became lost and intermixed as the army moved in an almost cohesionless mass towards the battlefield. Many officers had no idea where they were headed and simply followed the next man. It would be many hours before the Duke would be able to rely on the bulk of his army.

The first reinforcements did arrive a little after Wellington's return to the battlefield. Merlen's Dutch light cavalry brigade had covered a prodigious distance but had the good fortune to have had a road to themselves. Some minutes later the first battalion of the 95th rifles appeared on the Brussels road. They were able to report that the rest of Picton's Division were some distance behind them. Two brigades of British infantry. If Wellington could

hold the line until they arrived he might yet save the day.

The 95th were immediately launched against Piraumont in a spoiling attack. While there was no way that the attack could be expected to succeed it threw the French off balance for a few minutes, vital minutes. Battalion by battalion the men of Picton's Division marched straight into line on the Allied left.

In the centre Foy had renewed his attack on Gemioncourt. This was now the weakest portion of Wellington's line. It should have broken but the Prince of Orange personally led a series of counterattacks which halted the French. The cost of these attacks was heavy on both sides; eventually the Dutch defenders crumpled under sheer weight of numbers.

Merlen's cavalry brigade had been mauled by Piré's lancers and as they fled for the safety of the British infantry they were mistaken, in their blue and green uniforms, for Frenchmen.

The 42nd and 92nd Highland Regiments delivered a volley which shattered the already routing Dutch. Orange had committed his last reserve and now it had been destroyed. Faced with unshaken infantry Piré withdrew to the cover of Foy's infantry who, in the meantime had occupied Gemioncourt.

The Duke of Brunswick was the next Allied commander to bring his men onto the field. They were committed at once to the centre and right. Perponcher's 2nd Dutch-Belgian Division was shattered but like the legen-

dary Hydra two more had come to take its place.

The only Dutch still fighting were the men of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar's Brigade who were defending the Bois de Bossu. They had been pushed steadily back by Prince Jérôme's Division but the shelter of the wood had saved them from destruction. With the fall of Gemioncourt Saxe-Weimar's left flank was in the air. Wellington therefore decided upon a general advance in order to form a continuous line.

In the centre the Duke of Brunswick was able to advance without opposition. On the Allied left, however, it was another story. Picton's Division was initially successful, routing Bachelu's Division with a close range volley followed by a bayonet charge. The British success was short lived, however, as their advance had brought them into close range of the French guns.

In order to give Bachelu time to regroup Piré's lancers advanced and a battery of horse artillery was unlimbered within 200 yards of the British. When the lancers charged the British right they were first thought to be a Brunswick regiment attacking the flank of Bachelu's retreating infantry. When the first cheering skirmishers began to be skewered the truth became clear.

The 42nd Highlanders formed a loose rally square and the commander of the 44th Regiment ordered his rear rank to about face in the best tradition of Frederick the Great's infantry. Once the cavalry had been fought off, Wellington ordered Picton to retire to the positions which they had held before the attack.

Although the initial advance of the Brunswickers in the centre had been without opposition an incident now occurred which changed the entire complexion of the Allied centre. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar's Brigade was running out of ammunition and consequently requested relief. Wellington rallied the remains of the other Netherlands units and together with the Brunswick Jägers they moved into the Bois de Bossu to relieve Saxe-Weimar.

The replacement gave the French an opportunity to advance a considerable distance further into the wood. Prince Jérôme was able to deploy skirmishers at the edge of the wood to fire into the flank of the Brunswickers. At the same time Ney shifted the bulk of his artillery from Picton onto Brunswick. In an attempt to sweep away the French on his right Brunswick led a cavalry charge which resulted in him being mortally wounded by a musket ball in the stomach.

The immediate effect of Brunswick's wound was to create a visible confusion among his division. Observing this Foy launched an attack which threw the Brunswickers back in disarray.

As Wellington prepared to launch his cavalry in a counterattack he was surprised by Piré's lancers. The Allied cavalry scattered and the Duke narrowly avoided capture by jumping his horse into the square of the 92nd Highlanders. Although a Hanoverian battalion was cut to pieces the rest of the infantry formed square. The Allied cavalry was once again mauled but the French were forced to withdraw.

Ney had again failed to break the Allied line. With the Allied infantry strength now approximately as great as his own Ney could not realistically hope for victory unless he committed the men of d'Erlon's Corps. More significantly with Wellington receiving reinforcements at a steady rate there would soon be a distinct chance that Ney could be beaten and beaten badly.

Any discussion of d'Erlon's Corps and the reasons why it did not appear on either battlefield that day must lead us to Napoleon and his battle with the Prussians deployed around the town of Ligny.

Gérard's Corps reached Fleurus at approximately 1PM on June 16th. All the French forces were now arrayed for battle. Facing them were three Prussian corps, 84,000 men in all. The main defensive line including Ligny and St Amand was held by Ziethen's I Corps. Although mauled on the 15th, I Corps was still a formidable fighting force.

On Ziethen's left was Thielemann with his III Corps. II Corps under Pirch formed the reserve and was positioned along the Namur road to the rear of Ziethen.

Napoleon's plan was to contain the Prussian left; which he did with the cavalry divisions of Pajol and Exelmans and Hulot's infantry division of IV Corps, while he probed the Prussian centre and right.

Once a weakness was discovered he would commit his reserves to exploit it while at the same time d'Erlon's Corps fell on the Prussian right. Broken frontally and enveloped on the right Blücher's army would collapse. The Emperor would then be free to turn his attentions on the hapless Duke of Wellington.

Grouchy opened the battle at 2.20PM with a demonstration against the Prussian left. Immediately following this Vandamme advanced against the twin towns of St Amand and St Amand la Haye on the Prussian right. Girard's Division of II Corps had been attached to Vandamme for the battle. In the centre Gérard attacked Ligny with two divisions in an attempt to draw in Prussian reserves.

Three battalions of von Jagow's Brigade were defending the town of St Amand. These were quickly overwhelmed by Lefol's Division who attacked in three columns.

General Steinmetz saw the possibility of a breakthrough and launched four battalions in a counterattack. As he did so he directed his artillery to shell the town even though some of Jagow's men were still in it. The Prussian guns were advanced to close range from where they poured canister into the town and a bayonet charge succeeded in recapturing it.

As Lefol's men recovered from their reverse, Berthezene's Division advanced against St Amand while Girard attacked St Amand la Haye. St Amand was captured by the French for the second time but Steinmetz again counterattacked and again threw the French out of the town. By now Steinmetz had

Grouchy
26th and last of Napoleon's Marshals.

lost 2,500 men from his division and he could not prevent Girard from taking St Amand la Haye. The fight now began to do what Napoleon had intended, that is to draw in the Prussian reserves. Ziethen ordered Pirch II to recapture St Amand la Haye and to ensure that Steinmetz held St Amand. The battle for the two villages continued for some time, the French ultimately gaining the upper hand, although Girard was mortally wounded.

At Ligny the Prussians had constructed barricades and were defending buildings and hedges. French losses assaulting these positions were extreme but the Prussians were compelled to commit more and more men to Ligny to prevent its capture. All the while the French batteries were "firing like hell". As the Prussian line thinned out, the critical moment of the battle was approaching. If d'Erlon's Corps appeared behind the Prussian right there would be few reserves with which to oppose him. The Prussian Army would be annihilated.

At 2PM a message was sent from Soult to Ney which indicated that the Emperor faced no more than a Prussian corps. Ney was to attack any force which may be blocking the Brussels

Gneisenau
The powerful Prussian Chief-of-Staff. Given the characters of Blücher and Gneisenau the Prussian system worked well

road and after driving it aside to 'turn in our direction, so as to bring about the envelopment of that body of the enemy's troops whom I have just mentioned to you...' Before Wellington's reinforcements began to arrive this was all very well. However, as the Anglo-Allied force continued to build up it became clear that there would be no mere 'driving aside' of Wellington's Army. If the first part of his orders could not be carried out then how could Ney expect to be able to move to support Napoleon?

The next message which reached Ney was despatched by Soult at 3.15PM. It was quite different both in content and tone. '...His Majesty desires me to tell you that you are to manoeuvre immediately in such a manner as to envelop the enemy's right and fall upon his rear; the army in our front is lost if you act with energy. The Fate of France is in your hands...'

Meanwhile the Emperor had decided to bypass Ney and order d'Erlon directly. General Bedoyère, the Imperial Aide-de-Campe was sent to fetch I Corps. When he arrived at Frasnes d'Erlon was at Quatre Bras with Marshal Ney. Bedoyère gave his orders to General Delcambre, d'Erlon's Chief-of-Staff. The orders were to '...Proceed immediately with all your forces to the heights of Ligny and fall on St Amand....'

Unwisely Delcambre set out himself to inform d'Erlon and passed the command of the corps to General de Salle, commander of the corps artillery. Delcambre showed de Salle the letter from the Emperor but it was evidently not copied out because de Salle made a terrible mistake.

Rather than marching to St Amand, de Salle had transposed the names of the two towns. He was moving to the heights of St Amand and was intending to fall on Ligny. Instead of appearing on the Prussian flank I Corps would arrive on the battlefield behind the French left.

Back at Quatre Bras Delcambre had found his commander alone. D'Erlon departed at once to take command of his corps and left his Chief-of-Staff to tell Ney what was happening. The Prince of Moskowa had just watched as Alten's British Division had marched onto the field. It could not be long before Wellington began his counter-attack and the Emperor had deprived him of over half his men.

Receiving the 3.15PM despatch from Soult at the same time as the news that d'Erlon was marching off to Ligny, Ney was flabbergasted. All his plans revolved around d'Erlon being present. He could not, he thought, hold the entire Anglo-Allied Army with three exhausted divisions.

Without d'Erlon Ney envisaged being driven aside himself and Wellington being able to detach men down the Namur road to Blücher. The only solution he could see was to recall d'Erlon's 20,000 men, smash Wellington aside and only then send reinforcements to Napoleon. Delcambre was duly sent after d'Erlon who was in turn riding after his Corps.

While the French subordinate commanders continued their comedy of errors Wellington was using his most recent reinforcements to good effect. Kielsmansegge's Hanoverian Brigade advanced from Thyle to Piraumont capturing the latter place from Bachelu. As Wellington was supervising this action the Prince of Orange ordered the regiments of Colin Halkett's Brigade into line. Ney saw his opportunity and released Kellerman's cuirassiers at the centre of the Allied line. The 30th and 33rd Regiments managed to form square but the 69th did not quite manage it. The cuirassiers burst into the partially formed square and cut it to pieces.

The 73rd Regiment also failed to form square but they largely escaped by the expedient of running into the woods. The 33rd Regiment was then blown apart by a battery of horse artillery leaving only a quarter of the brigade intact.

Wellington reacted quickly. He now had a reserve and two battalions were deployed in square in the path of the cuirassiers. A battery of horse artillery recently arrived was unlimbered behind a ditch so that Kellerman charged into point blank musketry and canister. The French general had his horse shot out from under him. The cuirassiers retired and another crisis was over.

At 6.30PM Cooke's Guards Division arrived on the battlefield along with the Brunswickers' artillery. Wellington had 36,000 men on the field, nearly twice as many as Ney. Even now, despite Ney's fears the Duke had no intention of sending men to Blücher's assistance. First he would throw Ney back down the Brussels road and secure some breathing space.

The Guards were committed to the fight in the Bois de Bossu and over the next two hours drove Jérôme's men steadily back. When the Guards emerged from the southern end of the wood they were cannonaded and attacked by cavalry. They withdrew to the edge of the wood.

The rest of Wellington's line advanced as the French slowly withdrew to avoid being outflanked by the Guards. By

9PM the light was beginning to disappear. Marshal Ney was retiring in good order. Wellington chose to allow the French to withdraw out of range and the two sides settled down for the night.

While the last act of the battle of Quatre Bras had been played out Napoleon was still fiercely engaged at Ligny. At 4PM the Emperor judged that it was time to finally break the Prussians. The artillery of the Guard was deployed in front of Ligny and the town was reduced to rubble.

Gérard captured the portion of the town on the near bank of Ligny Brook and then attempted to force the bridges. Meeting with initial success the French were then pushed back by a Prussian counterattack.

The fight in Ligny soon tailed off into a musketry duel across the brook. Casualties were high on both sides and the Prussian reserves continued to be drawn into the battle. Napoleon was loath to commit either Lobau's VI Corps or the Guard before d'Erlon arrived. But where was d'Erlon?

D'Erlon, as it turned out was approaching the rear of Vandamme's III Corps, hopelessly off course due to the blunder by De Salle. Seeing a large body of men where none should be Vandamme expected the worst. He withdrew Girard's Division from the fight and deployed it to meet an attack from this new force.

Napoleon assumed that this was probably d'Erlon but in case he was mistaken the Emperor sent Duhesme's Division of the Young Guard to reinforce Vandamme. Lobau was also notified to have his Corps ready to move against the threat.

Errors tend to compound, and so it was that Gneisenau, with reports of d'Erlon's Corps and observing the French deployment against a threat from their rear, assumed that the unknown body of men were British. Clearly the correct course of action was to attack the French left, crushing it between the two Allied forces. The remaining reserves were gathered together for the attack.

By the time the Prussians had decided to attack, Napoleon had received notification of the true identity of d'Erlon's Corps. It was not where he had planned and it would not take the Prussians by surprise but they would still have to find some way to combat 20,000 fresh men striking them in the flank. The remainder of the Guard was ordered to Ligny.

It was lucky for the French that Vandamme had elements of the Young Guard to stiffen his corps. If he had not then the Prussian counterattack would have swept him off the field. As it was, the entire French left was pushed back. The lancers of the Guard counterattacked and drove the Prussian cavalry off the field. The Prussian infantry, unsupported, ground to a halt.

It was time for Napoleon to release his masse de dècision, the Guard. Sixty cannon pounded the Prussian infantry on the far bank of Ligny Brook while two huge columns waited.

As the cannonade died down the guard came through the smoke. A sudden downpour prevented Prussian musketry taking full toll of the cumbersome formations but it would have made little difference. With ranks thinned and reserves committed elsewhere the Prussian lines were shattered. The Guard wheeled to the right and smashed into the flank of Thielemann's Corps while Gérard wheeled left into the rear of the Prussian right.

Both sides watched with amazement as d'Erlon's Corps marched off the battlefield but for the Prussians the disappearance of their supposed allies coincided with the collapse of their centre. Something had to be done to stem the rout and Blücher was the man to do it. Gneisenau had directed the battle for most of the day but this was the type of situation in which the old hussar excelled.

At the head of 32 squadrons Blücher thundered into the Guard. It was a slaughter. The slow moving squares were impervious to injury and Prussian cavalry were shot down in their

hundreds. To a calculating man like Gneisenau it was insanity, but Blücher's mad charge saved the Army. Units which had been on the verge of rout, rallied. Men had time to recover their wits and reform their ranks. By the time Blücher's cavalry had been beaten off, the Prussian Army was retiring in a semblance of order. Napoleon had won the battle but he had not destroyed his opponent.

The main reason for the survival of the Prussian right was the non appearance of d'Erlon. The I Corps commander had received his orders from Marshal Ney at 6PM. The order to return to Quatre Bras placed d'Erlon in an iniquitous position. He had to disobey one of his superiors. Ultimately Ney won.

"I decided that as he summoned me back, in direct opposition to Napoleon's will, the Marshal must be in extreme peril." However, d'Erlon tried to satisfy both his commanders by leaving two divisions, Durutte's infantry and Jacquinot's cavalry, the head of his column.

As d'Erlon sent Durutte and Jacquinot up the Roman road into the Prussian rear his last words were "be prudent". Like many statements made by generals on that day, the words were poorly chosen given the character of the subordinate.

The advance of Jacquinot's cavalry enabled Durutte to follow up along the road in column without fear of attack. Wagnelée fell and then Durutte simply stopped. General Brue, a brigade commander in Durutte's Division became so dismayed at the lack of action that he had a shouting argument with his commander. It was to no avail. Two divisions sat idle while Prussian fugitives streamed past them.

The remaining three divisions of I Corps finally made it back to Quatre Bras in time to bolster the French line against the last Allied attack of the night.

Ligny and Quatre Bras were over. It only remained to analyse the results. Blücher was beaten but his army was intact. In fact it was, like its commander, bruised but not dead. The Prince had

lost his horse in one of the last charges and had been trampled. He was lucky not to have been captured as French cuirassiers rode over him twice.

It was only the quick thinking of an adjutant who dismounted and covered the Field Marshal's uniform that saved the old man. Blücher must have been the toughest 72 year old the world has ever seen because he quickly re-mounted and rode off to consult with Gneisenau.

In the absence of his commander the Chief-of-Staff had assumed command. It was up to him to decide where the army would reform. The obvious route of retreat would be towards the Prussian supply depots at Namur but Gneisenau had reasons for not being obvious.

The main reason was that the right wing of the army was separated from the left and would have to retreat north before regaining the Namur road. Therefore Gneisenau decided to regroup at the town of Wavre, a choice endorsed by Blücher when he staggered into headquarters because it kept the Prussians in contact with Wellington. The Duke would later refer to this decision as "the decisive moment of the century".

Napoleon had failed to crush Blücher because d'Erlon had failed to carry out his orders. How much blame for this must rest with Marshal Ney is a vexed question.

Considering the fact that Ney had only received his command late on June 15th he may be excused for not reading the Emperor's mind. The absence of Berthier was critical. The clear, precise and prompt messages that had characterised previous campaigns were absent. Where it was possible for misunderstandings to occur they commonly did. Neither Napoleon or Ney can be blamed for that.

What Ney can be blamed for is his overreaction to the loss of d'Erlon. For a man who had spent over ten years campaigning with the greatest general of the current, or perhaps any other, age, Ney had very little confidence in

Napoleon's judgement. Or perhaps he had too much confidence in his own judgement?

If Napoleon is guilty of a mistake, it is in his failure to use Lobau's Corps. For most of the 16th the Corps languished at Charleroi without any orders. It was only late in the day that the Emperor seemed to remember them.

If Lobau had been ordered to a central position early in the day then he would have been in position to carry out the manoeuvre that was asked of D'Erlon. As part of the army reserve there would have been no doubt about where Lobau's loyalties lay.

Blücher and Gneisenau had fought much as expected. They had put up a good fight but had been outgeneralled by Napoleon. French losses in the battle had been 11,000, compared to 16,000 for the Prussians (not including the 8,000 deserters also lost). However, with the Prussian commanders' unique combination of intelligence and guts they were far from out of the fight.

Wellington, the only general amongst the group under discussion never to have been defeated came closer to losing at Quatre Bras than at any time in his career to date. His staff work had been amateurish and he had little idea of where his men were. He was saved by a series of fortuitous arrivals throughout the day.

Gneisenau was very definitely under the impression that Wellington would send aid. That he didn't was unavoidable. What could have been avoided was the misunderstanding between Wellington and the Prussians. There was no attempt on the part of the Duke to keep the Prussians up to date with his progress. If Blücher and Gneisenau had known more of what was happening at Quatre Bras they would have been unlikely to have mistaken d'Erlon for Wellington and launched their disastrous counterattack.

Intermezzo

With the day over and two battles fought it only remained to plan for the

day ahead. The events of June 17th would depend most heavily on whether the Prussians retreated, and if so, where to. Therefore, despite their defeat Blücher and Gneisenau were in a position where the progress of the campaign would be determined very much by their own actions.

Napoleon was in the uncharacteristic position of having to wait till he knew what the Prussians were doing before he committed himself to a course of action. Orders were given for cavalry to be sent out at first light to reconnoitre.

Wellington went to bed that night under the blithe assumption that Blücher had beaten Napoleon. Throughout the night more and more of the Anglo-Allied Army arrived at Quatre Bras. Now it was the Duke who, with little hope of support from his ally, was concentrating dangerously far forward.

On the morning of June 17th Wellington was anxious to receive news of the Battle of Ligny. He sent out numerous riders to find Blücher and determine what the Prince's Army was doing. In the meantime the Anglo-Allied Army sat where it was and Marshal Ney, to their front, did likewise.

Napoleon was taking breakfast at 7AM when he received news that some Prussians at least were retreating towards Namur. Although this was only the Prussian deserters it fitted with the Emperor's preconception. Still, with Blücher's reputation for coming back from a drubbing Napoleon waited to be sure.

A second message was more unexpected. Ney had sent word that Wellington was still in position at Quatre Bras.

It is unclear what Napoleon thought upon receiving this message. Probably he felt that Ney was exaggerating and that only a rear guard remained in place. His message to the Marshal was quite ambiguous and would no doubt have left Ney unsure as to whether or not the bulk of the Armée du Nord was moving to support him.

It was not until 11AM that Napoleon realised the opportunity that Wellington was presenting him. Reports from Quatre Bras confirmed the presence of at least half the Anglo-Allied Army. Almost simultaneously reports came in stating that the bulk of the Prussian Army was retiring northward.

This was the news for which the Emperor had been waiting. Sure now that there was no immediate threat from the Prussians he felt secure in attacking Wellington.

Lobau's VI Corps and the Guard were ordered to Marbais, on the Quatre Bras-Namur road as well as the cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie and Milhaud's Corps.

His plan was simple. Ney would attack frontally with the corps of d'Erlon and Reille. When the Allies were fully engaged Napoleon would attack down the Namur road and roll up Wellington's left flank. The Emperor had been denied his decisive battle on the 16th but he could well have it on the 17th.

But Napoleon was probably unaware that his battle with Wellington had become a race against time. At 10AM a messenger had returned to Quatre Bras with the news that the Prussians were retreating to Wavre.

The Duke had already foreseen the possibility of retreat and he now produced a set of written orders instructing the army to concentrate at Mont St Jean. Wellington had ridden over this ground a year before and had commented on what an ideal position it would be if he were ever called upon to defend Brussels.

One of the benefits of the position at Mont St Jean was that the army could march there along a number of different roads. Obviously the portion of the army currently at Quatre Bras would take the Brussels road but those units still strung out to the west could travel by any one of several north-south roads parallel to the main one.

In moving by these roads Wellington defended all the major approaches to Brussels save for the route covered by

The Battle of Quatre Bras

the Prussians. The Duke had set the scene for a battle with Napoleon on ground of his own choice.

The Prussians were informed of the decision and Wellington requested support from at least one corps. Failing this, he said, he would be forced, if attacked, to retire behind the Scheldt River.

As Napoleon moved towards Quatre Bras Grouchy was receiving his orders to move against the Prussians. With 33,000 men he was ordered to "devote your energies to the pursuit of the Prussians." Grouchy was ordered to "keep a sword in the backs' of the Prussians while maintaining close contact with Napoleon's right."

The one point that was left out of Grouchy's orders was what he was to do if Blücher moved to join with Wellington. There was no order to prevent such a union occurring and there was no order to rejoin Napoleon if he could not prevent the Prussians from joining the Anglo-Allies.

At midday, as the Allies retreat was well under way, Napoleon reached Marbais with his two corps and cavalry. Hearing no sound of guns from Quatre Bras he sent a message to Ney inquiring as to why the Marshal had not yet attacked the crossroads. The reason was that the last message from

Soult had given no indication of the urgency of the situation. Ney was asked to attack if he thought success possible and he was informed that, amongst other things, the day would be spent 'replenishing ammunition, gathering stragglers and detachments'.

Ney had sent skirmishers forward at first light and had decided that Wellington's position was too strong for the forces he currently had. He sent a report to Soult recommending that Napoleon attack Wellington's flank before d'Erlon and Reille completed the rout.

This report was not received by Soult until it had travelled from Frasnes to Fleurus, then to Ligny and finally to Quatre Bras, two miles north of its origin.

Ney assumed that his report had been received and in the absence of a reply he appeared to be awaiting the Emperor. While this was fair enough, Ney could observe the Allies, beginning at 10AM, withdrawing up the Brussels road. He knew the importance of destroying Wellington's Army and he really should have attacked, if not at 10 then surely by midday. The initial arguments that the position was too strong and Wellington had too many reserves was growing weaker by the minute.

Down but not Out
Blücher is shown here just after being unhorsed by French Cavalry. If anyone had thought to deliver the coup de Grace the world could look very different today

Napoleon finally brought on an engagement as his advance guard clashed with Allied cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge. A captured camp follower told Napoleon what he feared. Almost the entire Allied Army had withdrawn and Quatre Bras was now held by only a strong rearguard. Only with vigorous action would anything now be achieved.

Napoleon set his own force in motion before riding to Ney's force where he encountered Comte d'Erlon. "France has been ruined." he said, "Go, my dear general, and place yourself at the head of the cavalry and pursue the rear guard vigorously."

Having said this Napoleon turned with his personal escort and raced for the crossroads. He was observed by the Duke whose response was "Well there is the last of the infantry gone, and I don't care." Turning the conduct of the rearguard over to Uxbridge he rode off after his army.

Seeing the French Army advancing; led in person by the Emperor was an inspiring sight for the men of the rear guard. They did not wait around to receive His Imperial Majesty but began to retire up the Brussels road after the infantry.

As it began to rain heavily Napoleon personally directed the horse artillery of the Guard as it poured canister into the British cavalry. While this was happening he was in great personal danger as Uxbridge's men replied. At Genappe the British counterattacked and a fierce melee ensued. As the French strength became overwhelming the cavalry skilfully broke contact and resumed the retreat.

The pursuit continued until the French breasted a ridge by the inn of La Belle Alliance. There in front of them was a valley and another ridge in front of the town of Mont St Jean. The last of the Allied infantry was crossing the valley and the cavalry was deployed in a screen along the base of the ridge. This was curious.

The Emperor brought up Milhaud's cuirassiers and deployed them as if to charge. He then opened fire from the horse artillery. The reply from a line of guns along the Mont St Jean ridge gave him the answer he had been after. The

Allied Army had stopped running. Amazingly Napoleon was to have his battle before Wellington and Blücher joined forces.

The Emperor had been worried that Wellington would retreat through the Forêt de Soignes. Once on the other side any army moving through the forest would be vulnerable to attack as it emerged. Furthermore a good road existed linking the northern end of the forest with Wavre.

If Blücher joined Wellington north of the Forêt de Soignes then they could not be defeated and the campaign was lost. The Duke of Wellington's decision to stand at Mont St Jean had given Napoleon one last chance to win the campaign.

Opening Moves

During the night Napoleon continued to fear a withdrawal by Wellington's Army. However, this was not to be and the Emperor's plans for a night attack on the Allied rearguard proved unnecessary.

Wellington was aware that he would require Prussian aid and he stated his need to Blücher in no uncertain terms. '... I hope to be supported by a single Prussian corps. But if this support is denied me, I shall be compelled to sacrifice Brussels and take up my position behind the Scheldt.'

Blücher's reply was equally forthright. 'I shall not come with one corps only, but with my whole army...'. The first Prussian corps to move towards Mont St Jean were Bülow's IV and Pirch's II. The I and III Corps were to be held in reserve, their actions, to a large extent dictated by the actions of Grouchy.

Grouchy was vacillating. He was aware that part of the Prussian Army had moved to Wavre and part (several thousand fugitives) had moved towards Liege. Not knowing which way the bulk of the Prussians had gone Grouchy informed the Emperor and waited for further instructions.

Whether the main Prussian Army was at Liege or at Wavre Grouchy should

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have realised that only the men at Wavre mattered. Unless Grouchy neutralised them they would be able to fall on the Emperor's flank. Any Prussians who had retreated to Liege were effectively out of the campaign.

On the morning of June 18th many of the French were found to have bivouacked well to the south of Napoleon's main position. The Emperor had intended to be ready to attack by 6AM but altered this to nine when he saw the dispositions of his men and the muddy state of the ground.

By 8AM the task of getting the army in order was well under way. The Emperor took his breakfast with Soult, Drouot and, by the end of the meal Ney, and Reille as well. The Peninsula veterans were uneasy about the prospect of attacking another of Wellington's armies and Napoleon unleashed several scornful rebukes.

It seemed, however, that Napoleon was not overconfident to the point of being foolhardy. He had stated that he did not need Grouchy but after breakfast he sent a message to his right-wing commander instructing him to 'head for Wavre in order to draw near to us, and place yourself in touch with our operations and to keep up your communications with us, pushing before you those portions of the Prussian Army which have taken this direction, and which have halted at Wavre; this place you ought to reach as soon as possible.'

Clearly the Emperor intended Grouchy to approach Wavre from the south west, thereby placing himself in the path of any Prussians who might be moving towards Mont St Jean. However, the order was badly worded and anyway would not reach Grouchy until 4PM.

As another indication of Napoleon's concern for his flank, the 7th Hussars were detached, along with a battalion of infantry to act as a screen against the possible advance of the Prussians.

The battlefield was remarkably small by the standards of the day, slightly more than two miles across. The French were deployed on one ridge and the Allies on another, some distance to the north. Curiously the French found themselves on the ridge initially chosen by Wellington to defend.

The Quartermaster General, De Lancey had been unsure as to which ridge Wellington meant and decided that, despite being steeper the ridge at La Belle Alliance was 'too extended to be occupied by our troops'. The Duke's supposed brilliant choice of ground upon which to fight was actually made by another man.

In front of the Allied line were three farmhouses which acted as bastions. On the left was Papelotte and the Château de Frischermont. In the centre was La Haye Sainte and on the right was Hougoumont with its hedges and orchards.

These strongpoints were the key to the position. Any frontal attack by the French would be channelled into the lanes between these places and subjected to flanking fire. The bastions would also make flanking movements difficult, the appropriate farmhouse needing to be captured before an effective envelopment could be carried out.

The two ridges were not parallel, the right flank of the Allied Army being closer to the French than the left. In effect Wellington's left flank was refused. The Duke was acutely aware of this, strengthening his right flank considerably.

Battalions were also deployed four ranks deep rather than the usual two. This was a safeguard against the numerous French cavalry. A four deep line could rapidly form a rally square. In none of Wellington's previous battles had the French enjoyed such a superiority in cavalry as they did at Waterloo.

The Corps system was modified for the battle with the main defensive line split between Hill on the right, Orange in the centre and Picton on the left. In reserve was Uxbridge's cavalry behind the centre and Brunswick's Corps behind the right. The deployment was such that the quality units were evenly distributed along the line.

The three bastions were strongly garrisoned, Hougoumont especially. The chateau held 1,500 men, Dutch, Nassauers, Hanoverian riflemen and the four light companies from the 1st Guards Brigade, perhaps the finest infantry in the British Army. La Haye Sainte was defended by six companies of KGL riflemen. Papelotte was less well defended, Saxe Weimar's Brigade, mauled at Quatre Bras, had half its strength deployed between Papelotte and Frischermont.

Clearly Wellington intended to stand on the defensive until either he or the French were broken or Blücher showed up. Billeted in the town of Waterloo, well behind the Allied line, Wellington was asked by his second in command, Uxbridge, what his plans for the day where. The Duke replied by asking Uxbridge "who will attack first tomorrow, I or Bonaparte?". "Bonaparte" said Uxbridge. "Well", continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend on his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?". One suspects that this conversation would be seen in a different light today, had an accurate French ball suddenly made Uxbridge the army commander.

On the other side of the field the French were deployed with two infantry corps forward and the remainder of the army in reserve. D'Erlon's I Corps was on the right and Reille's II Corps, still without Girard's Division was on the left. The Cavalry divisions of Jacquinot and Piré covered the right and left flanks respectively.

A second line consisted of Kellerman's Cavalry Corps on the left, Lobau's VI Infantry Corps and two cavalry divisions in the centre and another cavalry corps under Milhaud on the right. The Guard was in the third line.

To the east of Mont St Jean Blücher had turned the mechanics of bringing the Prussian Army to Wellington's aid over to Gneisenau. The Prussian Chief-of-Staff had not trusted Wellington before the campaign opened and the events of June 16th had only reinforced his preju-

dices. Therefore Gneisenau was determined that the Prussians would not arrive at Mont-St-Jean before the French had been given an opportunity to test the English general's resolve.

Under the premise that it was the only corps not to have been engaged at Ligny Bülow's IV Corps was chosen to lead the advance. The fact that Bülow's men were five miles east of Wavre meant that the Prussians would take the maximum possible time to reach the battlefield.

If the Anglo-Dutch Army broke before Bülow arrived then the Prussians would be justified in retreating. If the battle was still under way then the Prussians would appear just in time to save Wellington and crush the French.

As it was the head of Bülow's column reached Wavre by 7 AM and was at Chapelle St-Lambert (within sight of the battlefield) by 10.30. The last of the Prussian IV Corps, however, did not reach the latter town until three in the afternoon. Napoleon was to have his opportunity to crush the British but there was no time to waste.

Napoleon's first orders for the day were simple. A grand battery was to be formed in front of I Corps which would bombard the Allied centre and left. D'Erlon would launch a frontal assault which would roll over the weak Allied left wing. At this juncture Reille would attack frontally while d'Erlon wheeled to the left, rolling up the Allied line.

Somewhere about this time Napoleon expected Wellington to break off the action and retreat towards his reserve, the 17,000 men left to defend the supply lines at Hal. Marshal Ney would be given one infantry corps and sufficient cavalry to pursue the broken Anglo-Dutch while Napoleon marched into Brussels. There would then be no chance of Blücher and Wellington joining forces.

After gaining Brussels the Emperor would most probably move first against Wellington. The Duke would be expected to choose retreat across the Channel in preference to another battle. With Blücher isolated the Prussian

Army would either be brought to battle and destroyed or choose to retreat on its lines of communication. Either way Napoleon would gain the prestige of having defeated the two most successful Allied generals and would be in a position to fall on the flank of the Russians and Austrians should they advance to the French border.

The attack was planned for 1 PM but some time between 11 AM and 11.30 the Emperor received a message from Grouchy which suggested that the Prussians were already on the move towards Mont St Jean.

Immediately Napoleon made an alteration to his plans. D'Erlon's attack would go ahead as planned. However, in order to give the attack greater chance of success, Reille would attack the chateau of Hougoumont. The diversionary attack by Prince Jérôme's Division of II Corps would draw Wellington's attention, and hopefully his reserves, to the point where he obviously most feared an attack. The grand battery was also increased in size from 24 guns to 84.

A little before 11.30 AM a cannonade began of the Hougoumont and its surrounds. Before very long French infantry could be seen advancing towards the chateau. The Battle of Waterloo had begun.

Battle!

The opening cannonade of the Battle of Waterloo was heard many miles from the battlefield. Grouchy and Gérard heard the noise which prompted the corps commander to tactlessly demand that they march to the sound of the guns.

Grouchy expressed his annoyance with the high handed manner of his subordinate and refused to march to Mont St Jean, citing Napoleon's orders to pursue Blücher. The stupidity of the situation was that by continuing to Wavre, Grouchy was allowing the Prussians to move westward unimpeded. Had he marched towards the battlefield the French right wing would have collided

with Bülow's column. At most, half of one Prussian corps would have reached Mont St Jean.

Meanwhile, Prince Jérôme's Division commenced its attack on Hougoumont. Preceded by a wave of skirmishers seven battalion columns, Bauduin's 1st Brigade, advanced towards Hougoumont Wood. The French skirmisher line was thrown back by the Hanoverian and Nassauer defenders but the main body advanced through the fire of the Allied skirmishers.

The fight degenerated into a close range musketry contest as the French columns disintegrated. Both sides used whatever cover they could find and the French continued to gain ground through weight of numbers.

Eventually the attacking brigade forced their way up to the Château itself and the defenders of the wood fell back behind the buildings. The French rushed the Château itself and were forced back by the heavy musketry from within. The 1st brigade broke and fled back into the wood.

Despite his reverse Jérôme was now in a position to bypass Hougoumont and threaten the Allied right flank. At the same time he would be able to bring artillery close to the walls and smash the château to pieces. Hougoumont had been neutralised by the capture of the wood but Napoleon's brother only saw that he had been repulsed and called for his second brigade to launch another attack.

An infantry assault on Hougoumont was, at this stage of the battle, a major mistake. Wellington would only consider moving his reserves onto the right flank if he felt himself genuinely threatened. While the French were concentrating on Hougoumont the remainder of the right flank was safe. The diversion was, so far, diverting only Frenchmen.

Despite the arguments of the divisional chief-of-staff, General Guilleminot, Prince Jérôme hurled his second brigade at the Château walls without the benefit of artillery support. Not so the defenders as Wellington ordered a bat-

tery of howitzers to fire shrapnel over the château into the French soldiers beyond.

Colonel Frazer, commanding the British horse artillery later recounted the incident. Wellington 'Whilst looking about, remarking again that the weak point of our line was our right, and imagining that the enemy, making a demonstration on our centre and left, would forcibly seize the wood, and interpose between us and Braine le Leud [sic], would endeavour to turn the right flank of our second line.'

Although only one battery of artillery had so far been shifted against Jérôme's attack Wellington had clearly been fooled into believing this to be Napoleon's main effort.

Under accurate fire from the British howitzers Soye's Brigade moved around the western flank of Hougoumont and launched an attack on the lightly protected north gate of the complex. The defenders were too few to repulse the massive column which reached the gate and began to force its way inside.

Wellington directed Byng's Guards Brigade to counterattack the French column which was driven off. However, this was not before two dozen Frenchmen under the enormous axe-wielding Lieutenant Legros (nicknamed 'the smasher') had forced their way into the courtyard of the château.

Under the command of Lt. Colonel Macdonnell, the defenders pushed the door closed and killed all but one of the enemy inside (the one survivor was a drummer boy).

There is considerable argument as to who ordered Foy's Division into the attack on Hougoumont. Some say it was Reille, others say Napoleon, or it could simply have been the divisional commander himself reacting to Jérôme's calls for reinforcements.

Whoever was responsible, Gautier's Brigade advanced into the orchards to the east of the Château. It was opposed by the Guards of Byng's Brigade and once again an attempt to capture

Closing the Gate at Hougoumont
This single action saved the chateau and deprived Napoleon of the services of two divisions later in the battle

Hougoumont collapsed into a bloody stalemate.

As the battle for Hougoumont was in progress Napoleon was composing a letter to Grouchy. The Emperor desired Grouchy to 'keep up your communication with us, so as to be prepared at any moment to fall upon and crush the enemy's troops which may endeavour to annoy our right flank. At this moment the battle is raging in front of Mont St Jean, manoeuvre therefore to join our right.

As he was composing this message Napoleon was brought a captured letter from Gneisenau to Colonel Müffling, Wellington's Prussian attache. The letter confirmed that the troops just visible to the east were the men of Bülow's IV Corps. Even worse was the news that the Prussians had lost contact with Grouchy's force. Blücher was free to fall on the Emperor with his entire army.

Napoleon wrote a postscript to his letter in which he informed Grouchy 'A letter which has just been intercepted states that General von Bülow is about to attack our right flank. We believe that we notice this corps now on the heights of St. Lambert. So do not lose a

moment in drawing near to us, and effecting a junction with us, in order to crush Bülow whom you will catch in the very act of concentrating.'

By 1.30 PM the 84 guns of Napoleon's grand battery had been pounding Wellington's centre left for an hour and a half. Because of the deployment of the Allies on a reverse slope the bombardment was not as effective as it might have been.

Not only did a great number of shots fail to clear the crest of the ridge but many sailed over the heads of the infantry into the ranks of the reserve cavalry. Enough shots, however, struck home for Napoleon to feel that his attack would be successful.

Marshal Ney was dispatched to lead the attack. The 17,000 men of d'Erlon's Corps started forward. Despite later claims that 'they came on in the same old way' the French were deployed quite differently to the way they would have been against a continental army.

The divisions of Donzelot, Marcognet and one brigade of Durutte's Division were deployed in divisional column rather than battalion column. The individual battalions were arrayed in line one behind the other. This gave a bat-

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Tally Ho!
Not content with having broken up the attack of d'Erlon's Corps the British heavy cavalry swept on over the French guns, ultimately to their doom

talion frontage of around 300 muskets. The reason for this deployment was the feeling amongst those generals who had faced Wellington in the Peninsula that any attempt to deploy into line within range of the British muskets would be suicidal.

As well as attacking in divisional column the French had a great many more skirmishers than was customary. The equivalent of a brigade of men swarmed in front of the columns to mask the Allies fire and cause further disruption.

As the advance commenced the fire from the grand battery increased to a crescendo. The Allied gunners had been ordered not to engage in counter-battery fire and by and large this order was observed. Ammunition was conserved until the French infantry came in range at which point every gun that could, went into action against the advancing columns.

With the French advancing in echelon from left to right the left hand units, the two brigades of Quiot's Division were the first to get into battle. At La Haye Sainte, as at Hougoumont the defenders were rapidly pushed back through the orchards into the farmhouse itself.

The first French onslaught was slowed and fierce fighting continued around the strategic location. The 95th Rifles in the Sandpit, to the east of La Haye Sainte drove back the skirmishers in front of Bourgeois's Brigade and momentarily halted that unit. A counter-attack by a battalion of Kielsmanegges Hanoverians pushed the French back from the farmhouse before they were cut to pieces by Travers' Brigade of cuirassiers.

Donzelot's Division was obstructed in it's advance by the men of Bourgeois' Brigade who were attempting to deploy around the Sandpit. Marcognet advanced past the stationary Donzelot and outflanked that portion of the 95th Rifles who had been on a knoll to the east of the Sandpit.

The outflanked riflemen withdrew to their brigade, leaving the three companies in the Sandpit to support the six KGL companies inside La Haye Sainte. The farmhouse was still holding but it had been surrounded by the French.

Kempt's Brigade, of which the 95th Rifles were a component, was deployed well to the rear of Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian Brigade. Here the French tactics worked to perfection. Bylandt became engaged with a large cloud of skirmishers who inflicted a significant number of casualties on the Dutch.

Suddenly, Marcognet's divisional column appeared. The skirmishers scattered and a huge volley crashed into Bylandt's men. The Allied brigade was composed of two line and two militia battalions. Having just suffered massive losses from the French volley the two militia units broke and ran.

By this time Donzelot's Division had moved around Bourgeois' Brigade and came up against Bylandt's two line units. As the Division came over the ridge the Dutch, who had been lying down, rose and fired a volley.

This so shocked the French that the head of the column halted. Then, instead of crashing into the Allied line with the weight of an entire division the lead unit began a close range firefight. With a full division of reserves the French were sure to win the engagement but it allowed two battalions to hold up the whole of Donzelot's force.

Meanwhile Durutte had advanced against the men of Saxe Weimar's Brigade between Papelotte and Frischermont on the Allied extreme left. The attack commenced with a bombardment of the hamlet of Smohain by three batteries of horse artillery.

One brigade advanced against the hamlet while the other took part in the main attack on the ridge line. Durutte personally directed the attack on Smohain and was hence unaware of what was happening over the small ridge which separated him from the main battlefield.

Marcognet's Division had dispersed its immediate opponents and was reforming to continue the advance. General Picton could see that the gap had to be sealed or the French would be through into the rear of the Allied Army. Picton ordered Pack and Kempt to advance with their brigades.

Kempt's Brigade of three English battalions moved to oppose Bourgeois' Brigade which was advancing between the remnants of the 95th Rifles and Bylandt's Brigade. Bourgeois' men withdrew slightly which left the flank of Donzelot's column open. The 28th Infantry poured a flanking fire into the mass of Frenchmen and the column which had already halted began to lose cohesion.

Pack's Brigade faced something completely different. In stark contrast to their Peninsula experience the British found themselves overlapped and outgunned by the French column. The 92nd Infantry broke in front of the charge of the division and the other battalions of Pack's Brigade, faced by Durutte's first brigade were unable to cover the gap which resulted.

The French appeared poised to roll up the Allied line. Marcognet's Division had defeated all the infantry to its front. Even though Donzelot was hard pressed, a quick left wheel would slam the victorious French division into the flank of Kempt's Brigade.

From his vantage point near La Belle Alliance Napoleon perceived that victory was imminent. He ordered Milhaud to release the remainder of his cuirassiers to support the breakthrough. Kellerman was also ordered to make his cavalry units ready to exploit a breach.

It was at this point that Wellington ordered Uxbridge to counterattack with the heavy cavalry of Somerset's Household Brigade and Ponsonby's Union Brigade.

Travers' Cuirassiers had been guarding the left flank of d'Erlon's advance since their destruction of the Hanoverian Lüneburg battalion. They were taken by surprise and overwhelmed by the attack of the Household Brigade. A number of Frenchmen were forced over the edge of a small cliff above La Haye Sainte.

The majority of the cuirassiers were forced back into Bourgeois and Donzelot's columns which were unable to fire on the advancing cavalry as a result. Bourgeois' brigade column broke and was closely followed by that of Donzelot when the Inniskillings slammed into the front of the latter column. The Royals also struck Donzelot's column, although they received an effective volley before slamming into the French .

The Scots Greys advanced at a walk towards the fleeing men of the 92nd Infantry. These made way for the horses and many of them turned and followed the cavalry into the attack. Far from the romantic charge of Lady Butler's painting the Scots Greys (in the words of Lieutenant Winchester of the 92nd Infantry) '...actually walked over this column...'. By the time the cavalry had passed through their comrades their was no room to get up speed so they simply moved into the French at the walk.

Marcognet's column, thinking itself victorious was in the process of reforming its ranks and did not even manage to get off a volley. The same formation which had allowed the French to overwhelm the Allied infantry now made it almost impossible to form square against cavalry. The French infantry was cut to pieces.

Before long the Scots Greys had passed through Marcognet's 24 deep column and a loose body of cavalry formed at the rear of the broken division. They immediately saw Pegot's Brigade of Durutte's Division which had not made contact with the British line. The Greys charged. The French formed a solid square and delivered a volley which shattered the remains of the regiment.

It was at this point, with the French infantry unloaded that a fresh squadron of the Royals emerged from between two French columns. The cavalry executed a perfect left wheel and slammed into the corner of Pegot's Brigade which broke.

The rout was now complete. With the exception of Quiot's Brigade which had been assaulting La Haye Sainte and Brue's Brigade of Durutte's Division which had been attacking Papelotte all the infantry of d'Erlon's Corps was dead, captured or in retreat. A number of rally squares sprung up amongst the survivors and there were too many individual targets for the victorious cavalry to think about assaulting another formed body.

Bachelu's Division of Reille's Corps had advanced in support of d'Erlon's left and was now able to repel the Household Brigade with a massive volley. The Union Brigade carried on to the grand battery where they sabred a few gunners and contemplated their inability to spike the guns.

Napoleon had by this time ridden over to Milhaud where he ordered a cavalry counterattack. Jacquinot, supporting the attack on Papelotte had already ordered his lancers into the fight. Martigue's Regiment charged the Union Brigade and routed it, killing its commander, Ponsonby.

A second regiment of lancers under Colonel Bro were attacked by Vandeleur's dragoons who were menacing Durutte's intact brigade. De Ghigny also attacked with his Light Brigade and Bro's lancers were routed. The pursuit carried the two Allied cavalry units past a battalion of Lobau's Corps which was en route to block the Prussians. The battalion formed square and was not troubled by the enemy horse.

The cavalry action entered its last phase when Milhaud's remaining cuirassiers thundered across the valley sweeping all before them. Vandeleur and De Ghigny retired in good order. The two brigades of heavy cavalry were ruined but they had routed a corps.

Napoleon's right and Wellington's left were both wrecked. If only another French corps had been available to resume the attack there would have been little that Wellington could have done to stop it. The problem for Napoleon was that the Guard were still in reserve and Lobau had moved to oppose Bülow's Prussians.

The Emperor was unwilling to commit the Guard, his only reserve, to a continuation of the attack. If he attacked and lost then he would not only have lost the battle but, without reserves to cover a retreat he would be annihilated. Another solution would have to be found.

It was felt that to call off Reille's attack on Hougoumont would be to show Wellington how weak Napoleon perceived himself to be at this time and so this was continued albeit only by a howitzer bombardment of the château.

It was at this time, as d'Erlon reformed the two thirds of his command which had survived the rout that Napoleon received a message from Grouchy.

The note, written at 11AM confirmed what Napoleon had feared, that Grouchy was proceeding to Wavre with his entire command and, rather than interposing himself between the Emperor and the Prussians, would uselessly engage the Prussian rearguard while at least one Prussian corps fell on Napoleon.

Although most writers fail to recognise it, Wellington was now in an excellent position to counterattack the French. The numerical difference between the two armies at the start of the battle had been slight. With Lobau deployed against Blücher, d'Erlon disorganised and Reille engaged at Hougoumont there were only the equivalent of two divisions of infantry to cover the area from Hougoumont to Papelotte.

An Allied attack would force Napoleon to commit the Guard and, even if the attack was repulsed, there would be nothing to counterattack with. Wellington had the advantage, if he only realised it and Napoleon's only option if he was to gain the time for d'Erlon to reform was to continue to attack.

Ney was ordered to gather what he could to attack La Haye Sainte and he sent Quiot's second brigade forward against the farmhouse. The only other offensive actions which Napoleon could carry out were to bombard the Allied line with the grand battery.

One regiment of Bachelu's Division was advanced in skirmish order to give some sort of support to the attack on La Haye Sainte and three battalions of Donzelot's Division did the same on the other flank of the farmhouse.

Despite the Emperor's fears Wellington had no intention of attacking Napoleon until he had Blücher present to guarantee success. Lambert's Brigade was moved into line on the left and a trickle of reinforcements maintained the status quo in Hougoumont. The defenders of La Haye Sainte were also reinforced by five companies.

Predictably the attack on the farmhouse at the centre of the Allied line failed as the outnumbered attackers marched into a storm of artillery and musketry. All the units involved retired with heavy casualties.

It was at this point, about 3.30 PM, with the Prussians set to fall on Lobau's VI Corps, that the decision was made to attack with cavalry. Much has been said about the great French cavalry attacks, most of it uncomplimentary.

Most authors suggest that the attack was made by Ney on his own initiative when he saw some Allied cavalry and wounded retiring into the Fôret de Soignes. It is unlikely that this was the case. What is more probable is that, as at Eylau in 1807, Napoleon felt forced to launch his cavalry in a holding attack in order to redeem the situation after the failure of what was intended to be the decisive infantry assault.

(Readers who are interested in this comparison should compare the accounts of the cavalry charges at Eylau and Waterloo contained in David Chandler's *Campaigns of Napoleon*. It seems incomprehensible that such an eminent writer should heap praise on the attack at Eylau while condemning utterly the almost identical attack at Waterloo.)

However, there were several differences between Eylau and Waterloo. The first and most important was that Joachim Murat was not leading the cavalry. Murat would have been quick to point out that one of the key ingredients of his success in 1807 was missing, horse artillery. Practically all the French horse artillery had been detached during the course of the battle so far to support the attacks by the infantry.

It is unthinkable that Napoleon would have intended a cavalry attack to go ahead without the close artillery support which was vital if squares were to be broken.

However, it is highly probable that Napoleon's orders to Marshal Ney made no mention of recalling the horse artillery batteries and that Ney assumed that he was to attack without them.

Perhaps it was felt that the intense bombardment of the Allied centre by the grand battery would be sufficient to disorganise the squares. Von Alten, commander of the British 3rd Division stated; 'Never had the most veteran soldiers heard such a cannonade.'

Altogether over 5,000 cavalry charged up the slope between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. At the same time Piré's lancers demonstrated on Wellington's extreme right. The Duke detached three cavalry regiments to dispose of the threat from Piré, leaving him with about 5,000 horsemen with which to oppose any breakthrough by Ney.

The Marshal charged at the head of the cuirassiers and was unhorsed by a cannon shot. Despite seeing their leader struck down the French cavalry continued their charge. As each square was approached a volley was unleashed which brought down more horsemen.

Despite their battering by cannon fire the squares were solid and sabre armed cavalry could do little to trouble them. The French artillerymen could not fire into the mass of friendly cavalry and enemy infantry without inflicting as many casualties on their own men as on the Allies. So for the infantry squares the attack by the cavalry was almost a respite from the terrible bombardment.

It is clear that the mass of fire broke the cohesion of the French cavalry so that none had the opportunity earlier presented to the Royals of charging in perfect formation into the corner of a square.

Few individuals were prepared to crash into a square without support from their comrades and so the majority of the French milled around the flanks of the squares occasionally thrusting at an unwary soldier within. By 4.15 PM Wellington felt that it was time to counterattack. Uxbridge sent his entire cavalry reserve forward into the lanes between the squares and the French were driven off.

As Ney, now remounted reformed his men at the bottom of the slope the French artillery continued its butchers work. Survivors noted that as many as

eight men could be carried off by a single roundshot and as many again by a shell.

While Napoleon had almost certainly ordered the first cavalry attack he was evidently greatly displeased when Ney led his squadrons back up towards the Allied line. "This is a premature movement which may well lead to fatal results. He is compromising us as he did at Jena." Wellington also felt that the continual cavalry attacks were not worthy of the Emperor, "Damn the fellow", he said, "he is a mere pounder after all." However, Napoleon resolved to support Ney's continuation of the attack, even if he thought it was wrong.

Kellerman's two divisions were ordered into the attack as was Guyot's heavy cavalry of the Guard. There were now only 800 carabiniers of Kellerman's Corps in the Emperor's cavalry reserve.

Ney's second attack met with the same results as the first. He was driven back down the slope to be joined by the additional 5,300 horse detached to him by Napoleon. As Marshal Ney prepared to once again charge into a hail of, predominantly, English lead he must have known that Lobau's Corps had been in action against Bülow's IV Prussian Corps for nearly an hour.

The first two brigades (remembering that a Prussian brigade was equivalent to a French or British Division) reached Chapelle St Lambert around noon. Here they were observed by Napoleon.

Both Blücher and Gneisenau were sure that their presence would only make Napoleon redouble his efforts to defeat one army before he had to seriously contend with another. It was therefore decided that Bülow's Corps would attack as soon as it was able, in the direction of Plancenoit. That is, the first Prussians would attempt to cut Napoleon's line of retreat as the Emperor had attempted to do to them with d'Erlon's Corps at Ligny.

Facing the half of IV Corps which was in position to attack was Lobau's VI Corps and the two cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie. A bombardment was opened by the Prussians as soon as

Blücher to the Rescue
The old Field Marshal spurs on his men as they march towards Plancenoit

practicable, more to hearten the Duke of Wellington than for any great effect on the French. On Mont St Jean Ridge Wellington heard the cannon shots and turning to an aide said "The battle is mine; and if the Prussians arrive soon, there will be an end of the war."

As the cannonade began, Losthin's 15th Brigade and von Hiller's 16th Brigade moved out from the cover of the Bois de Paris in line abreast. The cavalry and fusilier battalions were deployed on the flanks leaving 13 battalions for the main assault. As the Prussian advance began Hacke's 13th Brigade began to form up on the edge of the wood, closely followed by von Ryssel's 14th Brigade.

Plancenoit was, as yet unoccupied by Lobau's men and as the French became engaged with Losthin on the Prussian right, von Hiller raced for the village. Lobau observed that his flank was open and ordered a brigade to occupy Plancenoit. At the same time he retired from his forward positions towards the village. 30,000 Prussians and 10,000 Frenchmen were soon locked in a deadly battle for control of Napoleon's available lines of retreat.

As Bülow's Corps pushed closer to Plancenoit Blücher received word from Thielemann, the III Corps commander

that he was being attacked at Wavre by a 'vastly superior force'. Gneisenau's answer to the messenger gave some indication of how faulty Grouchy's continued advance to Wavre had been, "Let Thielemann defend himself as best he can, it matters little if he be crushed at Wavre, providing we gain the victory here."

Interlude - The Battle of Wavre

Grouchy was convinced that he would best serve Napoleon by proceeding to Wavre which he did. After hearing the opening cannonade of the battle of Waterloo the Marshal picked up his previously desultory pace in order to get into action against the Prussians as soon as possible.

The Prussian advance was slowed by Gneisenau's insistence that IV Corps lead the column. IV Corps was followed by I Corps which soon took the more northerly routes which would bring it onto the battlefield behind Wellington's left flank. This allowed II Corps to move off in the wake of Bülow's men.

Thielemann's III Corps was to be last of all and was in the process of moving through Wavre when the first of Grouchy's men were sighted.

Brigades (Cont.)

Vandamme's III Corps appeared when only Borcke's 9th Brigade was on the French side of the River Dyle which flowed from the southeast through the town. The bridge at Wavre had been barricaded so Borcke crossed at Lower Wavre to the northeast. The bridge at this place was destroyed after the brigade had passed.

Borcke had orders to march to Mont St Jean but, on his own initiative detached three regiments of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry to oppose the French as they crossed the Dyle. 9th Brigade then marched off to the west, somehow missing the rest of III Corps which had been turned around to face Grouchy.

Thielemann had only three division sized brigades with which to oppose the two French Corps advancing towards him. He declined to leave his men in large bodies within range of Grouchy's artillery, instead pushing forward a very strong skirmish line behind which the bulk of the three brigades sat ready to feed in reserves or counterattack as circumstances dictated.

Most of the Prussian artillery was well forward, in position to enfilade the approaches to the few bridges the French would have to use.

At around 4 PM Vandamme decided to attack without orders from Grouchy. The village of Aisemont on the southern bank of the Dyle between Wavre and Lower Wavre was taken and an assault was begun by 10th Division on Wavre Bridge.

The first rush against the bridge ran into intense musketry and cannon fire and was beaten back with the loss of 600 men including Habert, the divisional commander. After two more assaults had failed the remnants of the division took shelter in the buildings on the south bank.

Grouchy realised that a continuation of the assaults on Wavre Bridge would be senseless and started to probe up and down stream. Exelmans' Dragoons were despatched to Lower Wavre while an uncommitted battalion of Vandamme's Corps was sent to attempt a crossing at the Bierges Mill to the south west.

It was at this point, around 5 PM that Grouchy received Napoleon's 1 PM despatch ordering him to the battlefield at Mont St Jean. With Vandamme committed to the fighting around Wavre Grouchy was left with Gérard's IV Corps and Pajol's Cavalry Corps. He decided to send the cavalry to Limale, well to the southwest in an attempt to get around the Prussian rearguard and attack the columns heading off to the west.

Meanwhile the single battalion crossing the Bierges Bridge was strongly opposed and was cut to pieces. Hulot's Division of Gérard's IV Corps was drawn into the attack on the bridge and was beaten back. Continued assaults were also unsuccessful with Gérard being wounded by a Prussian sniper.

At Limale Pajol found only a Prussian outpost and sent a regiment of hussars thundering across the bridge. The rest of Pajol's cavalry was soon across, followed by Teste's Division (nominally part of VI Corps) and most of Gérard's Corps.

As night fell Thielemann sent urgent messages to Blücher informing him that III Corps had been outflanked and risked destruction in the morning. All of Thielemann's reserves were rushed to oppose the French across the Dyle and Grouchy was fooled into thinking that he had drawn the mass of Bülow's Corps away from the Emperor onto his own force.

The Crisis!

As the Prussians fought to break through Lobau's thin screen with one hand and hold off Grouchy with the other Marshal Ney was leading his third advance up the slope against the Allied centre.

This attack proved as unsuccessful as the first two and was finally bundled back down into the valley by another counterattack from the increasingly depleted Allied cavalry.

As the fourth massive charge started towards the Allied lines Ney began to use a little tactical finesse. Bachelu's Infantry Division and a Brigade of Foy's Division advanced on the left of the cavalry. Enfiladed by the Hougoumont garrison and raked by musketry from the British Guards Foy was wounded and his brigade pushed back. Bachelu withdrew before becoming engaged.

Ney also brought Piré's horse artillery battery into action which may have resulted in at least one square being broken, Napoleon being brought British and Brunswick colours. The French horse artillery was forced to retreat when attacked by Brunswick hussars and lancers.

By 6 PM the Allied centre was still standing firm and Ney called off his cavalry attacks. The cavalry on both sides was wrecked, Trip's Dutch-Belgian Brigade was refusing to advance again while the Cumberland Hussars were routed and did not draw rein until they reached Brussels where they spread the rumour of an Allied defeat.

The end of the cavalry attacks gave the long-suffering Allied infantry no relief as the French guns reopened their cannonade, drawing from a seemingly endless supply of ammunition.

Napoleon had remained curiously inactive during the last hour and a half. Perhaps he felt that the Allied centre must inevitably break, as so many continental armies had done under such appalling punishment. Whatever the reason for the Emperor's lack of action he now ordered Ney to attack again.

La Haye Sainte was the key to the Allied centre. It had channeled the two great French attacks, one to the right of the farmhouse and one to the left. Its capture would enable Napoleon to bring artillery right up to the Allied centre and to finally break Wellington's Army in two.

By the time Ney came to attack La Haye Sainte he was able to make use of the large number of d'Erlon's men who had reformed after their rout earlier in the day. The centre of the attack was Quiot's Division and this was sup-

ported, on the left by Bachelu and on the right by Marcognet. The entire force was shadowed by the remnants of Milhaud's Cuirassiers.

While Ney was forming his men the artillery bombarded the farmhouse causing many casualties and, more importantly for the French, blowing holes in the walls through which infantry could assault. A stalemate ensued as the French forced the defenders back from the walls into the buildings. However, any attempt to scale or pass through the wall was beaten back.

The defenders of La Haye Sainte were rapidly running out of ammunition and despite several messages Major Baring could not secure any extra. Quiot brought up an artillery battery to blast the farmhouse at close range. The combination of this barrage and the slackening in the defender's fire as they ran out of cartridges prompted the French to redouble their efforts.

Upon gaining the top of the wall many French infantry found that they could fire on the Germans inside without any reply. Major Baring gave the order to retreat but only 42 men got out alive. Wellington's central bastion was finally under French control.

As the French stormed up the slope past La Haye Sainte two of Ompteda's battalions were ordered to oppose them. The brigade commander questioned the decision to deploy in line, citing the fact that he could see French cavalry behind the infantry. Ompteda was ordered by the Prince of Orange to send his men forward, which he reluctantly did.

The disorganised French infantry withdrew before the formed body revealing one of Kellerman's Cuirassier regiments. One battalion, the 8th KGL was struck in the flank. Ompteda and all but 18 men were sabred. The other battalion fled. The cuirassiers in turn were repulsed by Arentschildt's KGL Hussars. Only the appearance of the Imperial Guard lancers prevented the hussars from routing the cuirassiers.

Wellington was finally convinced that Napoleon intended to break his centre and ordered the 3rd Netherlands Division from Braine L'Aleud on the far right of his line into the depleted area behind La Haye Sainte. Vivian and Vandeleur's cavalry were positioned behind the infantry protecting the centre.

While La Haye Sainte was being attacked Durutte had resumed his attack on Papelotte. Saxe Weimar's depleted brigade was bundled out of the buildings which were then occupied by the French for use against the advancing Prussians.

Although his left flank was now securely anchored, Lobau was having trouble holding Plancenoit. Driven out of all the village but the cemetery the French were subjected to canister fire from well handled guns which enabled the Prussian infantry to close with the bayonet. In a savage contest the French were steadily pushed back.

Lobau called on Napoleon for reinforcements and seeing how critical the fighting was in Plancenoit, the Emperor released the eight battalions of Duhesme's Young Guard. The elite infantry tore through the exhausted and in part, inexperienced Prussians and Plancenoit was recaptured.

Once again the French were holding an entire Prussian Corps of 30,000 men with barely more than a third the number. But the Emperor had been forced to commit a large proportion of his beloved Guard to an action which could not win, only save the battle.

Meanwhile Marshal Ney had been positioning his artillery in front of La Haye Sainte and Lambert's Brigade was reduced to a shambles by French canister fire. Huge numbers of skirmishers were sent forward to increase the attrition while Ney prepared to launch the attack which must destroy Wellington's fragile line.

With the cavalry arrayed behind the artillery the units defending the centre were forced into square which the French guns blew apart. The Prince of Orange was taken from the field wounded, along with Generals Alten, Halkett and Kielsmansegge. Colonels Gordon and De Lancy, the Duke's two most senior staff were also killed by this cannonade. Muttering to nobody in particular Wellington was heard to say, "Night or the Prussians must come."

Individual units were being annihilated by the French gunnery and the swarms of skirmishers. The 27th foot lost 480 out of a complement of 698. Their bodies were said to have been found laid out in a perfect square. The 1/1st Nassauer battalion broke square to charge the gunners but were ridden down by cuirassiers instead.

Matters were so serious that the colours of several depleted battalions were sent to the rear to avoid capture. Ensign William Leeke of the 52nd recalled seeing a dead kitten, some soldier's pet which made him suddenly think of home.

Ney sensed victory and sent a messenger to Napoleon requesting that the Emperor release the Guard. Napoleon, however, was in the process of detaching another 1,100 of his Guard, this time two battalions of the Old Guard, to Plancenoit. The sight of the bearskins caused a rout amongst the Prussians in which it is estimated that 3,000 were killed.

Napoleon was more than holding his own against Blücher and Gneisenau, but at the cost of his victory over Wellington. When Colonel Heymes rode up to the Emperor requesting fresh men to complete the destruction of Wellington's centre Napoleon angrily replied, "Some troops! Where do you expect me to get them from? Do you want me to make some?"

As Wellington brought the Brunswick Corps into the centre Ney himself rode up to Napoleon and pleaded his case for an attack by the Guard.

Reports from Durutte suggested that the units moving towards the rear of Bülow's Corps were the vanguard of Grouchy's Army. Of course they were simply more Prussians but, as with the mistaken identification of d'Erlon's Corps at Ligny it prompted an attack. The Guard would be used to break the

Merde!

Despite the attempts of various Frenchmen to put the phrases of a poet into his mouth there is no doubt that the only word uttered by General Cambronne when called upon to surrender was this

wavering Allied centre, Wellington's Army would be destroyed and the next morning the Prussians would be trapped between Napoleon and Grouchy.

By the time the Guard began to advance Napoleon was aware that the men he had thought were Grouchy's were in fact Ziethen's I Prussian Corps moving towards the Allied left. Of the fourteen battalions of Guard infantry uncommitted Napoleon was only will-

ing to release five for the attack on Wellington's centre. These battalions formed square before Napoleon rode to their front. With the words "Who will follow me?" he advanced towards the Allied line.

With the word that the Guard was going into action morale soared among the French soldiers. If Napoleon was throwing in his Guard that meant that the battle was almost over and that victory was assured. The gunners re-

doubled their fire and the infantry attacked as if the battle had just begun.

On the Allied left the Nassauers who had recently moved up to occupy that part of the line were driven back by d'Erlon's infantry.

It was only the intervention of Ziethen's I Prussian Corps which prevented the entire flank from crumbling. This intervention by the Prussians very nearly did not occur. Blücher had sent word to Ziethen ordering him to march south towards Plancenoit. Luckily for Wellington the Corps commander overrode the orders and commenced an attack on Papelotte with Steinmetz's Brigade.

Meanwhile the Guard was advancing towards a point approximately half way between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont. Allied guns began pounding the five battalion squares as they advanced up the slope and were in turn subjected to punishing counterbattery fire from guns near La Haye Sainte.

Originally intended to attack as one body the Guard split into two bodies, one on either side of a small spur. Ney, on foot since his fifth horse had been killed, and Friant led the 1/3rd and 4th Grenadiers on the right of the spur. The 1/3rd overran an artillery battery and was in the process of breaking a Brunswick battalion, the 30th and 73rd Foot when a Netherlands horse artillery battery under Captain Krahmer de Binche deployed and let loose a volley of canister into the French.

The 4th Grenadiers also enjoyed early success forcing the 33rd and 69th foot to retreat. As the five front line battalions were recoiling from the grenadiers General Baron Chassé counterattacked with Ditmers' completely fresh Dutch-Belgian brigade. Two battalions, even the Guard could not withstand a bayonet charge from 3,000 men. Friant was wounded and the Grenadiers withdrew.

On the left of the spur the 1/3rd and 2/3rd Chasseurs were well in front of the 4th Chasseurs. The column advanced towards what appeared to be a gap in

the line. In fact they marched straight onto Maitland's Guards Brigade who had been ordered to lie down in the corn.

The Duke of Wellington waited at the point of impact until the last possible moment before he turned to the brigade commander with the words "Now Maitland, now's your time!". Then, without giving Maitland a chance to give the orders the Duke shouted "Stand up Guards!" The head of the French column visibly slowed as 1,500 men rose up in front of them. "Make Ready! Fire!" shouted the Commander-in Chief.

300 men of the 1/3rd Chasseurs dropped in less than a minute before a bayonet charge drove them back onto the 2/3rd in disorder. It was at this point that the 4th Chasseurs came up.

The 2/3rd rallied and the two battalions charged into the British Guards. Just as the French appeared set to break through, Colborne's 52nd Regiment, 1,000 strong executed a parade ground left wheel onto the flank of the French.

Assailed by continuous volleys from front and flank the Chasseurs replied in kind. Colborne lost 150 men in the firefight before the rest of Adam's Brigade joined the 52nd. Even then the French held on. It was only the movement of Hew Halkett's 3rd Hanoverian Brigade from behind Hougoumont, threatening to hit the Chasseurs in the rear that started the retreat. Led by Colborne, Adam's Brigade charged and the retreat became a rout. It had taken three brigades to break the equivalent of one but, for the first time since they were raised an attack by the Imperial Guard had been repulsed.

"La Guard recule" became the cry that raced around Napoleon's Army. It was unthinkable but anyone who cared to look could see the attack on Wellington's centre had failed. Not only was the Guard routing but with a resigned "Oh well, In for a penny, in for a pound" Wellington had unleashed his entire remaining force into the French. It was perfect timing. Almost as Wellington was waving his hat in the direction of

the fleeing French Ziethen cracked the corner of the French line and Prussians poured through Papelotte towards La Belle Alliance.

Napoleon formed four uncommitted Guard battalions into square and placed them astride the Brussels road. By the time the victorious Allies reached these four solid blocks of men their cohesion was gone.

Vivian's cavalry tried to ride over a square and was shattered by a volley. The cavalry moved around the squares and continued the pursuit but the Allied infantry reformed and poured volley after volley into the four battalions.

A request came from the English to surrender to which General Cambronne succinctly replied "Merde!". Slowly the Guard began to march back along the road, in perfect formation all the way. A dazed Marshal Ney was dragged into a square by a major who found a horse and sent him in the direction of the Emperor.

Three of the squares broke up when so many men had been killed that any attempt at a formation was ludicrous. The last square, the 2/3rd Grenadiers were charged by cavalry. 200 horses were killed, so many that their bodies formed a wall in front of the French. Somewhere between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme cannon broke the square and the cavalry rode the survivors into a red ruin.

At Rossomme the last two battalions of the Grenadiers of the Guard were formed into squares with a battery of 12 pounders between them. As fugitives streamed past them the last of the Guard stood silently. Finally the Allies attacked and once again they were thrown back with severe losses.

However ennobling these acts of defiance were they achieved nothing in the face of a battle that was already lost and lost badly. Plancenoit was still being defended but had been encircled by the pincer attacks of Pirch to the south and Ziethen to the north.

Blücher got together what men he could and advanced to La Belle Alliance

where he met Wellington. The old General embraced his English ally. "Mein Lieber Kamerad" he exclaimed, "Quelle Affaire!"

The two men then got down to business. It was 9 PM and the Allied Army was in no fit state to conduct a pursuit. Although all his men had marched for most of the day Blücher promised that he would take over the chase.

Gneisenau took over command of the Prussian cavalry and scarcely drew rein until he reached Frasnes, the town occupied by Ney three nights ago. Napoleon escaped with 40,000 men but only managed to drag off 27 of his 246 guns.

Blücher wanted to name the battle after the village where he and Wellington had met but as apt a name as La Belle Alliance would have been Wellington refused. His battles were always named after the place in which he spent the night preceding them. The night of 17/18 June had been spent in the town of Waterloo, two miles north of Mont St Jean. So Waterloo it was and probably better for the monolingual English that it should be so.

Aftermath

Convention has it that Waterloo was the end of the war and that the crushing defeat inevitably caused Napoleon's abdication. This is not so. The Emperor reached Quatre Bras at 1 AM on June 19th. Messengers were sent to Grouchy at Wavre and the rout became an organised retreat.

At Wavre Thielemann heard about the Allied victory before Grouchy did. Consequently the Prussian Corps commander was surprised when the French attacked early on the morning of the 19th. Thielemann realised that Grouchy would have to retreat once word came about Waterloo and so once the Prussian line became dangerously stretched he began a general withdrawal to gain time.

Once word of the battle reached Grouchy he called off his attacks. Vandamme proposed that they march around Thielemann and capture Brus-

sels but Grouchy decided to retreat into France cutting across the Prussian's supply lines at Namur and Dinant.

Napoleon retreated to Laon from where he rode to Paris. Grouchy joined the army on June 26th after conducting a skilful rearguard action. But by the time Grouchy had brought the army back up to a respectable total Napoleon had abdicated.

The Chambers of Parliament, led by Fouché called out the National Guard to protect them, in effect daring Napoleon to crush them with the army. Although the people were behind him the Emperor chose not to bring the Parliament to heel with violence. Instead he abdicated.

It was an unusual decision, Napoleon had a far larger army than after the Russian disaster in 1812 or the battle of Leipzig a year later. Perhaps Napoleon trusted that Davout, the new minister of war would allow the military situation to remain as it was. He certainly talked, after his abdication as if he expected Davout to let him keep the army. Napoleon had, after all, abdicated in favour of his son and he may have meant his abdication to be merely a symbolic gesture to break the power of the parliament.

What finally destroyed Napoleon was the loss of Davout. The Iron Marshal had been his staunchest subordinate and certainly his most capable. But now Davout refused to follow his Emperor. At least the Marshal provided Napoleon with an escape route; Fouché had wanted him delivered to Blücher. Napoleon boarded a ship for America but was picked up by the Royal Navy. There were to be no more chances. Napoleon spent the last six years of his life chained to a rock in the South Atlantic.

The final battle of the campaign was fought after Napoleon had been captured. Under pressure from his officers not to allow the Prussians into Paris Davout marched out and defeated Blücher, the old Hussar in the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars.

CREATING THE SCENARIO

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk (or hard disk), we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in the Decisive Battles manual.

There is some additional information for IBM users at the end of this section. Be sure to read it, especially if you have an EGA/VGA card and want to take advantage of our "full map" graphics.

Macintosh users should note there are some changes to the numbering system in their design manual and that access to the various design routines is obtained through conventional, pull-down Mac menus.

Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store any of the historical scenarios in any unused save-game location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the *Waterloo* scenario.

Hard disk users should note that all they need is enough room on their hard disk to hold the new scenarios. Macintosh users should note that they do not need to use an existing scenario as the template. They can select *New* from the File Menu.

The WarPlan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary. Macintosh users should check their WarPlan™ manual for the location of the different design routines.

Title [5c]. There are three lines of text for the title of the scenario:

Waterloo

Battle of Three Armies

June 18, 1815

Go back to Menu J and re-save the game in the same location.

Map Size [5a(i)]. The top left sector is 0. The bottom right sector is 8. Macintosh dimensions are 27 x 27.

Define Terrain [5a(ii)]. The accompanying Terrain Effects Chart lists the details of the active terrain types for this scenario. Select (or paint) the icons of your choice to represent the four terrain types.

Create Map [5a(iii)]. Select the <CLEAR> line from Menu J. Clear the map and the data. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign control to each hex.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

Limits [5b(i)]. Before you can enter the military units for each side, you must set the force limits. The force limits are as follows; corps (9), divisions (24), brigades (82).

Weapons [5b(ii)]. Consult the Small Arms and Artillery Tables and enter the data as shown.

Forces [5b(iii)]. Edit the North (French) Army HQ and the South (Allied) Army HQ as shown in the data tables.

The objectives assigned to the Army HQs will not appear on the screen until after the objective data base has been entered.

The North has 4 corps. The South has 7 corps. Consult the Corps Table and enter the data as shown

The North has 10 divisions. The South has 23 divisions. Consult the Divisions Table and enter the data as shown.

The North has 40 brigades. The South has 81 brigades. Consult the Brigades Tables and enter the data as shown.

Objectives [5b(iv)]. There are 16 objectives. Consult the Objectives Table and enter the data as shown.

Scenario Setup [5d(i)]. Enter the following data. Date (18), Month (6), Year (15), Century (18), North Maximum Hex Movement is (4,0,5,3,6), South Maximum Hex Movement is (4,0,5,3,6), neither side is encamped. The entrenchment values are 0 for both sides. VP awards are 25 per leader, 3 per 100 men (North), and 15 per leader, 3 per 100 men (South). IBM and Macintosh users should note the combat value for this scenario is 0 for the North and 0 for the South.

Scenario Details [5d(ii)]. This is a one day scenario. Enter the following data for Day 1. The weather is Clear (0), the North is Offensive (1) and the South is Defensive (0), 2am to 8pm are day (3), move (1) turns, 9pm to 11pm are dusk (2), move (1) turns and 12pm is a night (0), End (2) turn. Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

NOTES FOR IBM USERS

IBM users with EGA or VGA cards must first create the game map with the "full-map" graphics disabled. To do this, run the program as DB2 f (or DB3 f or DB1 f) which will by-pass the "full-map" graphics. Select a scenario as a template as explained above and save it in a save-game location. Build up the map in the usual way and save when finished. The rest of the data for the scenario may be entered with the "full-map" graphics either disabled or enabled. There is a full explanation of "Full Map" graphics in Issue 14.

Re-boot the program (this time with the "full-map" graphics enabled) and use the "full-map" WarPaint™ tool to build up the map. In other words, the "full-map" graphics are only graphic images and do not affect the play of the game.

A NOTE ON .LBM FILES

The .lbm files contain the graphic images. DPaint2™ from Electronic Arts can be used to manipulate the file. Up to 250 hexes can be created but DPaint2™ must be used to change the size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the

'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file.

The Decisive Battles program reads the size of the .lbm file on loading and adjusts the WarPaint™ values automatically. If you don't want to worry about manipulating .lbm files, choose a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as the template to build the new scenario on.

When saving an .lbm file, a temporary file is created first. When the temporary file is successfully saved the original is deleted and the temporary file renamed. This means there must be enough space on the current disk to hold the temporary file.

Macintosh users will find no such complications when it comes to creating scenarios. Follow the directions given in the design section of any *Decisive Battles* game manual.

A NOTE ON SCALE AMONGST OTHER THINGS

Players will note that the game is 23 turns long. Now obviously the battle of Waterloo did not rage for 23 hours, but in testing we have found that Napoleonic battles need to be fought with half hour turns to give a believable result. With the less accurate weapons and consequently tighter formations of Napoleonic warfare as many casualties were suffered by the combatants on June the 18th as by the two sides in three days at Gettysburg. Therefore the turns are half an hour and the time displayed in the game is wrong because of it.

It should be noted that the Prussians have a great many more brigades in the game than they did on the battlefield. This is because the average Prussian brigade was 6-8000 men strong. Prussian brigades were in effect divisions and have been treated as such in the game.

Following Civil War usage the cavalry at Waterloo has a distressing habit of dismounting. Ignore it; in all other respects they tend to act correctly. Because they only possess melee weapons the cavalry will try to close.

Note that due to a deletion late in the creation of the scenario there is no Corps number 3.

PLAYER'S NOTES

French

Your main advantage early on is in the quality of your troops. Use it and use it fast. The Allied left is weak and D'Erlon's Corps is deployed to crush it. Don't rely on one Corps when three will suffice, send Lobau and the Guard as well. Avoid the area between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte; it is a killing ground for English musketry. Once the line has been broken keep pushing along the Brussels road and simultaneously roll up the Allied right. Don't launch Reille at Hougoumont too early, wait till the Allies are in trouble elsewhere. You may be tempted to keep reserves to combat the Prussians; don't. Annihilate Wellington and then all your men will be free to turn on Blucher. Vive L'Empereur.

Allied

Your opponent will likely hurl at least two corps on your weak left. Unless you are very lucky you will not be able to hold. Move your reserves in behind your centre-left to give yourself some defence in depth. Occupy the ridgeline wherever possible as the British receive an entrenchment bonus simulating their use of reverse slope tactics. Make the French pay for every inch of ground and pray for Blucher. If you have kept a sufficient force intact you will be able to crush the French between the two Allied Armies.　◆

ERRATA

Magazine only subscribers will need to replace certain portions of the Fort Donelson data from Issue 23 with the following.

Title [5c]. There are three lines of text for the title of the scenario:

Fort Donelson

"Unconditional Surrender"

February 15-16 1862

Map Size [5a(i)]. The top left sector is 0. The bottom right sector is 4. Macintosh dimensions are 18 x 18.

Limits [5b(i)]. Before you can enter the military units for each side, you must set the force limits. The force limits are as follows; corps (0), divisions (5), brigades (17).

Scenario Setup [5d(i)]. Enter the following data. Date (15), Month (2), Year (62), Century (18), North Maximum Hex Movement is (5,0,0,4,12), South Maximum Hex Movement is (5,0,12,4,10), The Union is encamped (1). The entrenchment values (introduced only in Volume II) are 0 for both sides. VP awards are 15 per leader, 3 per 100 men (North), and 15 per leader, 3 per 100 men (South). IBM and Macintosh users should note the combat value for this scenario is 5 for the North and 1 for the South.

Scenario Details [5d(ii)]. This is a two day scenario. Enter the following data for Day 1. The weather is Clear (0), the North is Defensive (0) and the South is Offensive (1), 6am to 5pm are day (3), move (1) turns, 6pm is a dusk (2), move (1) turn and 7pm is a night (0), move (1) turn. Enter the following data for Day 2. The weather is Clear (0), the North is Offensive (1) and the South is Defensive (0), 5am is a dawn (1), move (1) turn, 6am to 5pm are day (3), move (1) turns and 6pm is a dusk (2), end (2) turn ◆

significant impact on the morale of the other side, even though it had little impact in terms of actually killing people. This was the objective. The longbowmen were intended to demoralise and disorganise the enemy rather than to kill or maim them. To this end the longbowmen were trained in area bombardment fire, rather than aimed fire (Ed. At the risk of seeming pedantic archers shoot and gunners fire. The latter is a contraction of the order 'Give fire to your musket', something which you very literally do with a matchlock, lowering a burning match into the flashpan).

Target practice was at the 'Cloth Yard' a yard of cloth laid out as a target for volley fire from a body of archers, much like a bombardment target for modern artillery. This training enabled the English longbowmen to lay down a concentrated and accurate bombardment on the enemy, using plunging fire, like a howitzer. Such fire was not possible from either crossbows or handguns.

As noted in your article, a longbow is largely incapable of penetrating medieval plate armour. The indirect area fire tactics would make it even less likely to do so. But as I have noted, the aim was not to injure, but to demoralise, and in this the longbow was king until the advent of effective handguns.

The rain of arrows had a sapping effect on the morale of those on the receiving end, which far outweighed the impact of the few casualties inflicted. Fear of this largely harmless fire caused the enemy to shrink away from the bowmen, throwing their formation into disarray. The enemy were largely defeated before they came into contact with the English line.

At Agincourt this was enhanced by the slippery nature of the ground, and the fact that the French were disorganised before they even started their advance. For those interested in this battle, I recommend *Crispin's Day*, *The Glory of Agincourt* by Rosemary Hayley-Jarman.

In my opinion, it was the disorganising and demoralising effects of the longbow that allowed the English men-at-arms to defeat the French, and therefore to win this battle. The contemporaries also believed this. The French took steps to neutralise the longbowmen so that they did not have to advance through the arrow storm. Others hired English mercenary companies.

One might ask, if the longbow was so good, why didn't others adopt it? The answer to this lies in the amount of training needed to perfect the necessary skill to use the longbow effectively, and the ongoing practice to retain that skill. Very few people were willing or able to make the effort.

In fact England, even with laws making archery practice compulsory had difficulty raising a sizeable body of adequately trained archers. The longbow was therefore the weapon of a small, select group of English and Welsh professionals who were dedicated enough to master it.

The difficulty of using the longbow left the bulk of the archers of the period the crossbow. This was a technologically superior weapon, which was also a cinch to use. It also had far better armour piercing capabilities than the longbow, a fact reflected in miniatures wargaming rules for the period. It did not, though, have the demoralising effect of the longbow, even though it was more effective at actually killing people. Its slow rate of fire and lack of ability at plunging fire meant that a unit of crossbowmen, no matter how well trained, could not lay down a morale sapping barrage of arrows at the enemy.

This now finally brings us to the handgun. This had many of the advantages of the crossbow. It was easy to use and had superior armour penetrating ability. In fact the noise of the weapon, and its proven ability to penetrate the best armour, had a morale sapping effect similar to that of the longbow.

The soldiers being shot at were not thinking about the remoteness of being hit, but rather about the fact that being hit meant a certainty of death. This, combined with the noise, which, mag-

Korea

A Scenario for Warlords II Deluxe

By Geoff Walden

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Following the declining influence of Han China(Chungguk) on Korea, there appeared in Korea 4 major powers; Koguryo(Koh-gew-ryaw) in the north and west; Paekche(pairk-cheh) in the south east Silla(Shee-lah) in the south east and Kaya(Kah-yah) in the south between Silla and Paekche.

Koguryo was the most advanced due to its proximity to China and expanded into the Manchurian area from its capital at P'yongyang. Paekche also traded with China across the yellow sea and carved out a territory based on its early capital at Sabi.

Silla being somewhat remote from china developed more slowly. Kaya was a confederation of small kingdoms along the lower Naktong river whose prominent cities were Pon (Original) Kaya and Tae (Tair=Great) Kaya. These traded with the Wa people of Japan and the Chinese as well as the peoples of the far north east coast. Kaya, however was caught between the expanding kingdoms of Paekche and Silla and finally succumbed to Silla by 562 AD.

Koguryo defeated the Sui dynasty of China precipitating that dynasty's collapse and the emergence of the Tang dynasty's genius Li Shih-Min. Silla in desperation to overcome the strengthening Paekche and Kuguryo kingdoms called in T'ang Chinese help.

Paekche collapsed due to a well planned two pronged attack and then Koguryo as well. It be noted that the collapse of these two Kingdoms was as much due to internal political strife as it was to the external attack. It now developed that China demanded suzerainty over all the peninsula as its reward. Silla opposed this and managed to gain the support of the nobility of the defeated kingdoms by generously giving them the same status within Unified Silla.

The new Pan Korean nationalism finally forced the T'ang to concede that control of the peninsula was beyond its means and Li Shih-Min with the example of the fate of the previous Sui dynasty wisely realised this and left the peninsula to itself.

The Japanese role in this was primarily as a nuisance. In fact the attempt by the Kaya to overthrow the Silla kingdom with support from Paekche by bringing in Wa mercenaries caused the Koguryo in alarm to side with Silla, attack Paekche and thereby enable Silla to conquer Kaya.

As a note to this there would seem to be a very strong kinship tie between Kaya and the Wa due the very Japanese sounding names of some of the Kaya leaders. Also tradition has it that many nobles from both Paekche and Kaya fled to Japan at the demise of their kingdoms and established themselves in southern Japan.

Also as a footnote many of the nobility from Koguryo fled north and joined the Malgal peoples and set up the Kingdom of Parhae(Pahl-hair) with control over much of Manchuria. The Malgal people, were a turkish people who were mainly a problem for China and not so much for Korea.

DESIGNERS NOTES

The names of cities which are followed by an asterisk are modern names and may not be the names of those cities during this historical period. The names of temples and ruins are in fact the names of modern temples, most of which but not all were the same in the scenario's historical period.

In playing the scenario be guided by the terrain in your plans of conquest. In particular Kaya will have to gain as much territory as possible and must defeat any of its nearby neighbors as soon as possible.

All four southern powers will need to develop some sort of naval forces to intercept enemy invasions before they can secure a toehold in your home territory.

Koguryo of course has Chungguk (China) and the Malgal to worry about. Use your troop types to best advantage in suitable terrain and especially be aware of those armies with which you have an advantage.

Have fun and may your enemies learn respect for your superior skills ◆

attitudes of the 12th century French knight differed enormously from both our own and from the attitudes portrayed in the average piece of Hollywood King Arthur schlock (which in turn says far more about our own attitudes than it does about the period it purports to display).

One of the central themes in the song is honour. In the twelfth century honour was a far more public matter than it became in later centuries. Honour was something that was important for a knight to obtain and it was vital that he do nothing to besmirch it. If one did a dishonourable thing then one was shamed. The shame came not from within oneself but in the form of censure from one's peers.

Honour was gained by showing courage and prowess in battle, by defeating one's opponents and by being a generous lord or a faithful vassal. Shame, on the other hand could be brought upon oneself in a number of different ways.

To lose in battle was to be shamed. The twelfth century had no such thing as a good loser. This is why in *The Song of Roland*, Roland is not defeated. He dies when his brain bursts as a result of the great exertions of killing several thousand infidels. Similarly Roland's comrade Oliver is struck from behind and Archbishop Turpin is surrounded and attacked by a crowd of Saracens. Neither is truly defeated as their opponents have been forced to use dishonourable tactics against them.

Obviously the reverse side of the equation was that anyone who struck a knight from behind or who combined with others to attack a single knight was guilty of a shameful act.

Not that the twelfth century had any concept of sportsmanship; rather to take advantage of an enemy by attacking from behind or in a group was to acknowledge fear or inferiority. This defeated the purpose of the struggle which was to prove yourself superior to other knights in the only possible way, by defeating them in single combat.

Courage and prudence are seen at odds in *The Song of Roland*. "Roland is fierce and Oliver is wise" states the poet, as if to say the two are incompatible. Oliver wishes Roland to sound his horn and summon back Charlemagne's army to crush the Saracens. Roland refuses saying, "In fair France my fame would suffer scorn".

Given the morality of the day to acknowledge the need for help against an enemy was tantamount to cowardice. It should be noted that it is foolhardy Roland and not prudent Oliver who is the hero of the poem.

Boasting was an important part of the warrior culture and, as in other aspects of life, a knight who made a boast was expected to keep his word. In order to bring the maximum honour on oneself it was necessary to make the greatest possible boast and then carry it through.

Roland boasts that he will die further towards the enemy than any other man and with his face towards the foe. He does so and is thus honoured, unlike Samson who cries "we'll beat them yet" only to be cloven in twain by Roland who replies "Yours is the lying boast!".

Another important concept was fealty. A lord should be generous and great while a vassal should be courageous and loyal. Roland was the perfect vassal and Charlemagne grieves his death both as a friend and as Roland's lord. Roland and Oliver on the other hand are both counts; they are equal. Even here their genuine depth of friendship is obscured by the requirements of honour until Oliver is dying. Betraying a lord or a vassal was perhaps the most dishonourable thing that a knight could do in the twelfth century.

Christianity is best portrayed in *The Song of Roland* by the figure of Archbishop Turpin. Turpin lays on good strokes with the best of them and by modern standards seems a most irreligious man. He even advances the knightly ethos in favour of the monastic life. Importantly Turpin absolves the knights of their sins and repeats the crusading message of salvation for all those who die in the service of Christ.

Of course it is doubtful whether the Church approved of most knightly conduct. They were not stupid, however, and preferred to have an unchristian knightly class under some control than to have the nobility turn away from Christianity entirely.

The knightly attitude to Church interference can perhaps best be summed up by the words of William Marshal on his deathbed in 1214. When told that he must give back everything he had taken throughout his life to the rightful owner Marshal replied "But their teaching is false - else no one can be saved."

The Song of Roland presents a picture of a medieval world very much different from the modern romantic view. It is simple to fall into the trap of interpreting past events in terms of current morality. This is a mistake. Morality is a subjective thing and has changed greatly throughout history. It is only when we understand this that we can hope to understand those people who went before us.

I have two versions of The Song of Roland, The first is translated by Dorothy L. Sayer and was published by Penguin in 1957. The other is translated by D. D. R. Owen and was published by Boydell Press in 1990 ◆

nifying the number of hand-gunners firing, caused the target soldiers to think heavily of their own mortality, with disastrous effects on their chances of standing firm.

The handgun was developed as a replacement for the crossbow, as a sort of

Stalemate in the East

From Moscow to Kursk with the Ninth Armee

December 5th 1941 - March 22nd 1943

by Stephen Hand

Following the successful closure of the Kiev Pocket in late September 1941 Hitler turned his sights on Moscow. Whether it was too late in the year or the Russians were simply too tenacious, the Soviet capital held. Commencing on December 5th a series of counterattacks drove the frozen divisions of the Wehrmacht up to 250 miles back. Most in danger of encirclement was the Ninth Armee of Generaloberst Walther Model. The battles fought by Ninth Armee over the next year and a half included a breakout from a pocket, the encirclement and destruction of two Soviet armies and finally a masterful withdrawal from a salient. Although they shrink into insignificance compared to events in southern Russia these operations ensured the continued existence of Army Group Centre.

The Soviet counterattack began as a classic double envelopment. The shoulders of the Moscow salient were attacked both north and south of the capital with the objective being Smolensk.

In a savage free for all around Vyasma Colonel-General Strauss's Ninth Armee (Model was yet to take over) narrowly avoided being pocketed. In the south General Efremov's 33rd Soviet Army actually broke through to Vyasma. The Germans succeeded in closing the gap behind the Soviet breakthrough.

Too weak to eliminate the resulting pocket, the Germans merely allowed it to collapse through lack of supplies and attrition. General Efremov shot himself during the last days of his Army in April 1942.

In the north a deep wedge was driven into the German positions by the 3rd and 4th Soviet Shock Armies. On their southern flank the 29th and 39th Armies attacked between Rzhev and Olenino. The XXIII Corps of Ninth Armee was cut off in the latter town.

As the Soviet spearhead moved south an attempt was made to cut the communications of 9th Army by capturing the vital town of Sychevka. The rail line to Vyasma which made Sychevka so important was also the downfall of the attacking Russians. Sitting on a rail siding was a supply train full of chocolate and cognac. This proved such an inviting target that the plundering Soviets were taken completely by surprise in a German counterattack. Reinforcements from France stabilised the position but the deep penetration of the German line remained, as did the isolation of XXIII Corps.

It was at this point, on January the 15th that Strauss asked to be relieved on the grounds of his ill health. His replacement was General der Panzertruppen Walther Model, one of Hitler's favoured commanders. Model had, like Rommel and Guderian enjoyed a meteoric rise, due as much to his having caught the Führer's eye as to his continued successes in the field.

Model's first action as commander of Ninth Armee was to ensure that the position west of Sychevka could be held. Once the immediate danger of the entire Army being encircled had receded Model was able to turn his attention on the plight of the four divisions of XXIII Corps encircled in Olenino.

1st Panzer Division had been switched to Ninth Armee to ensure that Rzhev remained in German hands. It had arrived just in time to be of great use in the battles around Sychevka. Now it was Model's mobile reserve and not to be wasted on defence. Along with the newly arrived 2nd SS Motorised Division 'Reich' 1st Panzer attacked northwest from Sychevka into the flank of the Russian penetration.

Just as Model had predicted the Russians moved men to seal off the breakthrough. This had two favourable effects. The first was to draw Soviet strength back from the open flank to the south and the second was to weaken the area between Rzhev and Olenino.

This initial attack had been made on January 21st. A day later, just as the Russians were starting to react, VI Corps attacked west from Rzhev and XXIII Corps attacked east from Olenino. Just after midday on January 23rd the two forces made contact. Not only was the German pocket relieved but the supply roads built by the Soviet 29th and 39th Armies were cut.

Although the Russians were not technically pocketed they were forced to receive their supplies through the 4th Shock Army sector to their west. This piggybacking of the supply lines for three armies resulted in chaos.

Model was well aware that the Russians would launch continuous attacks to regain their lines of communications. He therefore shifted the strongest regiment of the Reich SS Division to defensive positions on the Soviet supply

OPERATION SEYDLITZ July 2-12 1942

- **XX** ⬭ **2** Panzer Division
- **X** ⧄ Cavalry Brigade Model
- ⬤ Area Occupied by German Forces July 1st 1942
- ➤ German Thrust July 2-3
- **39th Army** Soviet Army

Map labels: 0 10 20 30 Miles; Volga R.; 4th Shock Army; Olenino; XX ⬭ 5; Rzhev; X; XX ⬭ 2; Bely; Sychevka; 39th Army; XX ⬭ 20; To Moscow; To Smolensk; Dniepr R.; Vyasma

roads. Under savage attacks from the north the line was held. This enabled Model to reinforce and renew the attack being made by 1st Panzer and the SS Reich Divisions to the south. The attack struck at the junction of the two Soviet Armies with the result that they became separated. As the attacking force swung north it was able to link up with the XXIII Corps near Olenino and on February 17 the Soviet 29th Army was encircled.

For three weeks the Russians had been attacking from the north. The casualties amongst the German defenders were heavy. Amongst the Russians they were ruinous. Whatever the Soviets hurled at the line, somehow it held. The result of this was that on February 18th the 29th Army was ordered to break out to the south where 39th Army was still receiving some supplies. The breakout attempt was a disaster. Although 5000 men broke through to 39th Army the bulk of 10 Russian divisions were destroyed. The figures of 26 000 dead compared to only 5000 prisoners give some indication of the ferocity of the fighting. German casualties were also high. On February 18th the SS

'Reich' regiment assigned to hold back the Russians in the north was pulled out of the line. There were only 35 men fit for battle.

By the end of February the danger to Ninth Armee was over. 29th Army had been destroyed and 39th Army was all but surrounded. The offensive power of both sides was practically spent and so the incredibly convoluted front line of Ninth Armee would remain until the spent units of the Army could be brought up to strength. In recognition of his achievements Walther Model was promoted to Generaloberst.

While this larger offensive was taking place other attacks were being launched against the Soviet 39th Army. A thrust from 3rd Panzer Armee retook Bely and separated the Russians from 4th Shock Army to the west. Only a narrow corridor existed into the 39th Army pocket.

While the other German offensives were going on an unusual series of attacks commenced in the area west of Sychevka. In this sector, occupied by 6th Panzer Division, the Russians still threatened the Sychevka-Vyasma railroad.

An offensive to the west would have two effects. Firstly it would safeguard Ninth Armee's supply lines and secondly it would push the Russians out of the numerous villages and rich farmland they were currently occupying into a barren region of forests and swamps.

Sixth Panzer Division at this time possessed practically no heavy equipment of any kind and was therefore limited in the type of attacks it could successfully perform. It was therefore decided that the division would launch a series of small, limited objective attacks, never pressing an unsuccessful attack and never risking high casualties. This series of attacks became known as the 'Snail Offensive'.

In order to avoid unnecessary artillery casualties neither side concentrated troops too close to the enemy. Therefore the front line of the Soviet 39th Army consisted of village strongpoints

which were intended to break up and slow down any German attack. This was all very well if the Germans intended a conventional breakthrough attack but was of little use against the tactics of the 'Snail Offensive'. Surprise attacks were launched to capture individual strongpoints which were then fortified and defended against counterattacks.

This 'bite and hold' technique was repeated with great success over a period of two months the only setback being when the Führer Begleit Battalion attempted a conventional breakthrough attack and was heavily repulsed.

As Sixth Panzer Division received new equipment the pace of the offensive picked up. By the end of March 1942 over two hundred villages had been captured and the Russians had been forced back into the marshes. Numerous replacements had been exposed to combat and troops who had been demoralised after the Russian offensives where instilled with a new confidence.

After the 'Snail Offensive' and the destruction of 29th Army the time was ripe for an offensive to destroy 39th Army and erase the bulge in the German front. During the spring as the Germans received replacements and new equipment to bring their divisions up to strength the Russians likewise reinforced 39th Army.

Given the fact that the Germans had regained the initiative in the sector held by Ninth Armee the Soviets were in great danger of being surrounded and destroyed. With no plans for an offensive of their own Soviet high command should have seen the danger to 39th Army and withdrawn it from the salient which it currently occupied.

Part of the Russian confidence lay in the fact that the Germans had pushed them back into an area of swampy forests which was practically impassable to vehicles. The only really suitable tank country was along the Rollbahn (a German term indicating a road designated as the main axis of motorised transport) from Olenino to Bely, both cities being in German hands. An at-

OPERATION BUFFALO - March 1-22, 1943

— Moscow - Minsk Highway

Area Evacuated by Ninth Armee during Operation Buffalo

Area remaining under German control March 22, 1943

tack along this road would have the added benefit of completing the encirclement of the Soviet 39th Army.

The Olenino-Bely Rollbahn was such an obvious avenue of attack that the Russians had heavily fortified it. East and west of the Rollbahn the approaches to the Russian positions passed through such unfavourable terrain that an attack by anything other than infantry was considered impossible. Model realised that if he were to attack the vulnerable Soviet supply

lines he would either have to accept heavy casualties or do the impossible.

In an excellent show of German military improvisation Model ordered the formation of a Kampfgruppe which would be able to traverse the so-called impassable terrain. This unit, Cavalry Brigade Model, was formed from the reconnaissance battalions of each of Model's eight divisions. While effective as a temporary expedient the removal of the reconnaissance battalion from infantry divisions in particular

left them without their sole mobile reserve.

Cavalry Brigade Model was equipped with roughly equal parts of horse cavalry and bicycle troops. Supplies were carried on local 'panje' wagons drawn by the Russian ponies of the same name. Although the brigade was weak in artillery it was equipped with approximately double the normal complement of machine guns giving it an impressive firepower against soft targets.

In late June 1942 the cavalry brigade was inserted into the line between 5th Panzer Division on its right and 86th Infantry Division on its left. It was to support the attack of 5th Panzer Division along the rollbahn. The other units of Ninth Armee were not to advance until 24 hours after the initial attack. A simultaneous attack from Bely by 2nd Panzer Division would hopefully link up with Model's spearhead.

The operation, codenamed Seydlitz, was scheduled for July 2nd. As this date approached it was decided to attach 14 tanks to Cavalry Brigade Model. In order to allow these tanks to reach the Russian lines a corduroy road was constructed by felling trees along the route up to the front. As the Russian defences in this area relied heavily on minefields a mine-clearing squad was attached to each tank.

At 0300 on July 2nd the tanks and cavalry of the brigade emerged from the woods and overran the Russian forward positions. The minefields were not adequately defended and therefore did not slow the German advance significantly.

Behind the Russian positions were more swampy woods which, in the absence of preparations, proved an impassable barrier to the German tanks. The immediate need for armour, however, had disappeared as the broken Russians were pursued through the forest.

The 5th Panzer Division attacked at the same time as Cavalry Brigade Model and immediately ran into difficulties. Deeply echeloned anti-tank defences took a heavy toll both in terms of casualties and time. By the middle of the day it was clear that the cavalry brigade would have to cut west into the rear of the Soviet positions.

Although the terrain to be crossed consisted of knee-deep swamps the first regiment of the brigade emerged onto the rollbahn just before dark. Realising that the enemy was in their rear the Russians facing 5th Panzer Division collapsed and a link-up between the two German units was made in the morning of July 3rd.

The rapid advance of 5th Panzer Division combined with the northward thrust of 2nd Panzer Division from Bely resulted in the communications of the Soviet 39th Army being cut by the end of July 3rd. Despite desperate counterattacks the German corridor was held open. Cut off from its supply source 39th Army weakened its entire front in order to be able to launch these attacks.

The result of this was that a series of German attacks on the pocket, commencing on July 3rd met with stunning success. 20th Panzer Division thrust into the pocket from the east, separating the Russians into two groups.

Over the next nine days these two pockets were reduced by concentric attacks. 50 000 prisoners, 230 tanks and 760 artillery pieces were captured. While the Ninth Armee still formed a salient into Russian lines it was broad enough to be safe from all but a major offensive. Although there were attacks over the next six months these were minor and posed no threat to Ninth Armee. The salient remained, a constant threat to Moscow.

It was not until early 1943 that more thought was given to what had become known as the Rzhev salient. After the disaster at Stalingrad there was an urgent need for experienced divisions in the south. The 29 divisions manning the 330 miles of the Rzhev salient were an obvious source of fresh units.

However, in order to free up more than one or two divisions from Ninth Armee the salient would have to be surrendered. This was a difficult military decision, possession of Rzhev and Vyasma gave the Germans a jumping off point for a future attack on Moscow. In order to defeat the Soviet Union it would be necessary to capture the capital. The surrender of the Rzhev salient was an admission that the Wehrmacht was not going to take Moscow in the foreseeable future. It was not the type of admission that a man of Hitler's temperament made easily.

Despite Hitler's preference for holding positions at all cost he finally allowed himself to be persuaded into ordering a withdrawal from the Rzhev salient. The order was given on February 6th 1943.

Ninth Armee and portions of Fourth Armee were given four weeks in which to make all the preparations for a withdrawal. The timing was vital if the operation was to be successfully carried out before the onset of the spring thaw. Generaloberst Model set the date for the commencement of the withdrawal as March 1st.

In the three weeks or so between transmission of the order and the first rearward movement a great number of things needed to be done. Firstly the new defensive line across the base of the salient had to be constructed.

The new position, dubbed the Buffalo Line was 125 miles in length, less than half the frontage of the salient itself. In addition to this, provision had to be made to pull back 29 divisions up to 60 miles. Roads were built for trucks and sleighs and track was laid for additional trains. Everything was to be removed from the salient, food, livestock, all machinery or vehicles and 60 000 Russian collaborators. Even the railroad tracks and the telephone wires were to be removed.

Security was strict but was of no use to the Germans as news of the withdrawal had already been relayed to Stalin by Soviet agents within OKW. Another difficulty was the possibility that the thaw would come before March 1st. Dual plans had to be made depending on the weather. In the case of snow the majority of supplies would be removed by sleigh, if the thaw came trucks and carts would have to be used.

Throughout the last days of February the weather stayed cold. Then on March 1st the temperature suddenly rose and the snow began to melt. The primary mode of transport would have to be wheeled vehicles.

The withdrawal was not scheduled to start until 1900 hours, after nightfall and just as the final preparations were made the temperature dropped just as suddenly as it had risen. The roads froze over and the troops patiently unloaded their trucks and carts and loaded up their sleighs.

As the withdrawal began the unpleasant job of the rearguards began. With prior warning of the German intentions the Soviets began their pursuit relatively soon after the beginning of the operation.

The first tentative probes by the Russians were thrown back by the rearguards, one third of the normal front line contingent. As the Soviet attacks became stronger the German rearguards began to retire and in doing so they uncovered the other defence left behind by the retreating divisions, mines.

Under normal circumstances mines would not slow down a pursuing enemy appreciably. Both sides had become proficient at mine clearing during the first two years of the war so if mines were to be effective something special was needed.

Firstly a huge volume of mines was made available to Ninth Armee but most importantly the engineers competed to find new and more fiendish ways to disguise mines and more unlikely places to conceal them.

When the Russians advanced into Rzhev they found mines set to explode when doors opened, under stairs, in ovens, attached by hidden wires to 'abandoned' tools, weapons or food etc. Within a day of the first withdrawals Russian soldiers were ordered not to enter any deserted buildings or touch any objects left lying around. The Soviet advance became tentative as mine clearing parties preceded each spearhead.

Over the next three weeks Ninth Armee withdrew to successive lines without major difficulty. Despite continuous Russian attacks on the rearguards not a single breakthrough was achieved.

Casualties among the German divisions were negligible, a tribute to the meticulous planning undertaken by Model and his staff. By March 22nd Ninth Armee had occupied the Buffalo Line with seven divisions. 22 divisions were freed up as a reserve.

Von Manstein in the south and Model in the north had given Germany a mobile reserve which could have been used to oppose Soviet breakthroughs along the entire front. Hitler, however, demanded an offensive solution.

A bit over three months after the withdrawal of Ninth Armee the reserves which both Model and Manstein had created were expended in the abortive battle of Kursk. Ninth Armee's year and a half in front of Moscow had been for nothing ◆

poor man's longbow. Combining as it did the morale sapping impact of the longbow with the ease of use of the crossbow it inevitably replaced both weapons.

Much of the psychological impact of handguns wore off, once they became common, and their inaccuracy well known. But by then they had improved to moderately effective killing weapons, well capable of disrupting an enemy formation.

It is possible that a group of longbowmen could have had an impact out of proportion to their numbers in the Napoleonic Wars. But given the logistical effort needed to train a longbowman and the size of the armies of the period it is unlikely that sufficient numbers could have been trained

to have had an impact. That fact, combined with their vulnerability to cavalry would have made it not worth the effort (Napoleon considered rifles more trouble than they were worth). You are therefore right in claiming that the advent of the arquebus and musket rendered the longbow out of date, but are wrong in dismissing it as never having any impact, however brief, on medieval warfare.

Yours Sincerely
Anthony S. Howarth
Campbelltown, NSW

Ed. Thanks for a thoughtful letter Anthony, though next time try to make it a little shorter. The moral effect upon the French men-at-arms of advancing under a hail of arrows was certainly a contributing factor to their defeats.

However, this would have achieved nothing had it not been for the English men-at arms. If the French had been attacking unsupported archers their superior skill and armour would have won the day. Similarly if the English knights had not been among the most solid hand-to-hand fighters in Europe there is no way they could have withstood even a demoralised column of Frenchmen.

The first attack at Agincourt threw the English line back 'two spear lengths'! And yet the English held. This is almost unprecedented in the history of warfare. For a line to resist a damaged but unbroken column is remarkable. Clearly the archers performed a useful, but still a subordinate role.

By the time of Bicocca in 1522 volley fire, probably by rank, enabled arquebusiers to deliver an almost continuous hail of bullets. For the first time in the history of warfare missiles alone were capable of shattering an attack. Within three years, between 1522 and 1525 arquebusiers had destroyed the best infantry and the best cavalry in Europe. Whereas the longbow had proved a useful adjunct to the more

traditional medieval arms the arquebus and subsequently the musket drove these same weapons off the battlefield, becoming within a century and a half after Bicocca the sole infantry weapons in use throughout Europe.

Reach for the Stars is a multiplayer game of space colonisation and conquest. Starting with a single colony players must carve out their own interstellar empire.

Reach for the Stars is a unique combination of constructive and destructive elements. To win a player must successfully manage their own economy as well as pursuing a correct military strategy. While a strong space navy is a very necessary part of your economic plans, it is by no means a guarantee of success.

Players must explore the unknown reaches of space, improve the economy and environment of their planets, successfully create and nurture new colonies, and invest in technical R&D so as not to be left behind in the military space race.

Reach for the Stars was a huge hit, right from its initial release, and has evolved through many versions and improvements. It has become the classic space conquest game, and is still the yardstick by which new games in the genre are measured. The new version of *Reach for the Stars* will build on this inheritance, and contain numerous improvements and enhancements to what is already a great game. These will include:

Network/modem play, Enhanced AI routines, State of the art SVGA graphics, Win 95 native program, New Diplomacy systems, New space combat systems, New technology/R&D systems, Enhanced planetary displays, Intuitive user interface, Large range of

scenarios from introductory level to full galactic conquest, Different races locked in interstellar combat.

Hardware Requirements

Windows 95, 8 Mb RAM, 486 DX2/66 minimum, Pentium recommended, 2 x CD drive

Warlords III is an eight player fantasy strategy game where the struggle for survival and eventual dominance is played out on an epic scale. Players start with a single city, and must explore and conquer their surroundings, whilst building their economic base in preparation for the intense conflicts to follow.

Warlords III is the successor to the highly successful and well regarded *Warlords*, *Warlords II* and *Warlords II Deluxe*.

All Warlords games have had common elements which have ensured a highly addictive game experience with maximum replay value. These elements include easy, statless gameplay, challenging AI, a multitude of game options, and deep game design. The general fantasy setting for Warlords has given it the widest possible appeal.

Warlords III will add many features in order to improve the basic game idea. Each side in a scenario will have it's own army set, allowing greater differentiation in both graphics and performance between sides. There will be different types of heroes with an expanded number of skills. Heroes will be able to use new magic spells and items.

Multiplayer support will be an integral part of *Warlords III*. Network play will have a real-time option, where all human players move simultaneously. (The sequential turn option will be retained for solitaire, and PBEM play.) A campaign mode will be introduced, and there will be a greater range of game options and increased flexibility in setting up scenarios.

A new, sophisticated diplomacy system will increase interactions between players, and players will be able to ally with each other, and win victories as an allied side, allowing for team play. As is the tradition of the Warlords series, the

computer AI will be among the best in strategy gaming. The AI will be substantially improved in diplomacy, resource acquisition, combat and movement over *Warlords II Deluxe*.

The minimum hardware spec will be 486 100MHz, 8MB of RAM, 256 color video card, double speed CD-ROM and Sound Blaster.

DON'T MENTION THE WAR

I did once, but I think I got away with it. Anyone who bought *The Complete Carriers at War* for the PC or *Total War* for the Mac will have noticed that the swastikas on the tailfins of the German planes were sort of smudged out. The reason is that the German government forbids the display of swastikas, even in representations of the war.

MEA CULPA

Yes, another mistake. I am reminded of a story I once heard from the editor of a scientific journal who recounted how he had an issue proofread by three separate people only to find one word spelled three different ways in the first paragraph. In Issue 23 some of the data for the Fort Donelson scenario was not correct. The appropriate data is included at the end of the Waterloo article in this issue.