Featured in this Issue

❋ **Invasion Hawaii -** the Japanese have triumphed at Midway and now the stage is set for the next objective; the Hawaiian Islands. A *Carriers at War* scenario

❋ **Kremenchug** - Guderian and Kleist trap the Soviet 38th Army at Kiev

❋ **Monocacy** - Early makes a last, futile threat against the Federal Capital

Run 5

Issue 22

Disk Subscriptions

Disk subscriptions are now available for IBM and Macintosh users. The cost is the same for all formats.

IBM users must tell us whether they prefer 3.5" or 5.25" format.If you don't specify a format, you will receive the 3.5" diskette. If you wish to switch disk subscriptions from one machine format to another, just let us know.

When we find the time, we intend to upgrade all the scenario disks from back issues into the new formats and allow new users to acquire them or current users to upgrade to them. We'll keep the cost as low as possible; it will depend on how much time it takes and how many scenarios we can fit onto a disk.

Upgrading to New Machines

We have received a large number of requests from our users to upgrade a particular title from one machine to another. In response to this demand, we have decided upon the following policy.

Any title from our range may be upgraded from one machine to another for a cost of half the retail price of the new version. You must send us the original program disk and the front page of the manual from that game. We will send you a complete copy of the new version of the game.

For example, if you wish to upgrade a C-64 version of *Halls of Montezuma* to the IBM/Tandy version, you should send us the original C-64 disk, the front page of the manual and the appropriate cheque, money order or MC/Visa number.

North American users must send their components and funds to our US Office. Everybody else must use our Australian Office.

EDITOR'S CHANCE

If all goes well this issue will first see the light of day at this year's Origins in San Jose. Once again we will have a strong presence at Origins and hopefully by the time you read this we will have seen many of you at the SSG stand.

Last issue saw our first exploratory steps into full color. We had a few teething problems, notably erratic photo quality. Hopefully that has all been fixed for this issue. We have even more color pages this time, hope you enjoy it.

We have had a few problems recently with subscribers changing their address and failing to inform us of the fact. Unless you inform us of a change of address we'll keep on sending your subscription to the same old one. Despite what some of our more ebullient correspondents might claim we do not possess godlike powers (well I don't anyway).

Some people have suggested that the Carriers at War Construction Kit is too complex. Hah! its so simple that a twelve year old can use it; and has. I was most impressed to receive a Carriers at War scenario the other day from twelve year old Chris Wieczorek. Well done Chris, you're putting all us larger children to shame.

IN THIS ISSUE

The closure of the Kiev pocket, in my opinion, lost Germany the war in Russia. The southern pincer of this envelopment, at Kremenchug is the subject of a *Battlefront* scenario by Steve Ford. It has also provoked enormous argument here at SSG on the subject of whether the Germans could ever have defeated the Russians in WWII. I believe that the Germans could have won but certain of my colleagues violently disagree. In practice I guess an army

led by Hitler was bound to fail. Even if Hitler had made the correct military decision regarding Kiev he would have been assured of making a fatal blunder somewhere along the line, after all, the man was insane. I guess it's just tough for us wargamers that the best quality army of WWII belonged to the bad guys. On the one hand you have to admire them for their professionalism but on the other hand they were led by a pack of totalitarian scumbags, crooks and psychopaths. But I digress.

Kremenchug is a touch and go situation where von Rundstedt's Army Group South has to force a crossing of the Dniepr in the face of stout Russian opposition. There are plenty of exciting decisions for both players. Make the wrong decision as the Germans and you will end the game languishing on the south bank of the Dniepr with a shattered army. Make the right decision and you will be racing to see whether you can destroy that last Russian unit by game's end.

The *Decisive Battles* scenario is Monocacy, another river line to be forced, although this time with musketry and cold steel. A quick victory for the Confederates could see Early's Valley Army in Washington. Alternatively a solid delaying defence by the Union forces will guarantee that Federal reinforcements reach the capital before the Rebs.

What would have happened if the Japanese had won the battle of Midway? Well in our version of reality they would have launched an invasion of Hawaii. In a new scenario for *Carriers at War* we explore the possibilities open to the Japanese in such an invasion. There are a lot more planes on Oahu than there were on Midway but can they make a difference? I warn you, this is another tough one for the Americans to win.

We also have an update of the Illuria scenario for all you *Warlords II* players who have subsequently bought the *Scenario Builder*.

Due to the small space taken up by the data for this issue's scenarios we have an extended letters column. We have been receiving numerous interesting letters, as usual in two sentences most writers can map out a prospective five year plan for SSG, don't worry though, keep them coming.

NEXT ISSUE

After the media had all but ignored a whole series of WWII 50th anniversaries it was a bit of a shock to see the coverage that D-Day is receiving. All this is serving to reinforce the insular western view that we won the war against Germany and the Russians were just a bit part player.

As experienced wargamers we know the truth, don't we? In the three months of June, July and August 1944 the Wehrmacht lost 293, 802 men on the western front and 916, 860 men on the eastern front. Therefore we are stubbornly resisting fashion and sticking to the decisive, Russian theatre.

If Army Group South had been commanded by a lesser man than FM von Manstein in January 1943 the Russians would almost certainly have broken through the Army Group front and created a giant pocket against the black sea. The Soviet attempt to do so is the subject of another Steve Ford *Battlefront* scenario, Pavlograd.

The *Decisive Battles* scenario is the long awaited title bout between the Army of the Potomac in one corner and the Prussian Army of the Elbe in the other. The battlefield is known to all, Gettysburg, scene of the Union's greatest triumph. Don't ask me why they're fighting or how the Prussians got there, just sit back and watch as Grant and von Moltke square off in the battle of the century.

If any group of people should be able to construct good *Carriers at War* scenarios it's naval officers. Judge for yourself next issue when we publish a series of scenarios by Lt. Commander Richard Mater of the Royal Australian Navy.

Book of the Quarter

In the first column under this title I reviewed a book written by a German Colonel General. I then went on to look at a book by a Field Marshal. This issue I am lowering my sights, firstly by examining a book written by a Captain and secondly by taking seriously the writings of a member of the British officer class. I will go on to examine two narrative histories of the Civil War.

The first book in question is Basil Liddell-Hart's classic; *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*. Originally written in 1920 under the title *The Decisive Wars of History* this book was revised in the light of further conflicts until it reached its final form in 1967.

Warfare, claims Liddell-Hart can be waged by the use of either direct or indirect approaches. Put simply a direct approach is anything that is expected and therefore prepared for by the enemy and an indirect approach is the opposite. If one were to distil the essence of Liddell-Hart's thesis it is that a general must always attempt to do what the enemy least expects.

In order to illustrate this principle the majority of the book is spent in examining the great wars of history in order to determine whether the successful strategies have been direct or indirect. It is of course no surprise to discover that throughout history the best generals have, according to Liddell-Hart, utilised variants of the indirect approach. From the oblique approach of Epaminondas to the German Schwerpunkt, the indirect approaches of different generals and different ages are discussed as well as the failures of these same generals, mostly due to their being too direct and obvious.

Although Liddell-Hart acts as a good counterpoint to the overly direct generalship of WWI, in response to which the first draft of the book was written, in common with most idealogues he overstates his case. Generals of the 19th

3

THE Q STORE

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Stephen,

Greetings and Salutations!

How are you all doing? We are all fine here I am writing for many reasons, one, and most importantly, to thank you for publishing Rainbow 5. I bet over the years I have made over 30 ground games between the Battlefront and Decisive Battles series, and even a few CAW and EA games on the Commodore; but Rainbow 5 was my pride and joy. So I just want to thank you for putting it into print.

Also, since John Gleason has referred many tech callers to me, I have taken an "unofficial survey" on SSG products. Here's some of the things I have been told from guys from Canada to Puerto Rico and all points in between.

A lot of SSG users would like to see Europe Ablaze, Russia, and the Battles in Normandy in IBM format; in that order.

The single scenarios that were offered on Commodore and Apple in the early subscriptions converted to IBM and made available.

Here's a good one; a separate listing of all scenarios published and unpublished, of all different SSGgames that you've received, put on an order sheet, and be made available for buyers.

How about an "above view" of the ships twisting and turning in the ocean to avoid bombs in CAW.

CAW on CD

European ship graphics for CAW

Let me tell you, EVERYBODY who calls about Carriers at War loves it! A lot of these guys have got some great scenarios. I keep telling them to send them to you. Many seem to be concentrating on the air war. One kid sent me a disk that was 10% ships and 90% plane warfare. Guys, you have a great Europe Ablaze system here with a great EA

KREMENCHUG

The Southern Pincer of the Kiev Encirclement

August 31st - September 9th, 1941

A Scenario for the Battlefront Game System

by Steve Ford and Stephen Hand

By the beginning of August 1941 the Wehrmacht had plunged deep into Russia. Pockets had been formed and hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were in captivity. However, as recent fighting at Smolensk had shown, the Red Army was far from beaten. There were more Soviet Divisions in the field than at the start of the campaign and a decisive effort was still required for the Germans to finish the campaign before the onset of winter. The Generals of Army Group Centre were poised for the final dash to Moscow when, inexplicably, it was postponed. Armeegruppe Guderian was diverted south to link up with Kleist's Panzergruppe 1 and form the largest pocket in military history.

Before the start of Operation Barbarossa on June 22nd 1941 Adolf Hitler stated that "When the attack on Russia starts the world will hold its breath". On the verge of launching the largest military operation in history this was perhaps stating the obvious.

The mass of the attack was with Heersgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre - AGC) whose initial objective was Smolensk. Subsequent objectives would be assigned at the appropriate date, however, to the men of AGC there could be only one objective, Moscow.

The initial progress of AGC was rapid and dramatic. By June 28th Panzergruppes 2 and 3 (Guderian and Hoth) had linked up at Minsk, creating the Bialystok pocket. Guderian on the southern flank rapidly pushed ahead, capturing the vital crossings of the Beresina.

On July 10th, after the capitulation of the Bialystok pocket, Guderian forced dual crossings of the Dniepr between the three Russian bridgeheads of Orsha, Mogilev and Rogachev.

As this was happening Hoth took Vitebsk and outflanked Smolensk from the north. Lead elements of Panzergruppe 2 occupied Smolensk on July 16th and despite strong Russian counterattacks to his southern flank, Guderian pushed on to the east.

As the Smolensk pocket was reduced by elements of the two Panzergruppes, Guderian attacked the strong Russian forces to the southeast. This put him astride the main Moscow highway. AGC had now achieved all its preliminary objectives and was poised to begin the assault on Moscow. Troops enjoying their first rest for several weeks erected signs marked "To Moscow".

To the south of these events Heersgruppe Sud (Army Group South - AGS) was making steady progress through the Ukraine. The Stalin Line

Backbone of the Infantry
Unlike the Allies who regarded light machine guns as an adjunct to riflemen, the Germans made the LMG the basis of each infantry squad.

Situation Map for the Kremenchug Scenario

Sixth and seventeenth armees and by Kleist's Panzergruppe 1 with a broad front advance by 11th Armee and Germany's Romanian and Hungarian allies.

The Northernmost units of AGS, Sixth Armee and the Panzers were separated from AGC by the Pripet Marshes, deemed impassable to mobile troops. As these two formations moved southeast through Zhitomir they were simultaneously attacked from the Pripet Marshes by the Soviet 5th Army and from the south by the Sixth Army. The aim of the attack was to cut off the German spearhead, creating a pocket. The result was that both Soviet armies were repulsed, the Sixth Army recoiling towards the southeast and the 5th Army retiring back into the marshes north of Kiev. The continued threat posed by 5th Army was to have long reaching effects.

Kleist's panzers continued along the west bank of the Dniepr and on August 3rd combined with 17th Armee to close a pocket in the Uman area. Two Russian armies, 20 divisions, were surrounded. AGS was free to look towards Kiev, the second largest city in the Soviet Union. The Kiev area now formed a dangerous salient for the Russians, containing five armies.

With the pause of AGC in late July Zhukov, the Soviet Chief of General Staff felt that he was in position to adequately defend the direct approaches to Moscow. In any case a second line of defence was prepared in front of the capital. The area in which Zhukov feared a breakthrough was Central Front, now guarding the northern flank of the Kiev salient. Stalin was advised to reinforce this front and to rationalise the line by giving up Kiev. As a consequence of this counsel Zhukov was sacked and given command of Reserve Front guarding Moscow. Stalin had no intention of surrendering a city as valuable as Kiev.

When the Russian leaders saw Guderian begin to move south in August they assumed that he was bypassing and attempting to pocket the strong

(A name used by the Germans, not the Russians) was a dilapidated series of fortifications along the pre-war Soviet border. After the collapse of the frontier defences it was expected that AGS would be held along this line. This was not to be the case as the defences were pierced almost at will.

The advance in the south combined mobile breakthroughs by the German

KREMENCHUG - Map

CLEAR	ROUGH
FRONT LINE	BRIDGE
FORT	HIDDEN ROAD

ROAD

DNIEPR RIVER

KREMENCHUG

MINEFIELD

forces barring the direct advance of AGC on Moscow. This was indeed what Guderian had wanted to do but Hitler had other ideas and the recently renamed Armeegruppe Guderian was in the process of closing the Kiev pocket.

On July 29th Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's chief adjutant visited Guderian, ostensibly to award him the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross but more significantly to get his opinions on future operations. Hitler was unsure of the direction of his next major thrust, should it be towards Moscow or should he use the flank formations of AGC to aid Heersgruppe Nord (Army Group North - AGN) and AGS. Guderian stressed the need to take Moscow.

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian
The father of the Panzertruppen and commander of the northern pincer of the Kiev encirclement

Being the major Soviet communication centre, the capture of Moscow would effectively split the Eastern Front into two distinct sections between which it would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to transfer troops. Added to this, Moscow accounted for 13% of Soviet industry and, to a far greater degree than any other European capital Moscow was the centre of government.

Its capture would render the country, at least temporarily, leaderless. It would isolate Leningrad and the Ukraine from Asiatic Russia and offered the chance to outflank both these areas and win the campaign.

Still undecided on his next move, Hitler called a conference of his key commanders for August 4th. Despite all the

army commanders of AGC advising a continuation of the thrust towards Moscow Hitler favoured a swift reduction of Leningrad followed by an advance into the Ukraine.

Heavy fighting continued on the south east flank of AGC and several small pockets were formed as Guderian cleared himself a jump off point for his drive to the Soviet capital. Kleist's Panzergruppe 1 captured their first bridgehead over the Dniepr on August 19th.

Another conference took place on August 23rd during which it was revealed that Hitler, who was not present, had settled on the Ukraine and the Crimea as his next major objectives. All the field officers present saw this as a dangerous reorientation of their axis of advance, one that would result in critical delays when the advance on Moscow began. It is interesting to note that all the officers present assumed that the cooperation with AGS to form a pocket in the Kiev area would be a diversion from the inevitable advance on Moscow. No one was prepared to envisage permanently switching the weight of the German attack on the Soviet Union away from the capital.

FM von Bock commanding AGC decided to send Guderian to talk to Hitler about his plans. Guderian was one of Hitler's favourites and it was thought that he might be able to get through to the Fuhrer. Before he was granted an audience with Hitler, Guderian was ordered by the commander-in-chief , von Brauchitsch not to mention Moscow. Instead Guderian cleverly engineered it so that Hitler brought the subject up. Guderian's views on the subject were inevitably asked for. Among other considerations Guderian mentioned the tremendous morale boost that the German army would get from the news that Moscow had fallen and conversely the lowering of Soviet morale. He also pointed out that the distance from AGC to Lochvitsa (the designated meeting point of the two armoured spearheads to close the Kiev pocket) was 275 miles, further than the distance to Moscow.

Hitler then laid out his arguments for the Ukrainian operation. They were dominated by economics. The denial of the Ukrainian agriculture and industry to the Russians, and its value to the Germans were uppermost in the Fuhrer's mind. He referred to the Crimea as "that Soviet aircraft carrier for attacking the Rumanian oilfields" and for perhaps the first time used the phrase "My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war". Little mention was made of the military benefit, beyond the obvious one of pocketing five Russian armies, of the proposed operation. Guderian failed to forcefully argue that the capture of Moscow would render the Soviet armies in the north Ukraine irrelevant and Hitler remained fixed on his plan.

The intention was to split Guderian's Armeegruppe, sending a portion of it south and retaining part of it to be refitted for the advance on Moscow. Guderian was notoriously jealous of his troops, even going so far as to have formations under his command paint a large white "G" on the front of their vehicles. Recoiling against the splitting of his forces Guderian requested that he be allowed to use his entire command in the Kiev encirclement. He suggested that the more force that was used, the sooner the operation would be completed and the sooner the advance on Moscow could recommence. Hitler agreed to Guderian's request.

Unbeknownst to both Hitler and Guderian they had just upset a plan thought out by Generaloberst Halder the chief of General Staff. Halder was convinced that both Moscow and the Ukraine were vital objectives before the onset of the Russian winter. He saw the possibility of retaining enough forces to continue the advance on Moscow, albeit at a slow pace, while using part of Armeegruppe Guderian to assist AGS in closing the Kiev pocket. These forces could, if needs be, continue their advance to the southeast, operating in conjunction with Panzergruppe 1 to cut deep into the Donets Basin.

The key point in this plan was the retention of the bulk of the formations comprising AGC. Halder was attempting to hoodwink Hitler. Once the Kiev encirclement was under way he would propose that the advance on Moscow could restart. It was an interesting permutation of other plans proposed by various generals. The problem for Halder was that Guderian's insistence on keeping his forces together had left AGC seriously understrength for an advance on Moscow. When Halder found out about the revised plan he suffered a nervous collapse.

German Mobility

For the majority of the German Army the invasion of Russia meant endless marching in the wake of the mobile divisions

The Second Largest City in the Soviet Union
German infantrymen in a church spire in Kiev watch an artillery bombardment on the opposite bank of the Dniepr

Guderian was simply swinging around the main Moscow defences in order to outflank them and create a pocket, Stalin was now informed by Zhukov that the probable objective was the encirclement of Kiev. The Bryansk Front under the capable Yeremenko had been formed with the object of striking the southern flank of Guderian's advance on Moscow. It now became the object of the German attacks.

Luck rather than good magagement had placed two Russian armies in the path of Guderian's handful of divisions. Yeremenko told Stalin that he thought he could prevent a breakthrough and Stalin therefore decided not to surrender Kiev. One concession to the imminent threat was that the units facing AGS were allowed to retire to the east bank of the Dniepr.

As late as August 24th Shaposhnikov, Zhukov's replacement as Chief of General Staff told Yeremenko that he should expect Guderian to swing his forces east in the next couple of days. Consequently Yeremenko created a hard shoulder against any eastwards movement and weakened the forces directly in the path of the Panzers.

Between August 24th and 26th Guderian made dramatic advances from the vicinity of Starodub to that of Korop, some 50 miles to the south.

As a result of this movement Bryansk Front was stretched beyond breaking point and gaps opened up along the Soviet front line. 21st Army was forced to retire due south and lost contact with its neighbour to the east.

Yeremenko was still unwilling to weaken his north-south line and preferred a gap at the point where his line swung around to the west. The 40th Army was activated and was placed into the gap. The hole was, however, so large that a gap still existed between 21st and 40th Armies. This was precisely the direction in which Guderian's advance was intended.

After closing up to the Dniepr 17th Armee prepared to cross the river on the 31st of August. The assault was to be made at Kremenchug, well down

Despite Hitler's assurances to Guderian; Halder and von Bock conspired to remove one of Armeegruppe Guderian's three Panzer Korps. With his two remaining Korps Guderian was to slice deeply behind the Russian armies in the Kiev pocket. He was supported on his right by 2nd Armee who were to place steady pressure on the northwest flank of the salient. In AGS sixth Armee was advancing due east

towards Kiev while 17th Armee held the long stretch of the Dniepr which flowed southeast from Kiev. A portion of 17th Armee was to be used to force a crossing of the Dniepr across which Panzergruppe 1 could pass on its way to link up with Guderian.

As Armeegruppe Guderian moved steadily south the Soviet leaders began to have doubts about the German objective. Initially convinced that

the river from Kiev and almost due south of Guderian's start point.

As the Germans had found all through the campaign this was facilitated by strong artillery and air bombardment which supressed the enemy fire until the assault boats were virtually on top of the defenders. Footholds were gained and on September 2nd the lead elements of Kleist's Panzergruppe 1 began to move into the bridgehead behind the infantry who were still fighting to enlarge it.

Also on September 2nd Bryansk Front commenced a series of counterattacks on Guderian's eastern flank. These attacks which continued until September 12th achieved little except to increase Soviet casualty lists.

In late August and early September Guderian made repeated requests for the release of his XLVI Panzer Korps. He received about half of the Korps in dribs and drabs never realising that it was the absence at the front of this Korps that was creating a lingering doubt in Stalin's mind as to the true objective.

On September 8th the Soviet leader quizzed Zhukov as to the German intentions. The former Chief of General Staff correctly predicted Guderian's continued southward advance and the of Kleist's Panzers from the Kremenchug bridgehead.

Stalin asked Zhukov for his advice and was told that Kiev would have to be given up. Unpalatable as this was to Stalin he took some of words seriously. All Soviet units west of the Dniepr, save those actually in Kiev, were withdrawn to the east bank.

The Soviet withdrawals, intended to free up troops with which to oppose Guderian, were too late. Units of the Panzer Korps had been probing for a weakness at the junction of the Soviet 21st and 40th Armies.

On September 9th the gap was found and the 3rd Panzer Division rushed through it, capturing Romney. Soviet divisions began to be stripped from all other parts of the line to bolster the

defences in this sector. They never got there. A series of hammer blows along the crumbling Russian front resulted in a clean breakthrough for Guderian. By September 12th lead elements of Armeegruppe Guderian had reached Lochvitsa, the assigned link up point with Panzergruppe 1.

At Kremenchug the bridgehead had been slowly expanded as the tanks of Panzergruppe 1 added their weight behind that of the infantry. On September 11th the breakout occurred and Kleist's panzers raced north to link up with Guderian. By the time Kleist broke out the road conditions had deteriorated due to rain and progress was slow. Lubny was taken on the 13th as Guderian brought the last road into the Kiev pocket under artillery fire. Russian resistance stiffened as the two armoured spearheads drew close to a union but inevitably on September 16th Germans met Germans south of Lochvitsa and the pocket was closed.

Why had Stalin forbidden a retreat and allowed the pocket to form? By the

time he realised that Guderian's true aim was to create a pocket it was too late. On September 11th Stalin pointed out to one of his subordinates that it would be impossible to retreat a significant number of the troops in the pocket before it closed. He preferred to have the men stay in their positions and cost the Germans men, equipment and above all time to dig them out.

Stalin had always seen Moscow as the German's main objective. He had great difficulty in recognising the Kiev encirclement, preferring to see the movements of Armeegruppe Guderian as being an attempt to outflank Bryansk Front and pocket the Moscow defence line.

Once the Kiev pocket had been formed Stalin gambled that the Germans would revert to their original strategy of attacks towards the Soviet capital. On September 16th when the pincers joined it had been nearly a month and a half since the surrender of the Smolensk pocket. Zhukov had spent the time wisely in his new job as commander of

A Politician Playing Soldier
Hitler, flanked by von Brauchitsch (left) and Halder examines maps of Russia.

SCENARIO
KREMENCHUG

Nationality
GERMAN

Organization Chart:

- XXXX HQ — Armee: 17 Armee
- 1st Ind — III — 17A — ●
- 2nd Ind — III — 17A — ●
- 3rd Ind — III — ⊠ — Res
- 4th Ind — III — ⊠ — SUP

- XX HQ — 1st Div: 125 Div
  - III — 1st Rgt: 419
  - III — 2nd Rgt: 420
  - III — 3rd Rgt: 421
  - III — 4th Rgt: 125
- XX HQ — 2nd Div: 101 Lt
  - III — 1st Rgt: 228
  - III — 2nd Rgt: 229
  - III — 3rd Rgt: 101
- XX HQ — 3rd Div: 100 Lt
  - III — 1st Rgt: 54
  - III — 2nd Rgt: 369
  - III — 3rd Rgt: 100
- XX HQ — 4th Div: 97 Lt
  - III — 1st Rgt: 204
  - III — 2nd Rgt: 207
  - III — 3rd Rgt: 97

HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	17 Armee	125 Div	101Lt	100Lt	97Lt
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Jaeger	Jaeger	Jaeger
HQ ADMIN	0-7	6	7	7	7	7
LEADERSHIP	0-7	6	6	6	6	6
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	6	7	6	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	1	1	1	1	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	8,16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

UNIT DATA

FORMATION	R/D	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	419	420	421	125	228	229	101		54	369	100		204	207	97		17A	17A	Res	SUP
LOCATION	(x,y)	5,9	6,10	5,11	5,12	8,12	10,13	11,12		13,11	14,10	15,10		17,13	19,13	18,15		10,16	13,14	5,14	11,13
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		13	13	0	4
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1	8	10	10	10		10	10	10		10	10	10		9	9	1	13
MOVEMENT	0-31	7	7	7	9	8	8	8		8	8	8		8	9	8		9	10	7	8
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	7	7	7	4	5	5	5		5	5	5		5	5	5		5	5	7	4
INIT. STREN.	0-15	7	7	7	4	5	5	5		5	5	5		5	5	5		5	5	7	4
RATING	0-15	9	9	9	11	9	9	9		9	9	9		9	9	9		13	13	9	6
RANGE	0-15	0	0	1	5	0	0	1		0	0	1		0	0	0		7	7	0	1
FATIGUE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		4	4	4		4	4	4		3	4	5	4
EXPERIENCE	0-7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6		6	6	6		6	6	6		6	6	6	6
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A		2	3	2	2

SCENARIO	Nationality
KREMENCHUG	GERMAN

Organizational chart:
- XXXX HQ — Armee — PzGruppe 1
- 1st Ind — Res
- 2nd Ind — 1PA
- 3rd Ind — 2PA
- XX HQ 1st Div — 16th Mot
  - III 1st Rgt — 60
  - III 2nd Rgt — 156
  - III 3rd Rgt — 146
- XX HQ 2nd Div — 9th Pz
  - III 1st Rgt — 33
  - III 2nd Rgt — 10
  - III 3rd Rgt — 11
  - III 4th Rgt — Sup
- XX HQ 3rd Div — 14th Pz
  - III 1st Rgt — 36
  - III 2nd Rgt — 103
  - III 3rd Rgt — 108
  - III 4th Rgt — Sup
- XX HQ 4th Div — 16th Pz
  - III 1st Rgt — 2Pz
  - III 2nd Rgt — 64
  - III 3rd Rgt — 79
  - III 4th Rgt — Sup

HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	PzGruppe 1	16 Mot	9th Panzer	14th Panzer	16th Panzer
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Panzer	Motorised	Panzer	Panzer	Panzer
HQ ADMIN	0-7	6	7	7	7	7
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	6	7	7	7
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	6	5	5	5	5
BRITTLE	0-1	1	1	1	1	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	4,18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

UNIT DATA

FORMATION	III/XX	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	60	156	146		33	10	11	Sup	36	103	108	Sup	2Pz	64	79	Sup	Res	1PA	2PA	
LOCATION	(x,y)	11,20	12,20	10,20		4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	4,18	
CLASS	0-13	1	1	13		11	2	1	12	11	2	1	12	11	2	1	12	1	13	13	
MODE	0-3	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
EQUIPM'T	0-31	2	2	8		3	5	2	12	3	5	2	12	3	5	2	12	2	9	9	
MOVEMENT	0-31	10	10	10		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
ARRIVAL	0-99	13	13	13		25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	8	27	27	
MAX STREN.	0-15	9	3	4		10	5	5	3	5	5	5	3	10	5	5	3	5	8	8	
INIT. STREN.	0-15	9	3	4		10	5	5	3	5	5	5	3	10	5	5	3	5	8	8	
RATING	0-15	10	10	11		10	9	9	8	10	9	9	8	10	9	9	8	7	12	12	
RANGE	0-15	1	0	5		1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	7	7	
FATIGUE	0-7	6	6	6		5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	
EXPERIENCE	0-7	6	6	6		7	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	2	3	

SCENARIO
KREMENCHUG

Nationality
SOVIET

Organizational chart:

- 1st Ind — Rep (X)
- 3rd Ind — Art (X, ●)
- 2nd Ind — Rep (X)
- 4th Ind — Rep (X)

- XXX HQ — Corps — Dniepr Fce

- XX HQ — 1st Div — 300 Div
  - X 1st Bde — 1/1
  - X 2nd Bde — 2/1
  - X 3rd Bde — 3/1
  - ● 4th Bde — 4/1
- XX HQ — 2nd Div — 304 Div
  - X 1st Bde — 1/2
  - X 2nd Bde — 2/2
  - X 3rd Bde — 3/2
  - ● 4th Bde — 2A
- XX HQ — 3rd Div — 169 Div
  - X 1st Bde — 1/3
  - X 2nd Bde — 2/3
  - X 3rd Bde — 3/3
  - ● 4th Bde — 3A
- XX HQ — 4th Div — 166 Div
  - X 1st Bde — 1/4
  - X 2nd Bde — 2/4
  - X 3rd Bde — 3/4
  - ● 4th Bde — 4A

HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	Dniepr Fce	300 Div	304 Div	169 Div	166 Div
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry
HQ ADMIN	0-7	4	5	5	4	5
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	4
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	5	5	5	5	6
BRITTLE	0-1	1	1	1	1	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	22,0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

UNIT DATA

FORMATION	III/XX	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1/1	2/1	3/1	1A	1/2	2/2	3/3	2A	1/3	2/3	3/3	3A	1/4	2/4	3/4	4A	Rep	Rep	Art	Rep
LOCATION	(x,y)	6,8	8,9	8,10	8,8	11,10	12,10	15,8	10,9	20,5	19,2	20,6	20,4	7,1	8,2	9,1	6,1	11,6	20,2	21,0	13,8
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	13	0
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1	8	1	1	1	8	1	1	1	8	1	1	1	8	1	1	9	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	13	13	13	5	5	6	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	6	6	6	4	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	6
INIT. STREN.	0-15	6	6	6	4	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	6
RATING	0-15	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	8	8	7	7	8	7	7	10	7
RANGE	0-15	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	5	0
FATIGUE	0-7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	5	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	4
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	3	3	3

SCENARIO: KREMENCHUG — Nationality: SOVIET

Organizational Chart

- 1st Ind: T34
- 2nd Ind: Art
- 3rd Ind: Rep
- 4th Ind: Rep
- XXX HQ — Corps: Res Fce
- XX HQ — 1st Div: 226 Div
  - 1st Bde: 1/1
  - 2nd Bde: 2/1
  - 3rd Bde: 3/1
  - 4th Bde: 1A
- XX HQ — 2nd Div: 199 Div
  - 1st Bde: 1/2
  - 2nd Bde: 2/2
  - 3rd Bde: 3/2
  - 4th Bde: 2A
- XX HQ — 3rd Div: 34 Cav
  - 1st Bde: 1Cv
  - 2nd Bde: 2Cv
  - 3rd Bde: 3Cv
  - 4th Bde: Crs
- XX HQ — 4th Div: 47 Tank
  - 1st Bde: 1Tk
  - 2nd Bde: 2Tk
  - 3rd Bde: 3Tk
  - 4th Bde: 4Tk

HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	Res Fce	226 Div	199 Div	34 Cav	47 Tank
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	Cavalry	Armour
HQ ADMIN	0-7	6	5	5	3	2
LEADERSHIP	0-7	6	4	4	3	2
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	6	6	6	6	6
BRITTLE	0-1	1	1	1	1	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	22,0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

UNIT DATA

FORMATION	III/XX	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1/1	2/1	3/1	1A	1/2	2/2	3/2	2A	1Cv	2Cv	3Cv	Crs	1Tk	2Tk	3Tk	5Tk	T34	Art	Rep	Rep
LOCATION	(x,y)	4,2	5,2	6,2	4,2	12,1	13,1	14,2	14,1	22,5	22,5	22,5	22,3	22,1	22,1	22,1	22,1	22,1	22,1	22,3	22,5
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	5	5	5	5	11	11	11	11	11	13	0	0
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1	8	1	1	1	8	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	11	9	1	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	8	8	8	8	10	10	10	10	12	6	6	6
ARRIVAL	0-99	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	21	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	21
MAX STREN.	0-15	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	6
INIT. STREN.	0-15	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	6
RATING	0-15	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	8	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	12	10	7	7
RANGE	0-15	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	0	0
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	3
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4	2	2	2

KREMENCHUG - Briefing

AXIS

SIDE [16]
Germany

CORPS [16]
Army Group South

COMMANDER [16]
GFM Von Rundstedt

ALLIED

SIDE [16]
Soviet Union

CORPS [16]
38th Army

COMMANDER [16]
General Tsyganov

DAY	NIGHT	SUPPORT	DAY	NIGHT
20	0	QUANTITY (0-99)	5	0
3	0	RELIABILITY (0-3)	1	0
12	0	RATING (0-15)	6	0

AIR SUPERIORITY (0-7)

STATUS = 0

RELIABILITY = .7

STRONG ALLIED
DEPENDABLE

SCENARIO [16]
Kremenchug

BRIEFING [26]
The Southern Pincer in the encirclement of Kiev
Aug 31st - Sep 9th 1941

(0-3)	START =	3
(1-31)	DATE =	30
(1-12)	MONTH =	8
(0-99)	YEAR =	41
(0-20)	CENTURY =	19
(1-16)	LENGTH =	11
(0-3)	WEATHER =	3
(0-7)	FORECAST =	6
(0-7)	CLIMATE =	0
(0-31)	MECH MIN =	10

nite
30th August 1941

CLEAR
CLEARING
EUROPEAN

BRITTLENESS

(0-9)	AXIS =	70	%
(0-9)	ALLIED =	60	%

NIGHT CAPABLE

(0-1)	AXIS =	0
(0-1)	ALLIED =	0

KREMENCHUG - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN CODE (T0-T15)	TERRAIN NAME [10]	TERRAIN COSTS PER HEX		ATTACK EFFECTS		
		MECH (0-31)	NON-MECH (0-31)	ARM (0-7)	ART (0-7)	INF (0-7)
T0	-	-	-	-	-	-
T1	Clear	3	2	6	6	6
T2	Dniepr R.	-	10	3	4	5
T3	Rough	4	2	5	5	5
T4	Kremenchug	2	2	3	2	4
T5	Bridge	-	10	7	7	7
T6	-	-	-	-	-	-
T7	-	-	-	-	-	-
T8	-	-	-	-	-	-
T9	-	-	-	-	-	-
T10	-	-	-	-	-	-
T11	-	-	-	-	-	-
T12	-	-	-	-	-	-
T13	-	-	-	-	-	-
T14	-	-	-	-	-	-
T15	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	ROAD	1	2	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
-	FORT	N.A.	N.A.	3	3	3
-	CITY	N.A.	N.A.	3	3	3
-	BRIDGE	3	3	7	7	7
-	RIVER	N.A.	4	2	4	3

KREMENCHUG - Objectives and Misc. Factors

I.D.	Name [11]	Map Loc [x,y]	Div. (0-3)	Def. (0-1)	Start (1-99)	End (1-99)	Pts/T (0-30)	Pts/E (0-255)
1(AX)	To Lubny	6,3	0	0	27	43	5	5
2(AX)	Dniepr Bridge	8,10	0	0	4	27	5	5
3(AX)	Kremen. Cntr	10,10	0	0	4	31	5	5
4(AX)	Kremen. Bdge	11,10	0	0	4	27	5	5
5(AX)	To Poltava	20,2	0	0	27	43	5	5
6(AX)	Crossing	20,12	0	0	4	17	3	1
7(AX)								
8(AX)								
9(AX)								
10(AX)								
11(AX)								
12(AX)								
1(AL)	To Lubny	6,3	0	1	27	43	2	10
2(AL)	Dniepr Bdge	8,10	1	1	4	43	2	15
3(AL)	Kremen. Cntr	10,10	1	1	4	43	1	15
4(AL)	Kremen. Bdge	11,10	1	1	4	43	2	15
5(AL)	To Poltava	20,2	2	1	27	43	2	10
6(AL)	Crossing	20,12	0	0	4	43	2	10
7(AL)								
8(AL)								
9(AL)								
10(AL)								
11(AL)								
12(AL)								

ADJACENT ENEMY HEX PENALTY (AXIS/ALLIED) (0-15)			
1st Hex =	1 1	4th Hex =	3 3
2nd Hex =	1 2	5th Hex =	3 4
3rd Hex =	2 3	6th Hex =	4 5

VICTORY POINTS PER STRENGTH POINT ELIM. (0-15)		
	MECH	NON MECH
AXIS	5	2
ALLIED	2	0

MAP SIZE	
ACROSS (0-2)	1
DOWN (0-3)	2

Another Day at the Office
Men of the German 1st Mountain Division prepare to attack across a field during the advance of Army Group South across the Ukraine

the Reserve Front. There were now two lines of defence between the front line and Moscow. Where the Russian defences were thin, in fact almost non-existent was in front of the two Panzergruppes in the Ukraine.

An advance on Moscow would have been possible in early August despite the strong defences east of Smolensk. The ability of Guderian and Hoth to pierce the prepared Russian defence lines when Operation Typhoon (the final assault on Moscow) finally got under way in early October showed that the Russians still had a lot to learn. The encirclements at Vyasma and Bryansk between them resulted in frac-

tionally more prisoners than the Kiev pocket. Neither bag of prisoners, nearly 700 000 in each case, crippled the Soviet Army. Clearly more than the whittling down of Russian numbers was needed to bring the Soviet Union to its knees.

Both Moscow and the Ukraine were valuable geographical objectives but Moscow was all or nothing whereas objectives in the Ukraine were more scattered. Clearly then Moscow should have been the primary objective followed by a diversion of manpower south into the Ukraine.

An early assault on Moscow becomes even more vital when one realises that winter hits in the region of the capital around six weeks before it does in the Ukraine. It would therefore have theoretically been possible to have taken Moscow in August and September and then have diverted both Panzergruppes south to create a superpocket in cooperation with AGS.

Given the all or nothing character of Moscow as an objective what would the correct course of action have been for the Germans after the closure of the Kiev Pocket?

Even given the spectacular opening to Typhoon there was never any real chance of taking Moscow so late in the season. The most that could be hoped for was that the city could have been besieged although to whose benefit that would have been in the middle of the Russian winter is open to conjecture.

Hitler would have been well advised to have listened to his generals when they recommended that their men be allowed to dig in and develop winter quarters. It is unlikely that the Soviet counteroffensives could have been successfully launched if the attack on Moscow had not been continued into the winter.

If Moscow was unattainable after Kiev then what was? With two Panzergruppes in the Ukraine the weight of the German attack favoured a continuation of the drive by AGS.

Just as Kiev was an unnecessary diversion from the attack on Moscow so too

0	
1	Rifles
2	Trucks
3	PzIII
4	PzIV
5	SdKfz251
6	Cavalry
7	T26
8	105mmArt
9	150mmArt
10	Jaeger
11	T34
12	StugIII
13	Hvy Weapons

was the resumption of the Moscow attack after Kiev had fallen.

Knowing full well the strength of the defences in front of Moscow Hitler should have kept Guderian in the south and exploited his additional strength to put the army in a position to attack north towards Moscow in the following spring.

Whether AGS could have sealed off the Caucasus, along with its vital oil, as they briefly did the following year cannot be known. What can be known for sure is that a lot more territory could have been gained with the addition of Guderian's Panzers.

In the south too, without the terrible magnet of the Soviet capital Hitler may have been able to call a halt for winter before it was too late.

The original plan for Operation Barbarossa envisaged the campaign being over within four to six months. By the time the battle for Moscow was being fought the German high command had expected there to be a stable front line from Archangel to Astrakhan. The Wehrmacht was not at fault, their performance outshone even the rapid

defeat of France and at the end of July all three Army Groups were actually ahead of schedule. To reach the line of the Volga it would have been necessary to take Moscow by the end of August. That this was possible is not really a matter of doubt. By the beginning of August AGC actually outnumbered the Soviet defenders in front of the capital.

The effect on the Soviet State of the capture of Moscow is unknown. The capital was far more important than it had been in Napoleon's day and its fall would have had significant and possibly fatal effects. Whatever the result of its capture, still a matter of intense debate, Moscow was the primary objective in the Russian campaign. That Hitler failed to realise this showed his

limited military ability, a limitation that would ultimately result in the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany.

On September 26th 1941 the last Soviet forces in the Kiev pocket surrendered. Over 665 000 men marched off into captivity and the largest encirclement in the history of warfare was over. The failure of AGC to push on to Moscow in August 1941 was later referred to by a captured Soviet General as a second "Miracle of the Marne".

Von Kluck's Turn, the Kiev Pocket and the nature of warfare in the industrial age

The above analogy, the closure of the Kiev pocket and the subsequent failure to take Moscow being another "Mira-

Mass vs. Mobility
von Kluge (left) in discussion with Guderian, his nominal subordinate in the first part of Barbarossa. Guderian regarded von Kluge as a "brake on progress"

cle of the Marne" set me thinking about the similarities between the two situations. World War One is usually regarded as a war of attrition and World War Two as a war of movement. Obviously that is overly simplistic, both wars contained elements of a war of movement and of a war of attrition.

In the First World War the Germans initiated a war of movement with their invasion of France and Belgium. In the first few days of the war the Germans gained the operational initiative and forced the Allies to react to the circumstances thrust upon them.

When von Kluck made the decision to wheel his First Army inside Paris he exposed his flank to a counterattack from the reinforced Paris garrison. In reacting to this French countermove von Kluck allowed a gap to open up between his army and that of von Below on his left flank. The BEF were able to exploit the gap and the initiative had

passed from the Germans to the Allies. The Allied counterattack had less energy than the initial German attack and like a pendulum swinging down the situation descended into a stalemate.

Because of the greater power of the defence over the attack in 1914 the stalemate took the form of positional warfare.

This positional warfare was essentially attritional in nature and continued until one side, Germany was so exhausted that it was unable to hold a continuous front. In the last months of the war the German Army was in constant retreat, unable to replace its losses.

If we distil World War One to its basic elements we can see that it fell into three distinct phases. There was an initial war of movement in which Germany was on the offensive and had the operational initiative. Once the initiative had been wrested from the Ger-

mans there was a period of attritional warfare in which neither side had the initiative. Both sides launched offensives which did little other than reduce both side's reservoir of men and materiel. Once Germany became exhausted and was unable to replace her losses the war of movement resumed, this time the Allies having the operational initiative.

If we compare the two World Wars we can instantly see the parallels. In World War II Germany attacked Poland and France and won stunning operational victories. The initiative gained by the Germans in the first few days of each campaign was enough to carry them through to victory.

When the Germans attacked Russia they once again gained the initiative and had early operational success. Hitler's decision to close the Kiev pocket and postpone the drive on Moscow allowed the Russians to recover sufficiently to hang on until winter. The effects of winter were such that the Germans lost the operational initiative and suffered strong Russian counterattacks.

In the halting of the initial German drive into Russia the war passed from a war of movement to a war of attrition. This is not always easy to recognise due to the increased mobility of forces in the Second World War. The war of attrition in WWII was mobile rather than positional but was attritional nonetheless. From December 1941 until June 1944 offensives and counteroffensives were launched by both sides. While ground changed hands the overall effect of the war between these dates was to wear away the reserves of men and materiel of each of the combatants.

It was not until the destruction of Army Group Centre in June and July 1944 and the breakout from Normandy in July and August of the same year that the war of movement was finally reintroduced. From this point on the Allies had an unstoppable momentum based on their preponderance of men and material and, more importantly, the inability of the Germans to replace

The Pocket Closes
An SdKfz 251/10 with a 37mm anti-tank gun and a Panzerjager (a tank destroyer based on a Panzer 1 chassis) of Armeegruppe Guderian advance near Romney, captured on September 9th

their losses. By shortening their defensive frontage the Germans were able to halt the Allied advances briefly, but once the war of movement had recommenced the issue was in no doubt.

So we can see that in both World Wars there was an initial phase consisting of a war of movement followed by a phase of attritional warfare and a return to the war of movement once one side had become materially exhausted.

The examples of Poland and France show us an abridged sequence of events. There was no phase of attritional warfare in these campaigns because the side that was attacked collapsed before they could regain the initiative.

The battle of the Marne is usually seen as the turning point of World War One. The equivalent point in World War Two, the Soviet winter counteroffensive, is less easy to recognise. It was here that the Germans lost the initiative of their initial advance. Stalingrad is often proposed as the turning point of the War but was merely a costly attritional battle in which the Soviets could afford their losses far more than the Germans could. Another suggested turning point has been Kursk, the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front. This was clearly an attritional battle and can be compared with the German 1918 offensives as a last desperate attempt to regain the operational initiative before the collapse of German manpower resources.

The common factor in both these Wars was the discrepancy between the resources of the two sides. Germany was outproduced in both cases by her opponents. In this situation the smaller country is obliged to attack its larger neighbour in an attempt to knock them out of the war before the larger country can outproduce and crush the smaller. The best odds for a German victory in both World Wars was at the outset when the superior German training and doctrine could have won them a Blitzkrieg victory.

Germany lost the First World War when von Kluck turned his army in front of

Antidote to Armour
One of the reasons why armour was not more readily adopted by the Allied countries between the wars was the increased effectiveness of antitank guns.

Paris, allowing the Allies to take the initiative in the Battle of the Marne. Similarly the Germans lost the Second World War when Hitler diverted Armeegruppe Guderian south to close the Kiev Pocket. This allowed the Russians time to consolidate in front of Moscow and stop the German advance when it came in October 1941. In doing so the Russians took the initiative away from the Germans. If Germany was to defeat the Soviet Union it was vital to prevent the loss of German operational initiative and the inevitable shift to attritional warfare.

CREATING THE SCENARIOS

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk, we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to

the corresponding section in any of the *Battlefront Game System* manuals.

Note that if you are building up the scenario on an IBM/Tandy version of the game, there are a couple of additional data entries to be made. These are noted where applicable. Furthermore, there is some additional information for IBM users at the end of this section. Be sure to read it, especially if you have an EGA/VGA card and want to take advantage of our "full map" graphics. Issue 14 of *Run 5* contains a detailed guide on the use of "full map" graphics on the IBM.

Macintosh users should follow the instructions in their game manual. In Issue 15 of *Run 5*, there is a detailed guide on WarPaint™ for Macintosh users.

IIGS and Amiga users should follow the instructions in their game manual. Most of the hints for Macintosh users are applicable to IIGS/Amiga users.

Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two disk drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store the scenario in any unused save-game location. Select <CLEAR> from Menu J and erase both map and data. Save again in the same location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the Kremenchug scenario.

The WarPlan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary.

If possible, we recommend you prepare this scenario with any of the *Halls of Montezuma*, *Panzer Battles*, *Rommel* or *MacArthur's War* master disks. If you are using the earlier *Battlefront* or *Battles in Normandy* master disks then a few variables will have to be omitted. These are noted in the text. Note that these restrictions apply only to Apple II and C-64 users.

Corps Details [5.31]. Enter the data from the Briefing table.

Scenario Details [5.32]. Enter the data from the Briefing table. Ignore the Century, Climate, Brittleness and Night Capable variables when using the BF/BIN master disks.

Map Size [5.11]. Enter the data from the Map Size table.

Define Terrain [5.12]. Enter the data from the Terrain Effects Chart. If you are using a HOM/ROM/MW/PZ master disk on the AII or C64 or any IBM, Mac or IIGS master disk, you can use WarPaint™ to create the customised terrain icons of your choice.

Define Miscellaneous Factors [5.13]. Enter the relevant factors from the Miscellaneous Factors table and the appropriate part of the Terrain Effects Chart.

Create Map [5.14]. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign control to each hex as advised above.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

Equipment Roster [5.22]. Enter the data from the Equipment table.

Troop Creation [5.21]. Enter the data from the OB charts into the appropriate locations.

Objectives [5.23]. Enter the data from the Objectives table. Note there has been an additional variable introduced into the Objective data base in *Rommel* (IBM), *Halls of Montezuma* (Mac, IIGS, Amiga) and *Panzer Battles* (all versions). Objectives which have a senior HQ assigned to them may be designated as defensive objectives. Only the specified senior HQ will be affected by this condition and it operates only while the objective is under friendly control. A junior HQ from the specified senior HQ will be despatched to the objective and will defend it as long as the time reference applies.

Note that the movement mechanics in the IBM/Macintosh/IIGS/Amiga versions are more efficient than those in the AII/C64 versions and this may slightly alter play balance.

Minor Combat Effects (IBM, Mac, IIGS, Amiga and *Panzer Battles* AII/C64) [5.33]. For the Kremenchug scenario, the Fort Enhancement values are 2 (Axis) and 2 (Allied). The City Enhancement values are 0 (Axis) and 0 (Allied). The General Enhancement values are 3 (Axis) and 3 (Allied). AII/C64 and Mac users may wish to experiment with play balance by altering the general enhancement values. Be warned that this scenario is particularly sensitive to small changes in the minor combat values so some tweaking may be required depending on your format or even your version of the game.

Note that C64 users will need the *Panzer Battles* master disk or the complimentary *Battlefront System* master disk given out to C64 disk subscribers with Issue 14.

Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

NOTES FOR IBM USERS

IBM users with CGA, MCGA, Tandy or Hercules graphics, or using the first edition of *Halls of Montezuma*, can create the scenario using the advice given above.

IBM users with EGA or VGA cards and the *Rommel* (or subsequent) master disk have access to our "full-map" graphic routines. When creating the map or the unit icons, you must first disable the "full-map" graphics. To do this, run the program as rom f which will bypass the "full-map" graphics. Select a scenario as a template as explained above and save it in a save-game location. Build up the map in the usual way and save when finished. The rest of the data for the scenario may be entered with the "full-map" graphics either disabled or enabled.

Re-boot the program (this time with the "full-map" graphics enabled) and use the "full-map" WarPaint™ tool to build up the map. In other words, the "full-map" graphics are only graphic images and do not affect the play of the game.

For a detailed description of the procedure, read the article in Issue 14.

A NOTE ON .LBM FILES

The .lbm files contain the graphic images. DPaint2™ from Electronic Arts can be used to manipulate the file. Up to 250 hexes can be created but DPaint2™ must be used to change the size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the 'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file.

The *Battlefront System* program reads the size of the .lbm file on loading and adjusts the WarPaint™ values automati-

cally. If you don't want to worry about manipulating .lbm files, choose a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as the template to build the new scenario on.

When saving an .lbm file, a temporary file is created first. When the temporary file is successfully saved the original is deleted and the temporary file renamed. This means there must be enough space on the current disk to hold the temporary file.

A NOTE ON THE GAME SYSTEM

In contrast to most board games, movement allowances are expended after a unit has moved into a hex; i.e. provided at least 1 MP remains, a unit will always move one hex. Only the *Battlefront Game System* handles movement this way. Our other games all require a unit to have the full cost of moving into a hex available before they can move into it.

PLAYER'S NOTES

Soviet Union

Hold your ground and die! The key to winning or losing is Kremenchug and the bridges. You must try to bleed the German infantry divisions white. They are brittle and they have a tough position to assault. Your reserves arrive earlier than theirs. Keep the pressure on and maybe one of their divisions will shatter. It's vital that you restrict their bridgehead. If their panzers are allowed to get out into the open on your side of the Dniepr then you are done for. Finally, remember, your men are expendable, the objectives are not.

Germany

Get across the river and secure a bridgehead in Kremenchug quickly. However, don't push your jaegers too hard. They're elite but brittle. When the panzers arrive they can break out from the bridgehead. To do this though they need room to manoeuvre on the Kremenchug side of the river. If the Russians are allowed to build a strong

line close to or in front of the bridges then you will certainly lose. Therefore the first half of the game is a balance between expanding your bridgehead and not pushing your infantry too far. When Panzergruppe 1 arrives in strength let them do the exploiting, its what they're trained for ◆

and early 20th centuries are heavily criticised for their overuse of the direct approach. From Napoleon to Marshal Foch, there is strong criticism of their obvious manoeuvres and profligate use of manpower.

The common ground is seen as having an excess of men and materiel prompting the general to be wasteful and unsubtle. Here Liddell-Hart has fallen into the trap of assuming a uniform level of command control throughout history.

During the period in question the size of armies increased dramatically. This resulted in huge command control problems for generals unable to be in direct contact with the bulk of their armies. This inevitably lead to a reduction in the degree of subtlety possible in generalship. Subtlety resulted in confusion and chaos, a situation unlikely to bring about military success.

The era where directness of approach was forced on generals due to the scale of the forces under their command lasted until the portable radio reintroduced proper command control onto the battlefield.

Despite such minor criticisms Liddell-Hart is correct. The indirect approach has been used in all but a handful of the great military successes of all time. The question then becomes one of why it is not used more often, particularly as the indirect approach encompasses all types of military surprise and in fact

anything not prepared for by the opposition.

A good general by definition guards himself against the dislocation of an indirect approach by calculating all possible actions which the enemy could undertake. Therefore when the enemy manoeuvres on our general's rear he finds himself facing an unsurprised enemy and in a position where the only course of action available is a direct assault or retreat.

There is no strict formula for generalship. For every move there is a countermove and the appropriate move must be tailored to the opponent and the situation. Only when these factors are taken into account can there be a true indirect approach.

It should now become clear that what may constitute an indirect approach on one battlefield may not against an opponent of a higher calibre. Conversely, against an opponent of the calibre of Braxton Bragg Grant's frontal assault at Missionary Ridge constituted an indirect approach because it was the last move Bragg was expecting.

Liddell-Hart concludes *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* with a series of chapters discussing the essence of strategy. In one of these he lays down a set of general principles which I feel it is worth repeating here.

(1) Adjust your end to your means.
(2) Keep your object always in mind.
(3) Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.,
(4) Exploit the line of least resistance.
(5) Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives.
(6) Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible-adaptable to circumstances.
(7) Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard.
(8) Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.

In conclusion I should discuss the effect that Liddell-Hart's writings had on the protagonists in WWII. It is no surprise that, among his possessions

Liddell-Hart numbered an autographed photograph of Heinz Guderian the father of the German blitzkrieg.

Guderian was an avid student of Liddell-Hart's writings and saw the possibilities of restoring mobility (and therefore the increased possibility of an indirect approach) to the battlefield. Possibly Guderian's greatest contribution to the remoulding of the German Army was to insist on radios being standard in at least command tanks. The restoration of command control over the forward elements of an attack proved decisive in the early campaigns of WWII.

In contrast to the German approach the British, deeply scarred by the cost of their victory in WWI interpreted Liddell-Hart in a different way. His writings were seen as a vindication of what has become known as the strategy of avoidance. In an effort to avoid a repeat of the western front of WWI the British High command attempted to avoid direct confrontation with the bulk of the German Army wherever possible. The diversion of vast resources into strategic bombing was seen as an indirect approach and was pursued dogmatically to the detriment of Britain's land forces. What made this approach absurd was that Germany had already shown in France how a direct confrontation between major armies need not be resolved by a series of direct assaults over a period of years. Although he was attempting to influence the British military Liddell-Hart did more to help the other side in WWII than his own. The proponents of the modernisation of the British Army had no patron like the Germans had Hitler. Consequently while the German disciples of Liddell-Hart, such as Guderian were racing through France in 1940 his British counterparts, like Percy Hobart were being shunted aside into jobs of little influence.

Construction Kit add on. Something to think about, eh?

Last but not least, take it from me. I am back in the 82d Airborne again.........keep your eye on Haiti. You heard it from me first.

My best to all. Keep up the good work.

Your Friend

Murph

Fayetteville, NC

U.S.A.

Thanks for the letter Pat, some interesting ideas. You've just proposed several months work for all of us down here in the land of Oz but that's pretty much par for the course. Keep telling those scenario designers to send us their work. We love to see what people are doing with the construction kit and who knows, if the scenarios are good enough we could even publish them! You're living proof. Keep spreading the word.

Regards

Steve

❖ ❖ ❖

Dear SSG,

Re: Warlords II

Congratulations on a fine strategy game! I had the misfortune of purchasing Warlords II during my school semester and my grades have probably suffered a little because of this well thought- out piece of programming. Please keep up the excellent work and I will continue to be a faithful customer.

However, I have noted an unusual occurrence in the game that continues to frustrate me; perhaps you can shed some light on the problem.

Often times, a hero will venture into my territory with a fairly large stack of

army units. I send out my own armies to counter the threat and weaken his forces to a couple of units (perhaps a worm or a unicorn survive my onslaught).

This hero then attacks one of my cities and wins it (no problem, I already have my armies en route to deal with the pest). But then comes the real problem: Where this hero had only a worm or a unicorn or two, he suddenly, and I mean SUDDENLY, has nine or TEN units of archons! Now he's conquering my cities left and right and there's very little I can do about it; it seems that after he wins a city he just instantly calls up more Archons.

* Is this the reward for a successful quest?

* Is there a magic item that produces special armies?

* Lastly, (goodness forbid!) is there a bug in the program?

The only other item I would like to bring up is that it would be nice to have a random-map editor. At least to let the user put the capital cities further from each other. The computer seems to want them right next to each other and it makes for an annoyingly short game.

I wouldn't mind spending just a little more money on an already fantastic game to get these small problems taken care of.

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely

Christopher Vera

San Diego

U.S.A.

Ed. Christopher, I'm glad you enjoy Warlords II. No, you haven't found a bug, in fact we dont know the meaning of the word. You were right first time, the Archons are the reward for successfully completing a quest. I doubt your opponent gets nine or ten archons every

THE BATTLE OF THE MONOCACY

Defending the Capital

July 9th, 1864

A Scenario for the Decisive Battles Game System

by Stephen Hand

By the beginning of June 1864 Robert E. Lee was becoming increasingly convinced that his struggle with Ulysses S. Grant would end in an unbreakable siege of Richmond. As a last attempt to save the Confederate capital Lee ordered Jubal Early to move to the Shenandoah Valley and launch an attack on Washington. It was a long shot, but unlike many Civil War generals Lee had the ability to differentiate between the probable and the certain. Jubal Early's raid would probably fail but if Lee sat in Petersburg, waiting for Grant to cut off his supply routes he would inevitably be defeated. As it was Early gave Washington a scare and at the Monocacy River forced Lew Wallace to accept a battle which he could not win in order to gain the time to save the Union.

Early in 1864 Major General John Breckinridge was placed in command of the Confederate Valley District. Opposing one of Grant's three advances on Richmond the Rebel leader was to face Major General Franz Sigel.

Sigel was German born and was only employed to pacify the large German population in the North. Sigel proved once again to be a poor general and was finally beaten by Breckinridge at New Market on May 15th.

Feeling that it would be some time before the valley was once again threatened, Lee ordered Breckinridge to meet him on the North Anna.

On the day the Confederate troops left the valley Major General David Hunter was appointed to replace Sigel. Hunter advanced steadily down the valley burning any building suspected of harbouring Confederates.

After Cold Harbour Breckinridge was released from the Army of Northern Virginia and sent back to the Valley with his division. As soon as he arrived it became plain that more men would be needed, Hunter had just been reinforced to 20,000 men.

It was at this time that Lee decided to split his army, a risky enterprise but a risk which Lee had shown that he was prepared to accept when the alternative was almost certain defeat.

Jubal Early's Second Corps had been reduced in the past few weeks to 8,000 men. This weakness meant that of all his corps this was the one which Lee could most afford to detach. Furthermore, II Corps contained the battered remnants of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Army. If anyone knew the Valley it was these men.

Lee realised that, as when McClellan was at the gates of Richmond, it would not be enough to defeat the Union forces in the Valley. It was necessary to threaten Washington and play on the well established fears of the U.S. Gov-

Lew Wallace
His defence on the Monocacy River saved Washington

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David Hunter

A mediocre commander more famous for his depredations against civilians than for his military exploits

River. The objective was the city of Petersburg. If Grant's latest move was successful Richmond would fall and Early's Washington raid would be over before it had begun.

Petersburg, south of Richmond was a communication hub, possession of which would cut Richmond off from the rest of the Confederacy. One attempt to cut Richmond off from the south had almost succeeded when Benjamin Butler had landed at the Bermuda Hundreds between Richmond and Petersburg at the start of Grant's campaign. Butler had failed to advance with any sense of urgency and had been "bottled up" in a bend of the James River.

The first units to arrive in front of Petersburg on June 15th belonged to the Corps of William "Baldy" Smith. 16, 000 infantry and 2, 400 cavalry were opposed by Beauregard with only 2, 200 infantry.

The defences of the so called Dimmock Line were formidable but they were 10 miles long and therefore perilously undermanned. To be fair to Smith it was difficult to estimate the numbers inside the enemy works and he wanted to be absolutely sure of his reconnaissance before he launched a frontal assault on defences far superior to the ones he had just seen at Cold Harbour. Smith's inspection revealed how weakly some parts of the line were held and he decided to attack at 5 P.M.

After various delays the attack was finally launched at 7 P.M. Smith need not have worried as his attack burst through the Rebel defences almost without pausing for breath. 300 men and 16 guns were taken and a mile of the line was in Northern hands.

All that remained for Smith to do was to advance his two as yet uncommitted divisions through the gap into Petersburg itself. By this time, however, night had fallen and with the darkness came fears of unseen Confederate reinforcements. Obviously Lee would be sending men to Petersburg and Smith expected a counterattack at any moment. Besides, Hancock was

ernment. In this way Grant might be recalled as McClellan had been, or at least be required to remove troops from the front back to the capital.

On June 13th, two hours before dawn, Early's Division left the Confederate lines at Cold Harbour. This went unnoticed by the Union Army for the reason that Grant and his men were gone.

Having failed to defeat Lee on the direct route to Richmond Grant had decided to make one last sidestep around Lee's right flank. On June 13th the Army of the Potomac began crossing the James

UNION FORCES

Washington Garrison

Major General Lew Wallace

Attached to Army HQ

8th Illinois (8Il; 400 cav, no guns), 159th Ohio (159; 200 cav, no guns), Loudoun Rangers (L.R; 200 cav, no guns)

Tyler's Brigade

1st Maryland (1Ma; 500 inf, 4 guns), 3rd Maryland (3Ma; 200 inf, 2 guns), 11th Maryland (11M; 300 inf, 4 guns), 144th Ohio (144; 300 inf, 4 guns), 149th Ohio (149; 600 inf, 4 guns)

Truex's Brigade

14th New Jersey (14N; 400 inf, no guns), 106th New York (106; 400 inf, no guns), 151st New York (151; 400 inf, no guns), 87th Pennsylvania (87P; 400 inf, no guns), 10th Vermont (10V; 300 inf, no guns)

McClennan's Brigade

110th Ohio (110; 500 inf, 2 guns), 122nd Ohio (122; 200 inf, 2 guns), 126th Ohio (126; 400 inf, 2 guns), 138th Pennsylvania (138; 400 inf, 2 guns)

CONFEDERATE FORCES

Early's Corps

Lt. General Jubal Early

Attached to Army HQ

McCauslan's Bde (McC; 800 cav, no guns), Imboden's Bde (Imb; 400 cav, no guns), Jackson's Bde (Jac; 500 cav, no guns)

Gordon's Division

Evans' Bde (Eva; 1000 inf, 4 guns), York's Bde (Yor; 1500 inf, 4 guns), Terry's Bde (Ter; 900 inf, 4 guns)

Breckinridge's Division

Echols' Bde (Ech; 700 inf, 2 guns), Wharton's Bde (Wha; 500 inf, 2 guns), Vaughn's Bde (Vau; 400 cav, no guns)

Rodes' Division

Grimes' Bde (Gri; 800 inf, 2 guns), Cook's Bde (Coo; 600 inf, 2 guns), Cox's Bde (Cox; 900 inf, 4 guns), Battle's Division (Bat; 800 inf, 2 guns)

Ramseur's Division

Lilley's Bde (Lil; 800 inf, 2 guns), Johnston's Bde (Joh; 700 inf, 2 guns), Lewis' Bde (Lew; 800 inf, 2 guns)

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expected later that evening with his corps of 22,000.

Beauregard was astounded that the assault had halted on the verge of complete success. During the night he retired to his second line of defences and was reinforced by Hoke's Division which brought his numbers up to 8,000. A further Federal assault was expected at dawn and no way was seen of stopping it, such was the disparity in numbers.

Hancock arrived at 10.30 P.M. ahead of his lead troops and despite feeling that the best course was an immediate resumption of the assault he was loath to pull rank and take over command from Smith. Not the least of Hancock's reasons was the fact that his thigh wound received at Gettysburg had reopened during his ride to Petersburg.

By midnight 75,000 Union men were on the south bank of the James, 40,000 of them at Petersburg. Beauregard decided to risk removing the 3,200 men from in front of Butler at the Bermuda hundreds asking Lee to take over the

defence of that area. Lee knew that Beauregard was a show pony but the order to totally strip the forces from an already weak area indicated that something serious was up. Lee had been totally confused as to Grant's objective over the past few days. Although he had his suspicions that a move south of the James was planned he could not remove his army from the direct route to Richmond until he had some hard evidence. Beauregard's plea finally convinced him and the Army of Northern Virginia was put in motion. At 3 A.M. on June 16th Pickett's Division moved off towards the Bermuda Hundreds. At 9.30 A.M. it was found that Butler had indeed moved into the empty lines in front of him. An attempt was made to prevent Confederate reinforcements reaching Petersburg by cutting the road from Richmond. It took Lee a full two days to throw Butler's men back and to "recork the bottle".

The first of those days was wasted by the Union commanders at Petersburg. Hancock was incapacitated with his wound and neither Smith nor Burnside, the other two corps commanders had the confidence to launch an all out assault.

By the morning of the 17th the odds against Beauregard were over five to one. Attacks were delivered piecemeal throughout the morning with some success although they always fell just short of a decisive breakthrough. By the time Meade arrived there was still time to recover the situation. None of Lee's troops had arrived in Petersburg and according to reports from Butler they were not likely to until the next morning.

Meade arrived during the day and was able to arrange for a coordinated attack just before sunset. This was as successful as Smith's first attack and captured 12 guns and 500 men. It seemed that this time the attack would be pressed and Petersburg must fall.

As a last ditch effort Beauregard launched his single reserve brigade in a counterattack. In the time it took for the attack to be beaten off night fell and

Early's Washington Raid   June-July 1864

Road ————	Battle of the Monocacy - July 9th ⭐
Railroad ∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙	Early's March to Washington ➤

Meade, shaken by the Confederate retaliation declined to order a continuation of the offensive.

Meade was aware of the need for a prompt renewal of the attack and spent much of the night ensuring that at dawn on the 18th a coordinated assault was made by four corps. The only problem was that Beauregard had pulled his men back during the night and was in the process of digging a new line of entrenchments. The attack was totally disorganised upon finding the old

Rebel trenches empty. By mid morning a second attack was organised and delivered on the new defensive works. It was decisively repulsed. In the time between the initial attack at dawn and the current one the first two divisions of Lee's army had marched into Petersburg.

Grant was stopped at Petersburg as he had been stopped at Cold Harbour. He had exchanged one stalemate for another. For three days the opportunity had existed to take Petersburg and

thereby Richmond. One after another Grant's subordinates had picked up the proverbial ball and promptly dropped it. Petersburg had become a siege and developments on this part of the front would be measured in months and yards rather than days and miles.

As the two main armies settled down into a siege the only major force in motion was Early's Second Corps. As he moved west Early discovered that Hunter had debouched from the Valley and was advancing on Lynchburg.

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MONOCACY - Map

OPEN	HILLS	WHEAT-FIELD
RUGGED WOOD	BRIDGE	FORD
WOODS	CROSSING	ROAD

STREAM	TRENCHES
MONOCACY RIVER	
FRONT LINE	

MONOCACY - Brigades

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
UNIT I.D. (Full)	'[9]	Evans	York	Terry	Echols	Wharton	Vaughn	Grimes	Cook	Cox	Battle	Lilley
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	*[3]	Eva	Yor	Ter	Ech	Wha	Vau	Gri	Coo	Cox	Bat	Lil
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	5,21	6,22	5,22	5,0	5,0	5,0	17,0	18,0	14,4	15,3	8,15
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	10	15	9	7	5	4	8	6	9	8	8
MOVEMENT	0-15	8	8	8	8	8	12	8	8	8	8	8
BATTERY STR.	0-15	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	5	4	4	4	3	4	5	4	4	5	3
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	5	7	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	3
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Johnston	Lewis	McCausland	Imboden	Jackson	1st Maryl	3rd Maryl	11th Mary	144th Ohio	149th Ohio	8th Illin
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Joh	Lew	McC	Imb	Jac	1Ma	3Ma	11M	144	149	8Il
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	9,14	10,14	6,23	9,13	13,3	22,1	21,1	17,5	17,7	17,6	11,21
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	4	4	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	5	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	2
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
TROOP STREN.	0-31	7	8	8	4	5	5	2	3	3	6	4
MOVEMENT	0-15	8	8	12	12	12	6	6	6	7	7	11
BATTERY STR.	0-15	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	0
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	6	4	6	4	5	2	2	2	4	5	5
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	5	6	5	5	3	3	2	4	4	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	22
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	159th Ohio	L.Rangers	14th N.J.	106th N.Y.	151st N.Y.	87th Penn.	10th Verm	110th Ohio	122nd Ohio	126th Ohio	138th Penn
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	159	L.R	14N	106	151	87P	10V	110	122	126	138
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt	Rgt
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	10,23	9,25	13,15	9,13	12,17	14,14	15,14	14,18	13,18	12,19	11,19
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	0	0	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	2	2	4	4	4	4	3	5	2	4	4
MOVEMENT	0-15	11	12	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
BATTERY STR.	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	3	5	4	4	5	4	5	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	3	4	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

MONOCACY - Divisions

DIV. NUMBER	1-39	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
DIVISION I.D.	[9]	Gordon	Breck'dge	Rodes	Ramseur	Tyler	Truex	McClennan
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TYPE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ORDERS	0-2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	5	8	9	3	2	3	4
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	6	6	0	6	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	6	4	5	5	4	5	5
STAFF	0-7	5	4	5	4	4	5	5

MONOCACY - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN #	0-31	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
TERRAIN NAME	[11]	Monocacy R	Crossing	Open	Hill	Woods	Rugged Wd	Trenches	Wheatfield
SIGHTING VAL.	0-7	0	0	1	3	4	6	1	2
MOVEMENT	0-7	0	2	1	2	2	3	1	1
COVER VALUE	0-7	0	0	1	3	4	5	1	2
FORT VAL. (N)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
FORT VAL. (S)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0

MONOCACY - Objectives

OBJ. NUMBER	1-23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
OBJ. NAME	[11]	Tollgate	Crums Ford	RRoad Bridg	Wood Bridge	Wheatfield	The Hill	To Washing	Upper Ford	Crums Hill
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	21,0	16,6	14,16	13,17	9,21	16,22	20,26	4,21	15,3
START (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (N)	1-95	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	5	10	15	15	1	5	5	5	5
MANEUVER (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
START (S)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (S)	1-95	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	1	2	2	2	1	2	5	1	1
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	5	10	10	10	5	10	25	5	5
MANEUVER (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Lynchburg was a major supply centre for the Confederates and its possession by the Union would have made it considerably easier for Grant to have isolated Richmond.

Hunter came up to Lynchburg on the afternoon of June 17th and discovered that he was opposed by Breckinridge. The Confederates had half the men of the Union force and were waiting for reinforcements. Fierce cavalry skirmishing was followed by an unauthorised assault from Crook's Division. The Union advance seemed inexorable un-til it was halted by two fresh brigades. Unbeknownst to the Union commanders these were the vanguard of Early's Division. Hunter confidently expected to scatter the southern defenders the next morning and was in a position to do so except that he had been duped into believing that all of Early's Divisions had arrived on the battlefield. In actual fact Early had moved the same locomotive back and forth all night to disguise the fact that the bulk of his Corps had not yet arrived.

All through the morning of June 18th Hunter probed the Confederate positions and finally dispatched half his infantry on a quite unnecessary flank march. Early saw his opportunity and attacked the Federal troops to his front. After initially being thrown back the northerners rallied and counterattacked. For an hour and a half the battle raged until Early was pushed back towards Lynchburg. As the fighting died down both sides were reinforced. Hunter recalled his missing division while the remaining two of Early's di-

MONOCACY - Small Arms

SMALL ARMS #	1-31	1	2	3
SM. ARMS I.D.	[11]	Rifle Mus	Repeaters	Carbine
RANGE	0-1	1	1	1
FIRE VALUE	0-7	5	7	4
MELEE VALUE	0-7	6	4	6

MONOCACY - Artillery

ARTILLERY #	1-31	1	2
ARTILLERY I.D.	[11]	12lb Rifle	12lb Howit.
RANGE	0-5	4	2
RATE OF FIRE	0-7	3	4
EFFECT'NESS	0-7	4	3
PENETRATION	0-7	5	1

visions came up. Although the numbers were approximately equal, Hunter assumed that the Confederate divisions were as strong as his own and that he was now outnumbered. Later pleading a shortage of ammunition the Union commander began to retire. In itself that would not have been disastrous. Hunter could have retired up the valley and at very least prevented Early from crossing the Potomac. Instead the Union commander chose to retire westward into West Virginia. This created a military vacuum in the Shenandoah and left Early with no one between him and Washington.

The Confederate march up the Valley Pike was rapid and unopposed. They paused briefly at Lexington to troop past the grave of Stonewall Jackson before resuming the march north. The first resistance encountered was from Franz Sigel who opposed Early's main force at Martinsburg with 5000 men. Living up to his recently acquired nickname of "the flying Dutchman" Sigel fled across the Potomac and, collecting the small garrisons of the other crossing points, entrenched his force on the Maryland Heights opposite Harpers Ferry.

Sigel's concentration enabled Early to cross the Potomac above Harpers Ferry and bypass the unfortunate Union commander. In the process of doing so Early helped himself to Union equipment and stores held at Harpers Ferry to re-equip his men.

By the evening of July 5th the entire army was across and was marching across the old battlefields of Antietam and South Mountain.

While the infantry were trudging east towards the capital the cavalry were collecting ransoms from towns along the path of Early's Army. These were to be paid in order to spare the towns the fate suffered by so many towns in the Shenandoah Valley during Hunter's march south. Hagerstown was forced to pay $20,000, due to a misunderstanding between him and his subordinates only a tenth of what Early had decided upon, and Frederick paid the full $200,000.

South Mountain was crossed on July 8th and Washington seemed to lie just ahead, practically undefended. At least that was how it seemed to the Confederates until they passed through Frederick and found their route over the Monocacy River barred by substantial Union forces.

Lew Wallace was to become more famous as the author of Ben Hur than he ever was as a general. Ever since Shiloh he had been in semi disgrace and in mid 1864 he was in command of the Middle Department which included the defence of most of Maryland and Pennsylvania. On July 2nd he received information as to the proximity of Early's Army. With orders that other units should be sent to the front as soon as available Wallace entrained with Tyler's Brigade of Baltimore militia and rushed to the Monocacy River to shield Washington from any advance.

With slightly under 3000 men of all arms Wallace was not in a position to seriously oppose Early's advance. The Union cavalry was thrown out west of the main force and on July 7th and 8th acquitted itself well in skirmishing with its Confederate counterparts.

With the force available to him there was probably little else that Wallace could have done other than fall back before Early's advance while skirmishing to delay the Confederates. The situation changed somewhat on July 8th when the first men of Ricketts' 3rd Division arrived at the Monocacy. The rest of VI Corps, to which the Division belonged, and part of XIX Corps had been detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent north by Grant to defend the capital.

However, apart from Ricketts Division it would be two days before reinforcements reached Washington. Early had to be delayed and that meant giving battle at a serious numerical disadvantage.

Once Wallace had made the decision to oppose Early's advance the choice of ground was obvious. All Union troops were pulled back to the east bank of the Monocacy River with the exception of a strong skirmish line holding the approaches to the two main bridges across the river.

Ricketts' veterans were positioned to prevent a crossing of the Monocacy on either the Washington Pike or the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Tyler's militia was placed along the river guarding several other crossings to the north.

There was one crossing in the immediate area that was not guarded, for the reason that Wallace was unaware that it existed. A section of the river to the south of the main Federal position was easily fordable as was demonstrated at

the start of the battle by McCausland, the confederate cavalry commander.

While McCausland was scouting downriver Early attempted to storm the works in front of the road and rail bridges. The first assault was bloodily repulsed which necessitated the bringing up of artillery.

While the artillery were banging away at Monocacy Junction McCausland crossed the river at his newly discovered ford. He assumed that the entire Union force was militia and therefore dismounted, formed a skirmish line and attacked. Wallace was able to see his line being outflanked and ordered that the wooden road bridge be burned. The railroad bridge was entirely built of steel and so could not be destroyed. The burning of the bridge freed up several of Ricketts' regiments to form a line opposite the new Confederate advance. The southern cavalry advanced in perfect order until they were met by a single thunderous volley. McCausland's men broke and ran.

Despite the failure of the first assault across the ford it was clear to both commanders that the possibility existed of large numbers of Confederate troops being moved onto the eastern bank of the Monocacy.

It was 2 P.M. before a new assault was organised but this time it was delivered by more than a skirmish line of dismounted cavalry. Gordon's Division had come up and deployed on the east bank followed by Breckinridge's Division (under the command of Echols while Breckinridge commanded one wing of Early's Corps).

Wallace looked at the possibility of retreating but with the majority of his troops engaged or about to be engaged a retreat would quickly have become a rout.

As Gordon's Division advanced in echelon the Union line poured fire into it. The assault continued to close musket range but the southerners were unwilling to charge. Both sides settled into a murderous firefight while Gordon hurried reinforcements into line on his left.

The Valley Turnpike
Over the course of the War this road saw perhaps more troop movements than any other road in the country

As is commonly the case in battles several minor events took place within minutes of each other the sum of which was to transform a solid Union defence into a rout. The reserve brigades of Gordon's Division came up to find that they overlapped the right of the Union line. In order to cover the right of Gordon's line Ricketts had extended his men to his left and was no longer anchored on the river. A second Federal line had to be formed from units holding the river line and pushed into the gap.

Just as the men were taken away from the defence of the river the skirmishers on the west bank gave way in the face of a fresh Confederate assault. This allowed the men of Ramseur's Division to deploy up to the river bank and to pour fire into the extreme right of the Union line opposing Gordon across the water. The combination of frontal assault and flank fire broke the 110th Ohio which fell back enabling Gordon to begin rolling up the entire Federal line. Imperceptibly the retreat turned into a rout and what was left of Wallace's little army fled for the relative safety of Washington.

Early had won the day at a cost of fewer than 700 casualties. Wallace had lost 1300, mostly captured but had gained

something far more important than a stretch of Maryland river; time. By the time the pursuit had petered out and the Confederates had regained a semblance of order it was too late to continue the march on Washington. Wallace had delayed Early by one full day.

The majority of the northern force retired on Baltimore, there still being some uncertainty as to the objective of Early's advance. Wallace was initially relieved of command but was later reinstated by Grant when it became clear how important the delay had been.

By the morning of July 11th there were 10,000 men inside the Washington defences with 15,000 due from Grant's force at Petersburg at any moment. Early arrived in front of the weakly manned Fort Stevens at noon. He immediately ordered an assault but his men were too few and too tired. Nothing had been achieved by mid afternoon when a division of Sixth Corps took over the defence of Fort Stevens from the militia.

Early's Washington raid was over when the first Union veteran sighted down his barrel at the skirmishing Rebels. Although he remained in place for the whole of July 12th Jubal Early had decided to retreat on the evening of the

Jubal Early
His invasion of the North was handled in a highly competent fashion although he was never really under any great pressure

11th. The one point of interest on the 12th was how close Abraham Lincoln came to losing his life.

The President had never seen a battle first hand and he was apparently unperturbed by the bullets striking the parapet which partially shielded him from Confederate fire. It was not until a youthful Colonel Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. saw Lincoln and shouted "Get down you damn fool, before you get shot" that the President agreed to sit rather than stand behind the parapet.

The Confederates slipped away in the evening of July 12th. Whereas Early had achieved everything he could from the raid the Union commanders still had an opportunity to turn a narrowly averted defeat into a strategic triumph. Hunter's Army had moved through West Virginia and on July 14th it once again marched into Harpers Ferry.

If Early had retired by the same route he had advanced upon he would have been caught between Wright, the VI Corps commander who was vigorously pursuing the southerners, and Hunter.

The southern commander sensibly chose to retire by a different route to the one he used to approach the Capital. Crossing the Potomac at the mouth of the Monocacy River Early moved to Leesburg closely pursued by Wright.

Although Hunter was technically the superior, Grant had had enough of incompetent subordinates and placed Wright in charge of operations against Early. Hunter protested and was allowed to resign his command in favour of General Crook.

The two Union forces moved swiftly to catch Early between them but were unable to prevent the rapid marching Confederates from passing through the Blue Ridge Mountains at Snickers Gap and getting across the Shenandoah River. Wright followed and as he was starting to move across the Shenandoah Early turned and counterattacked. The lead elements of the Union force were thrown back and the two army's eyed each other warily across the wide stretch of water.

Cavalry reinforcements were sent through Harpers Ferry to cut Early off from his communications. This movement proved successful and Early retired down the valley. In the process of doing so he detached Ramseur's Division to strike at the cavalry on his flank. Ramseur was young and eager for glory. He attacked Averell's cavalry only to find that it had been reinforced by infantry and that he was outnumbered. His assault was heavily repulsed.

With a solid force once again blocking any Confederate movement north through the Shenandoah Wright's infantry was withdrawn and Hunter was once again placed in command of Union troops in the Valley. Before Hunter could rejoin his army it was attacked at Stonewall Jackson's old battleground of Kernstown. The three Union divisions were poorly coordinated on the battlefield and were broken by a well executed Confederate assault. As they had already done many times in the past few years the Union Army of the Shenandoah retired across the Potomac River into Maryland.

There was one postscript to the Washington raid. Early detached his cavalry on raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania. But the days when the Union cavalry were unable to prevent even the most daring southern depredations were over. On August 7th Early's cavalry was caught in a dawn attack and lost 500 men. When Phil Sheridan took over operations in the valley the Union cavalry superiority obtained on August 7th was to have a very great effect.

At the outset Jubal Early had desired to occupy, at least temporarily, Washington or at very least to prompt Grant to launch a suicidal assault on the works at Petersburg in an attempt to take Richmond before he himself could take Washington. Neither of these aims had been realised but had that made Early's Washington raid a failure?

Early returned to Lee with 1000 prisoners and $220,000 U.S. dollars. He had beaten the Union in a battle a days march from Washington and, more importantly he had forced Grant to shift troops from Petersburg, thus delaying the inevitable fall of that city. Foreign observers were in admiration of the bold stroke even if they contributed nothing to the Confederacy other than words. Furthermore Union civilians who had been willing to see the huge casualty lists from the Forty Days wondered what all the blood had been spilt for if the army leaders couldn't prevent yet another invasion of the north.

Militarily Early's raid was nothing more than a nuisance to Grant and an excuse for him to remove Hunter from the Shenandoah Valley. However, as Napoleon had said "in war the moral is to the physical as three is to one". With a Presidential election looming Lincoln could not afford to have it thought that the Confederacy was anything other than a spent force. In hindsight it is easy to see how militarily bankrupt the south was in July 1864 but it was simply not that obvious to the voters who were fast becoming the only weapon the south had left if they were not to lose the Civil War.

CREATING THE SCENARIOS

The units of manoeuvre for *Monocacy* are brigades for the Confederates and regiments for the Union. The reason for this split scale is that by this stage of the war the average Confederate brigade was as small as a Union regiment. Furthermore the Union only had three brigades on the field which would have made for a pretty boring game. References in the game to Union brigades should be read as regiments and references to Union divisions should be read as brigades. Each strength point represents the normal 100 men of brigade level scenarios rather than the 50 men used in regimental level games.

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk (or hard disk), we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in the Decisive Battles manual.

There is some additional information for IBM users at the end of this section. Be sure to read it, especially if you have an EGA/VGA card and want to take advantage of our "full map" graphics.

Macintosh users should note there are some changes to the numbering system in their design manual and that access to the various design routines is obtained through conventional, pull-down Mac menus.

Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store any of the historical scenarios in any unused save-game location. This procedure prepares

the template on which we will build the *Monocacy* scenario.

Hard disk users should note that all they need is enough room on their hard disk to hold the new scenarios. Macintosh users should note that they do not need to use an existing scenario as the template. They can select *New* from the File Menu.

The WarPlan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary. Macintosh users should check their WarPlan™ manual for the location of the different design routines.

Title [5c]. There are three lines of text for the title of the scenario:

Monocacy

Defending the Capital

July 9th 1864

Go back to Menu J and re-save the game in the same location.

Map Size [5a(i)]. The top left sector is 0. The bottom right sector is 8. Macintosh dimensions are 27 x 27.

Define Terrain [5a(ii)]. The accompanying Terrain Effects Chart lists the details of the active terrain types for this scenario. Select (or paint) the icons of your choice to represent the ten terrain types.

Create Map [5a(iii)]. Select the <CLEAR> line from Menu J. Clear the map and the data. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign control to each hex.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

Limits [5b(i)]. Before you can enter the military units for each side, you must set the force limits. The force limits are as follows; corps (2), divisions (5), brigades (17). Apple II and C64 users must also set the artillery weapon limit to 11.

Weapons [5b(ii)]. Consult the Small Arms and Artillery Tables and enter the data as shown.

Forces [5b(iii)]. Edit the North (Union) Army HQ and the South (Rebel) Army HQ as shown in the data tables.

The objectives assigned to the Army HQs will not appear on the screen until after the objective data base has been entered.

Neither side has any Corps in this scenario.

The North has 3 divisions. The South has 4 divisions. Consult the Divisions Table and enter the data as shown.

The North has 17 brigades. The South has 16 brigades. Consult the Brigades Tables and enter the data as shown.

Objectives [5b(iv)]. There are 9 objectives. Consult the Objectives Table and enter the data as shown.

Scenario Setup [5d(i)]. Enter the following data. Date (9), Month (7), Year (64), Century (18), North Maximum Hex Movement is (7,0,11,0,10), South Maximum Hex Movement is (8,0,12,0,12), neither side is encamped. The entrenchment values (introduced only in Volume II) are 0 for both sides. VP awards are 15 per leader, 3 per 100 men (North), and 25 per leader, 5 per 100 men (South). IBM and Macintosh users should note the combat value for this scenario is 3 for the North and 5 for the South.

Scenario Details [5d(ii)]. This is a one day scenario. Enter the following data for Day 1. The weather is Clear (0), the North is Defensive (0) and the South is Offensive (1), 9am to 6pm are day (3), move (1) turns and 7pm is a day (3), End (2) turn. Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

NOTES FOR IBM USERS

IBM users with CGA, MCGA, Tandy or Hercules graphics can create the scenario using the advice given above. There is a minor change in the weapons data base. You do not have to set limits for weapons. There is space for 31 weapons of each type.

IBM users with EGA or VGA cards must first create the game map with the "full-map" graphics disabled. To do this, run the program as DB2 f (or DB3 f or DB1 f) which will by-pass the "full-map" graphics. Select a scenario as a

template as explained above and save it in a save-game location. Build up the map in the usual way and save when finished. The rest of the data for the scenario may be entered with the "full-map" graphics either disabled or enabled. There is a full explanation of "Full Map" graphics in Issue 14.

Re-boot the program (this time with the "full-map" graphics enabled) and use the "full-map" WarPaint™ tool to build up the map. In other words, the "full-map" graphics are only graphic images and do not affect the play of the game.

A NOTE ON .LBM FILES

The .lbm files contain the graphic images. DPaint2™ from Electronic Arts can be used to manipulate the file. Up to 250 hexes can be created but DPaint2™ must be used to change the size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the 'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file.

The Decisive Battles program reads the size of the .lbm file on loading and adjusts the WarPaint™ values automatically. If you don't want to worry about manipulating .lbm files, choose a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as the template to build the new scenario on.

When saving an .lbm file, a temporary file is created first. When the temporary file is successfully saved the original is deleted and the temporary file renamed. This means there must be enough space on the current disk to hold the temporary file.

Macintosh users will find no such complications when it comes to creating scenarios. Follow the directions given in the design section of any *Decisive Battles* game manual.

PLAYER'S NOTES

North

You will have trouble controlling your widely spread forces, especially when it comes time to retreat. Stay near the two bridges so that you can coordinate

the defence against Ramseur as well as shifting troops to delay Gordon as he advances against your left. Let him come to you and you should have no trouble trading lives for space and time.

South

Washington is a day's march away and you don't have time to waste brushing aside a handful of bluecoats. Attack rapidly and continuously with Gordon, Breckinridge and the cavalry. Look to have the bridges cleared by the end of the game but don't sacrifice too many men on assaulting trench lines. Ideally you should be able to flank the Union off the Washington Pike rather than having to push them ◆

time? If he does you can count yourself very unlucky! When I complete a quest all I ever seem to get are some lousy gold pieces, Bah Humbug.

❖   ❖   ❖

Dear SSG,

It was with some anticipation that I awaited the IBM PC version of *Carriers at War*. I was not dissapointed with the results. I have since received the *CAW Construction Kit* although I have yet to use it.

I do have one or two comments and suggestions for you. In your scenarios-Warroom™ selection information screen, as you go through the various variants it would be nice to know how they vary from one another as to goals, objectives, etc. Usually the "historical variant" is described but not! the others. I would also like to have the ability to go from one battle to the other with the results from the last battle playing a part. For example, if the Saratoga were sunk in the Pearl Harbour scenario, do not have it appear in subse-

quent scenarios. Let us have longer periods to fight on one or more battles instead of just a few days to fight one battle.

Also let us in on the planning stages of these various campaigns and objectives, goals, what resources to allocate, how long to have to carry them out, what reinforcements to have/or to send. I realise this would be a very large undertaking, but one I feel would be worth it. Also let us have better use of the keyboard for menu selection.

Also perhaps try to make a comprehensive WWII game covering all 6 years of the war including planning, allocating and staging the various resources. I would certainly like to see it! Thanks for your time.

Sincerely

Alan Jousset
High Level
Alberta
Canada

Ed. Thanks for the letter Alan. Unfortunately your plan for a *CAW* campaign game is quite impractical using the current Warroom[TM] intelligence package. Using Warroom[TM] a scenario designer is able to give units a series of alternative plans just as if he was giving them orders before a battle. This is a quite complex task even for one engagement as you can see from the 74 Warcards in the Wake Island scenario. To do a campaign using Warroom[TM] would be a job of impossible proportions. It would be like planning every possible battle of an entire campaign before the first engagement was fought.

❖   ❖   ❖

Dear Stephen,

First up I would like to add my plaudits to those you have already received. I only own two of your games, *Halls of Montezuma* and *Carriers at War*, but with all the scenarios contained therein plus the ones included with Run5 I have had many, many hours of excitement, tension and plain old fashioned fun.
I look forward to the release of *CAW II* and *Warlords II* for the Mac and, when finances permit, I'd like to get hold of at least one of the Decisive Battles of the ACW series.
Carriers at War is one of my favourite games. Back in the days when I was a fanatical collector of military simulations in board game form, *Flat Top* by Avalon Hill was one of my favourites and it is great to be able to play a highly detailed carrier warfare game without having to clutter up the place with a large board and innumerable small, easily lost pieces for days on end. Apart from that I could rarely persuade friends to play a game that could take days to complete. Now the AI in your games is ready to play me any time I like and is a good opponent into the bargain.
Incidentally I enjoyed the hypothetical *Rainbow 5* scenario in issue #21, particularly when I, as the US commander, annihilated the Japanese fleet and successfully invaded Wake Island.
Once again, conratulations and keep up the good work.

Yours Faithfully
Peter Kealey
Richmond, Victoria
Australia

❖   ❖   ❖

G'day Stephen,

Congratulations on your recent appointment as Run 5 editor. I have enjoyed SSG for the past five years and its dedication to the gaming fraternity; being an American Civil War buff, I enjoy the ACW articles and scenarios even more.
Would the SSG team consider (for the future) a strategy game that's based on the entire ACW period. Food for thought.
Another possible strategy game would be the scramble for Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, say from 1870 to 1912. This would be ambitious indeed, encompassing Africa from top to bottom, from east to west, the famous explorations of the dark continent; the intrigues, deceits, ambitions and stark imperialism of the great powers... and the myriad of wars, battles, skirmishes, massacres and border disputes. Perhaps something similar to Gold of the Americas, a most enjoyable game.

Sandy Savos
Woronora, N.S.W.
Australia

Ed. Thanks Sandy, no plans at present for a "Gold of Darkest Africa" but *Road to Appomattox* is still on the drawing board. Just when we'll get around to doing it is unclear at present but we'll do it.

❖   ❖   ❖

Dear Mr Hand,

I am disappointed to realise that SSG uses Hollywood as a source for their research. There is no real historical justification for the cult of Patton reflected in your issues 20 and 21, other than the fairy tale movie *Patton*. If you had seen or heard the real Patton, you would have realised Don Knots was a more accurate lead than was George Scott.

I don't mind considered Monty bashing, but mostly it is an exercise in double standards. When American historians report on Alamein, they record with great detail Monty's numerical superiority over the Axis, as if it was a no brainer to win. In their own campaigns rarely is there a similar accounting of the opposing forces.

It is very revealing to make a weekly comparison of the men, quality, tanks, vehicles, artillery and airpower of the British and Americans against a similar accounting of the Axis forces opposing their sectors in the Sicily, Normandy and the Rhineland campaigns. It shows the Americans (& Patton) hav-

ing a huge, crushing superiority and that the quality German formations were arrayed against the British and Canadians. When Monty lets up the pressure so the Germans can concentrate against the Americans, the result is the near disaster in the Ardennes.

As for Patton and Operation Cobra, the real issue is: why did it take so long? The Americans struggled for a month and a half against relatively negligible opposition (with margins of superiority Montgomery never enjoyed) before they were finally (after many attempts) able to overwhelm the minor forces opposing them. Patton then races across France, but faced no opposition, big deal. The Germans hastily scrape together some formations to face Patton around Metz, and he is stalled for months. What a genius. Patton is a one hit wonder. He is a pursuit general, a Murat; not a Napoleon, not a Wellington, not a Blucher, nor even a Montgomery.

In histories of the Russian campaign, it is always reported favourably when Manstein et al advocate a flexible, elastic defence, and Hitler as a kook for his defend everything strategy. Monty's suggestion of a similar elastic defence in the strategically unimportant Ardennes is presented as weird by your article. His strategy left the Germans over extended, father from supply, and exposed to a bigger defeat.

Who proposed the most daring, risky, bold and blitzkrieg like strategies during the '44 campaign in France? It was Montgomery: his proposed narrow front blitz to the Ruhr in August/September 1944 (turned down by the cautious Americans), and Market-Garden. Monty had many limitations, but he was a far more competent general than Patton. Someone with opinions similar to mine is General Bradley:

"He steamed about with great convoys of cars. Great squads of cameramen. Became unpopular with his troops...To George, tactics was simply a process of bulling ahead. Never seemed to think out a campaign. Seldom made a careful estimate of the situation. I thought him

a rather shallow commander... He was colourful but impetuous, full of temper, bluster, inclined to treat troops and subordinates as morons. His whole concept of command was opposite to mine. He was primarily a showman. The show always came first."

From "Bradley Commentaries, World War II", Military History Institute, Carlisle, Penn., 1947. The date is important because, unlike his later writings, especially A General's Life, they were written before the Patton Cult began to control the spin of historiography.

There is no historical basis for the 'race' to Messina, except the aforementioned Patton fantasy movie. Messina was assigned to the U.S. 7th Army area of operations around July 25th. The race existed primarily in the 'showman' mind of Patton. Another sign of a thoroughly amateur military officer.

Do you really believe in the Patton Cult, or are you just pandering to the delusions of your biggest market?

Sincerely,

Richard MacRae

Richmond B.C.

Canada

Ed. I don't normally reply in such length to letters but this one aroused my interest. Richard, you have attempted to defend the one general that all of us here at SSG regard as being completely without merit, Montgomery. Such vile heresy must be put down, please don't take the following at all personally.

It was von Manteuffel, the commander of 5th Panzer Army who said "Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant Panzer Army commander."

Manteuffel's commander on the Western Front, von Rundstedt spoke of Montgomery in different terms. "Montgomery was always extremely cautious and unwilling to take risks... (He) was very systematic, which is all right if you have sufficient resources and sufficient time."

The above comments give some indication of how the enemy felt about the two men in question. A German Panzer Leader was expected to be a troop pusher, someone who would create opportunities and then exploit them to the utmost. Only the most energetic, talented leaders became good Panzer Generals and it was one of these men who, after being defeated by Patton in the Ardennes, recognised a professional of equal or greater ability.

I believe Patton to have been the best Allied Army commander of the war and furthermore I believe Montgomery to have been mediocre at best.

Richard MacRae presents a very "Empire" view of the situation amongst the Allies in WWII, the solid, competent British with their tough Canadian allies versus the flashy, overrated Americans.

This is the view of history I was brought up with. As a boy I was taught that the British, led by Montgomery, won WWII. Over the past 20 years I have slowly realised the truth of the situation. Britain was the junior partner on a secondary front (the most important front against Germany of course being the Russian Front). Inevitably, along with the "we won the War" myth we get the myth of "our general was the best general of the War".

Having put Montgomery in perspective I would like to deal with his performance in those battles which Mr MacRae has specifically mentioned. At Alamein Montgomery deliberately embarked on a battle of attrition knowing that it was the one style of warfare which assured him of success. It also assured him of horrendous casualties.

The British commander used the term a "crumbling" process to describe the way in which he intended to hammer at the German and Italian infantry before tackling the armour. He also called it a "killing match" and predicted that the attritional phase of the battle might last up to ten days.

If this has an eerie ring of a previous war about it that should come as no surprise. Montgomery's plan was vin-

tage WWI. His tanks were to be used as infantry support and were forbidden to exploit a breakthrough if one should be made! The tank was the antidote to the battle, if not to the war, of attrition and to use them in the way Montgomery did at Alamein was inexcusable.

In Sicily Patton was supposed to support Montgomery's flank while the British pushed north to Messina. When he ran into stiff opposition Montgomery took the better part of two weeks to reorientate his advance around the west flank of Mt Etna rather than the right.

A top German general who decided to shift his axis of advance under similar circumstances would have been expected to have done so in a day or less. Any longer would give the enemy time to shift reserves to the threatened area.

While Montgomery was twiddling his thumbs in front of Catania, Patton had been champing at the bit to be allowed to exploit the opportunities opening up in the west of the island. When he was finally allowed to move west the progress was rapid and dramatic.

In stark contrast with Montgomery's moribund pursuit of Rommel during the latter's retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia Patton showed himself able to keep the spearhead moving despite obstacles and other difficulties which could so easily have brought about delays.

In Sicily Patton showed all the attributes of a good armoured commander. He was the master of the breakthrough *and* the pursuit. Contrary to the comments of Mr MacRae pursuit requires skills and determination as great as any other facet of military command.

In the words of the British General Wavell. "To the uninitiated pursuit seems the easiest possible form of war... Yet the successful or sustained pursuits of history have been few, the escapes from a lost battle many."

After D-Day the British and Canadians were the more immediate threat, being as they were already at the base of the Peninsula and in a position to break out towards Paris. The Germans moved the bulk of their mobile divisions to face Montgomery. As a result of this the British and Canadians remained concentrated whil the Americans were forced to take over progressively more of the Allied line.

Up until the commencement of Operation Cobra on July 25th the Americans had advanced 30km (20 miles) due south from Omaha Beach as well as capturing the entire Cotentin Peninsula north of Utah Beach. They did this against determined opposition, fighting through hostile bocage country. By comparison the British and Canadians had advanced 10km (6 miles) from their day one bridgehead.

Epsom and Goodwood had been costly attritional battles which had achieved little except for a reduction in manpower and materiel on both sides.

Patton's Third Army was activated on August 1st. Despite being counterattacked by four panzer divisions Patton swept the German defenders aside and in 20 days took all of Brittany and had spearheads across the Seine.

The Americans were now drawing the entirety of the German reserves onto them as well as forcing FM von Kluge to pull forces away from the front facing Montgomery.

Surely Monty would now be able to advance to close the Falaise pocket. In fact he was so sure of his ability to do so that he forbade the entry of Patton's spearhead into the 21st Army Group area of operations. Consequently between 20, 000 and 40, 000 Germans escaped while American troops were forced to remain idle. Montgomery later admitted that he had "botched Falaise".

The pursuit across France put unbelievable pressure on the Allied supply services and this led to the famous argument for a broad front or a narrow front advance.

Montgomery favoured a narrow thrust to capture the Ruhr and cripple German industry. The problem was, as von Mellenthin, chief of staff to Army Group G, puts it that though Montgomery's plan would have "simplified the Allied supply problem, it would also have simplified the German defence problem. Divisions assembling on the Moselle to stop Patton could have been diverted to Belgium to stop Montgomery."

A narrow front "schwerpunkt" attack is only valid if the enemy is forced to hold the entire front by the presence of your units. Montgomery's "narrow thrust" would have telegraphed the Allied intentions and made it simple for the Germans to concentrate and stop the spearhead while there was no pressure, indeed no threat whatsoever, at any other part of the line.

Von Mellenthin states that Patton was poised to break into Germany when his fuel ran out on August 31st. By the time more fuel had reached the spearhead on September 4th the moment had passed and the German line had been stabilised.

Meanwhile, Montgomery, with the lion's share of the fuel supply had ground to a halt in front of stiffening German resistance. On September 2nd the British spearhead was ordered to slow down. Montgomery was planning to drop parachutists near Tournai and did not want the ground troops to overrun the drop zones and ruin his operation. Brussels was taken on September 3rd but the Germans were reorganizing to defend the great rivers of southern Holland. By September 10th the British had all but stopped. The reason for this was not lack of fuel but German resistance.

Eisenhower had rightly put pressure all along the German front but had given the most fuel to the wrong commander. Patton, according to German observers could have been across the Rhine in September while Montgomery was still bogged down in Belgium.

Following the halt of the Allied advance Montgomery came up with his one daring move of the war, Operation Market-Garden. Unfortunately Montgomery allowed this hare-brained scheme to divert him from the most important job, clearing the Scheldt Estuary. Although the British had cap-

tured Antwerp they did not control the Scheldt Estuary which was necessary for use of the port. Despite this omission all available resources were funneled into an attempt to drive what Bradley described as "a 60 mile salient up a side-alley to the Reich."

Market-Garden was a disaster waiting to happen. The thrust was so narrow and depended so absolutely on individual bridges that it was doomed to failure. Dropping the paratroops secured most of the bridges but signaled the axis of the ground advance absolutely to the defenders. There was none of the room to flow around strongpoints and the ability to alter the direction of the spearhead that charcterised German blitzkrieg operations. In short there was no flexibility and so the Allies lost an entire airborne division for nothing.

The comparison Mr MacRae makes between von Manstein's withdrawals in Southern Russia between late 1942 and early 1943 and those made by Montgomery in the Ardennes is invalid.

As I intend to explore next issue von Manstein drew back to a shorter line to free up reserves for a counterstroke. In doing so he removed troops from a salient in the south of the line and massed them considerably north of that point. The ground he gave up was worthless and was in danger of being pocketed if the withdrawal had not been made.

In the Ardennes Montgomery ordered a withdrawal from St Vith, a vital road junction. By doing so he allowed the Germans to freely move troops and supplies through the town and to establish an effective shoulder against the north of the salient.

Even if St Vith had been cut off it would have been possible to supply it from the air as was the case with Bastogne. The northern flank of the bulge was being reinforced faster than the southern. Patton had no trouble building a defensive line so why did Montgomery with more men?

The ultimate indictment of Montgomery in the Ardennes is the

way in which he confidently asserted that the troops under his command would not be able to counterattack for at least three months. At the exact moment those words were uttered "lightning" Joe Collins' 2nd Armoured Division was destroying its German counterpart in a highly successful attack.

Throughout the war Patton demonstrated that he was a far more capable general than Montgomery. The Germans who fought both men recognised it and so too did Patton's immediate superior Omar Bradley who described him as "An outstanding combat commander.... Of the ten general officers of his grade known to me, I would list him number one as a combat leader."

Patton was an exemplary showman, as was Rommel and Montgomery himself. His showmanship did not affect his generalship, any more than it affected Rommel's. Far from SSG subscribing to a "cult of Patton" Mr MacRae I would assert that you have been overexposed to the "cult of Montgomery". Monty was a third rate leader which makes it all the more apalling that the British regarded him as the best they had.

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To SSG game design and creators,

I wish to begin by congratulating you on the outstandingly mint game *WarlordsII*. I began playing with *Warlords*, which was a terrific concept combining two great loves of mine; fantasy and war. *Warlords II* is a fabulous improvement over its predecessor in all the right areas, and each person who contributed to its creation really deserves some attention in the spotlight. I think a standing ovation would be in order, not to mention perhaps a bonus besides!

The game is nearly perfect in playability, in interest and in difficulty, but where are the stats? This is not to criticise, but to point out that it would be a beneficial improvement. I jump at the chance to play *Warlords II*. The beginning is extremely strategic and ex-

citing, full of so many good possible variations for a great game. The middlegame poses all sorts of problems where the outcome is still not certain, no matter how good a position you think you have. I play with a 96% difficulty and use the white player, which seems to have the least strategic ability to win as well as the traditional underdog of being so "good", (if the game takes this into account). (Ed. No Tim, sorry but it's all in your imagination)

I've gone through a dozen or so games, beating the computer and getting beat, but I've found the thrill of winning the game somewhat diminished. There just doesn't seem to be any benefit to conquering the whole continent as opposed to negotiating peace. Now, if there were stats. . . ? Maybe the next game, I'd go for conquering the continent in less time or with fewer armies. I might also like to see if I could win with more medals or just see all the different types of medals I could possibly win. Besides that, how can I exaggerate how great a conqueror I am to my friends without proof?

It has been shown statistically that in a game where a person plays for a goal, he will play an average of three more games for the same goal 85% of the time, to achieve a better result.

How about campaigns? If you give us stats, it would be nice to give me more atmosphere, and keep me playing even more. Perhaps with these individual games I'm taking over an entire world and with a campaign game I need to conquer it three times with increasing levels of difficulty. On the same premise if I win I could carry over my best hero and an elite army force as well as his magic items and banner, plus all those special armies that received medals. Perhaps special magic items will be introduced, but nothing too overbalancing for the game. I would suggest these items be acquired only through a

Invasion Hawaii

An Exercise in Possibilities

September 1st - 5th, 1942

A Scenario for the Carriers at War Game System

by Stephen Hand

Anyone who has played the Midway scenario from Carriers at War will realise just how lucky the Americans were. Outgunned and still to an extent outclassed, the U.S. Fleet pulled off an astonishing victory. Of all the battles in the Pacific War Midway is the one which went most against the odds. It could so easily have gone the other way. How would the Japanese have followed up a victory at Midway? One of the possibilities is that they would have launched an invasion to once and for all throw the American Fleet out of the Pacific, an invasion of Hawaii.

THE TIME LINES DIVERGE

The eyewitness account of Commander Handamoto aboard the IJN Kaga.

"It is 2100 hours, June 3rd, 1942 and our massive armada is moving inexorably towards the island of Midway. This will be the decisive victory, the puny American Fleet will be destroyed utterly and the glorious Japanese Empire will rule over an enlarged sphere of Asian co-prosperity!

Throughout the night of June 3rd our fleet steams on its course. A strike on Midway is planned for dawn, but only the planes from the Kaga and the Akagi are being used. The strike is launched and at 0520 the planes arrive. Most of the U.S. planes are caught on the ground and substantial damage is inflicted.

Our planes have been recovered before any sightings are made. The first is at 0820 when capital ships are reported north east of Midway. By 0850 it is clear that the Americans have split their task force into two groups, one north east of Midway, the other southeast. They are still out of range of our carrier aircraft at this time. Around the same time American planes are observed sortieing from Midway. CAP is put up and the we wait. From 0920 to 0940 the U.S.

planes attack. Our valiant pilots prevent any damage to the carriers. Only one hit is recorded, against the cruiser Chikuma, a fire which is quickly extinguished.

By 1030 our fighter pilots are ready to escort a strike against the Americans. Our confidence is unmatched as wave after wave of fighters and bombers leave the decks. It is our job to await the inevitable news of our glorious victory.

Even as our pilots go to sink the enemy carriers, planes from the Zuiho attack

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Macintosh Owners Read This First

Unbeknownst to us scenario designers the format of Macintosh Carriers at War AIQ files was changed very slightly between the release of Carriers at War and Carriers at War II. The upshot of this is that the *Rainbow 5* scenario sent out with last issue will only work if you run it under Carriers at War II. The good news is that you can fix the problem yourself in about 30 seconds. Find the Rainbow 5 AIQ file and change the name so that it has the word historical in it. I called mine "not historical" on the grounds that it is a hypothetical scenario. When you start the game up you will then have to go to "Warroom selection" and then hit "accept selection". The game will then run normally. You will have to do the same with the *Invasion Hawaii* scenario in this issue. Alternatively you could go out and buy a copy of Carriers at War II which is a great game in its own right containing eight fabulous new scenarios. Next issue we intend to include a patch of the CAW application for disk subscribers. We apologise to those people who had problems. Our Mac programmer has been beaten.

Thursday, 4 days 10 hours and 25 minutes remaining   12:35 Jun 4 1942

Air Strikes All Round
A period of tense waiting for both sides

Dauntless dive bomb CV Soryu [Hits : 2]   12:40 Jun 4 1942

CV Soryu

The Japanese in Trouble
Two hits on the Soryu; could this be the end for the IJN?

Vals dive bomb CV Enterprise [Hits : 1]   13:05 Jun 4 1942

CV Enterprise

A Pristine USN Carrier
... and it was never seen again!

the base at Midway. More destruction is wrought.

As we have attacked the enemy, so he has sent planes against us. At 1235 he attacks our carriers. All of the carriers are hit although only the Akagi is seriously damaged. We remain to see whether we can damage them more than they have damaged us.

As the reports come in it is clear that our pilots have found and sunk the Enterprise and the Hornet. That only leaves the Yorktown which we suspect is in the southern task group.

The Yorktown still has teeth. At 1430 its planes strike our carriers. The Akagi and the Hiryu now have their flight decks closed and the Soryu is badly damaged. Only the Kaga remains undamaged.

As soon as we are able a strike is sent from our two functioning carriers which will hit the Yorktown at dusk. Once again we are successful, our pilots reporting both the Yorktown and the cruiser Astoria sunk. As night falls we are confident that a crushing victory is still ours. Even the torpedoing of the Battleship Mutsu by an American submarine cannot upset us.

In the early morning of June the 5th our cruisers commence their bombardment of Midway as our other surface vessels begin sweeping east of the island, searching for the remnants of the American taskgroups. At 0430 we get a sighting southeast of Midway and several of our units converge on it . A strike is also planned to arrive at first light.

At 0530 the battlecruisers Kongo and Hiei make contact with the enemy. It is the Yorktown, still afloat and its escort of six destroyers and one cruiser. The Yorktown and the cruiser Portland are sunk in the first engagement and then the remaining destroyers are sunk by a combination of air strikes and surface actions.

By the late afternoon of June the 5th the Imperial Japanese Navy is unopposed. The transports are slowly steaming towards the island where they will land

their troops. We have won the battle of Midway, there is nothing which can stop us. Next we will conquer Hawaii, then, who knows, Los Angeles, New York, Washington D.C. !!!"

As you've probably guessed, what you just read was an account of a game of *Carriers at War* where I played the Japanese at Midway and completely flogged the Americans. I have made this my starting point for the Invasion Hawaii scenario. Midway is in Japanese hands, the Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown sleep with the fishes and the Imperial Japanese Navy has reformed for an invasion of Hawaii.

But things didn't go all the Japanese way. The Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu were damaged at Midway and it has taken nearly three months to refit an invasion fleet for Hawaii. In that time, however, the Hiyo and Junyo have joined the

invasion fleet. The Japanese will be stronger at Hawaii than they were at Midway.

The Americans will also be stronger in everything including carriers. There is a lot of land-based air on Oahu including the new Avengers, deployed for the first time in great numbers. Three fleet carriers and two escort carriers are available along with two battleships. The odds will be as daunting as they were at Midway and with higher stakes. One more defeat in the Pacific will put the U.S. in a position from which even their massive industrial base will find it hard to recover.

If you enjoy this scenario you will be pleased to know that I've got a series of hypotheticals up my sleeve. If the Japanese had won Midway they may have gone on to Hawaii, then again they may have had another crack at New

Guinea, bringing on another Battle of the Coral Sea.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was another long odds win. The Japanese were still strong enough at the end of the battle to have pushed home and landed their troops at Port Moresby. The fact that they didn't will remain a (happy) mystery to many Australians. Be that as it may, if the Japanese had taken Port Moresby, Australia would have been open to attack.

Whether or not the Japanese would have attacked us is a question that no one can answer. Of course for the purposes of our hypothetical history they would have attempted an invasion, probably of Cairns and Townsville. Given the distances involved in Australia (it is about the same size as the continental U.S.A.) it would have been very difficult to defend such isolated coastal towns.

It looks grim for the Enterprise...

... and for the Hornet!

The Japanese Take a Pounding!
Only the Kaga is operational

If the U.S. had been unsurprised at Pearl Harbour the Japanese could have got a nasty shock. The Americans had some big surface ships which could have done a whole lot of damage to the Japs if they had been in the right place at the right time. Even if the bases had put emergency CAP up the Japanese could have been very sorry that they ever tangled with the U.S.A.

If the Japanese had been badly defeated at Pearl Harbour the Americans could have been in a position to relieve the Philippines before the garrison capitulated. The Japanese would have been just as anxious to send the U.S. transports to Davy Jones Locker.

A successful relief of the Philippines would open the way for the defeat of Japan in 1942 or 1943. Attacks on the Marianas, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the Japanese mainland without the tremendous material preponderance of 1944 and 1945 would make for fast-paced, exciting scenarios. Looks like I've got a whole alternate World War II mapped out. By the time I'm through I'll have you failing history exams.

PLAYERS NOTES

United States

This is another tough one. If you steam out towards the enemy you will find yourself beyond the range of the land based air. If you hug the land bases you forfeit any hope of surprise and you can be sure that the bad guys will concentrate on your carriers before finishing off the guys on the ground. The only tactic which gives some hope is to steam the battleships at the Japanese with the idea of showing a big target at first light. This should give you a chance to get one free air strike in before the Japanese can respond. If you can keep the battlewagons steaming up to the Japanese carriers they will keep sending planes against them and you will have your carriers free for counterattacks. Concentrate on the main carrier group and the transports. All other task groups are secondary. You have plenty of land based air, some of high

quality. Use it to reinforce your carriers but don't send heavy bombers against their carriers unless you like rescuing aircrew from the ocean.

Japan

If you are careful and husband your resources there is no way you should lose this one. Rule no.1 is to protect your transports because without them the best result you can achieve is a draw. Make sure that there is a task group with capital ships near both your major carrier groups in case the yanks try a sneaky attack with their battleships. Don't worry about Hawaii until the US carriers are sunk and don't get close enough for the land based light bombers to hit you. Once the American ships are out of the way you can worry about neutralising the air bases on Oahu. ◆

quest. Allow heroes to go beyond Paladinhood in these campaign games.

I love this game and the ideas I've suggested, I hope, provide an enhancement to it, not to change it. I just wasnt to see this game be the perfect game of all games. It is my hope that you will seriously peruse these ideas for development in the game *Warlords II*. It does seem to lack a certain competitive completeness without it.

Thank you for your time.

Respectfully

Timothy Baier,

Huntington Sta. N.Y.

U.S.A.

Ed. Thanks for the ideas Tim. We have already identified the end game sequence as an area for improvement if we ever do a sequel to Warlords II. Campaign games are a nice idea too. ◆

The Last Nail Goes into the American Coffin
The Yorktown slips under the waves

The Japanese Celebrate a Stunning Victory at Midway
It could have happened so easily!

Hawaii is Next!
Can you turn the Japanese tide this time. . .

Strategy: The Indirect Approach was published in its final edition in 1967 and is (was? it is probably out of print) published by Faber and Faber of London.

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The Seven Days and Lee's Last Campaign

Normally I avoid books about the Civil War written from a southern perspective. Those words usually mean that the author is a partisan southerner and all pretence of objectivity usually disappears after the opening paragraph (sometimes before). It is extremely pleasant to find exceptions to this rule, as in the case of Clifford Dowdey's two books, *The Seven Days* and *Lee's Last Campaign*.

Dowdey manages the difficult task of maintaining reasonable objectivity while leaving one in no doubt as to his personal sympathies. He is a Virginian born and bred and he has a boundless admiration for Robert E. Lee. Despite this he treats Lee very much as a human being and attempts to explain how Lee worked and what made him a great military commander.

Dealing as they do with the beginning and the end of Lee's career as a field commander the two books are an interesting comparison.

The Seven Days begins strangely by discussing the probable effects a Union victory in 1862. The premise is that Lee saved Richmond in 1862 and by doing so prolonged the war by nearly three years. Dowdey points out that had the South capitulated in the summer of 1862 they would almost certainly have received better conditions than they did in 1865.

One is almost placed in a Shakespearian tragedy where the hero, attractive in all respects is condemned, by virtue of his one fatal flaw, to a sorry end. Robert E. Lee is our hero who is fighting for a doomed cause, ultimately to the detriment of himself and all he holds dear.

I cannot help but quote Sir William Waller's famous words to his friend Sir Ralph Hopton as he was about to take command of a Parliamentary army against him in the English Civil War. "That great God which is the searcher of my heart, knows with what a sad sense I go upon this service and with what a perfect hatred I detest this war without an enemy..."

Dowdey may not have read Waller's words but I am sure he would agree with them with regards to the American Civil War.

The narrative of the book opens after 1st Bull Run with Johnston encamped near Washington and McClellan training the Army of the Potomac. The background and opening of McClellan's Peninsula campaign are dealt with briefly but informatively. The action really begins with McClellan advancing on Richmond and Johnston slowly retreating up the Peninsula.

Lee was brought to Richmond to be Jefferson Davis' military adviser, a poorly defined position with no real authority. This eventually led to a duality of command among the Confederates as Johnston retreated closer to Richmond and Lee.

Johnston and McClellan appear an odd pair of generals as the two face each other attempting to avoid a general engagement. McClellan resorted to laying siege to the Confederate army in Yorktown while Johnston intended to retire before any real action could take place. In due course the southern army retired towards Richmond and the Confederate Cabinet seemed almost resigned to the fall of the capital. There was one voice, that of Robert E. Lee which spoke in favour of defending the capital .

With Johnston refusing to confide his plans in the government Lee worked behind the scenes to safeguard the other approaches to Richmond. In correspondence to Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley Lee encouraged his aggressive campaign of manoeuvre against the superior Union forces arrayed against him.

When it became clear that Johnston must either fight or give up the Confederate capital he chose to attack McClellan in the badly organised battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks). At the climax of the indecisive battle Johnston was wounded, making way for the elevation of Lee and a new chapter of Confederate military history opened.

Upon taking command of the army Lee changed its name to the Army of Northern Virginia. It was an indication of his aggressive intentions.

Lee allowed McClellan to inch closer to Richmond while he concentrated his forces for a counterstroke. Jackson had been successful in his Valley Campaign and was now brought to Richmond to add his weight to that of Lee.

Lee's plans for attacking McClellan's right flank were sound. He intended to mass the weight of his army in the attack, leaving only a skeleton force in front of McClellan's left flank. The early stages of the Seven Days Battle showed up the weaknesses in Lee's command structure. Attacks were delivered late or not at all while coordination between divisions was practically non-existent. One of the great mysteries of the Seven Days was the uncharacteristic lethargy of Stonewall Jackson.

Dowdey devotes an entire chapter to the question of Jackson's malaise. By an examination of Jackson's behaviour during the Seven Days and a comparison of this with his normal behaviour Dowdey has concluded that Jackson was suffering from stress fatigue. While the diagnosis is far from certain, Jackson was off color during the battles and stress fatigue would certainly explain his actions.

The actions of the Seven Days Battle, actually only six, are described by Dowdey in impressive detail. Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Savage's Station, Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill are dissected without losing the element of human drama inherent in any story of great conflict. The development of Lee as a field commander is seen over the course of the six days of battle. At the outset he is unsure of himself and becomes overly frustrated when his orders are not carried out as he would have liked. By the end of the Seven Days Lee has found his feet. He is becoming familiar with the vagaries of battle and is accepting, if not liking, the confusion and command breakdown of a great battle.

There are some aspects of Lee's military personality which are unchanging throughout. Lee has a solid sense of strategy, what is possible, what is necessary for certain ends and how his actions will turn out. He also shows his ability to read his opponent. From McClellan to Grant, Lee predicted their actions and was able to react accordingly. This was perhaps his greatest gift as a commander.

At the end of *The Seven Days* one is left with mixed feelings. There is at once a sense of hope and of impending doom. Even knowing as we do, the outcome of the story it is difficult not to get caught up in the emotion of the hour. Richmond had been saved and for the people of the Confederacy there was new hope. One of the great tragedies of civil war is that for there to be compromise one side has to be defeated.

Dowdey's other book, *Lee's Last Campaign* deals with the 1864 campaign against Grant. The Lee of 1864 had visibly aged since the Seven Days. His greatest victories were behind him but his men were not to know that. The North had a new general, U.S. Grant but they had had new generals before and had been thrown back. There was nothing to suggest that Lee would not simply defeat Grant and force the Union to retire for another season. The material imbalance was no greater in

1864 than it had been in 1862 so what was different about this campaign.

The difference was one man Ulysses Simpson Grant and his refusal to accept tactical defeat. Grant was the best strategist of the war and Lee realised that Union armies were pressing into the Confederacy from all sides. Lee had to win a rapid victory so that forces could be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia to aid in the other theatres.

Lee's Last Campaign is, like *The Seven Days*, essentially a narrative. The battles of Grant's Forty day's campaign are described in all their detail. At the Wilderness Lee's superior command structure enabled him to keep a vestige of control over what was essentially a gigantic mellee. After two days it became clear that the Army of Northern Virginia had won a great victory.

It was at this point that both Lee and Grant made momentous decisions. Grant decided that despite his tactical losses he was not defeated unless he admitted to defeat. The order was given to continue the march to Spotsylvania Court House and Union morale soared. At the same time that Grant was effectively changing the entire nature of warfare by ushering in a new military paradigm Lee second guessed him. Lee predicted that Grant would refuse to acknowledge defeat and would be heading to Spotsylvania.

Grant should have won the campaign there by placing himself between Lee and Richmond but Lee somehow knew what Grant was going to do. However, by allowing Grant to continue south (and he could not stop him) Lee did something which he had never done before, he surrendered the initiative to a northern general. Lee went over to the operational defensive for the first time in his career. He would never regain the initiative that he had lost in the Wilderness.

The one chance that Lee had to attack Grant and regain the initiative was at the North Anna. After sitting on the defensive at Spotsylvania Lee deployed in a position on the North Anna River

from which he could attack Grant to his advantage. However, as discussed in Issue 20, Lee fell ill and the moment passed. It is doubtful anyway whether the initiative regained by Lee could have been retained past the day of the actual battle.

Lee saw the inevitability of his defeat months before that defeat became a reality. He saw the unbreakable siege of Richmond that he had fought the Seven Days Battle to avoid. Finally Lee was unable to predict Grant's final movement, south of the James River. As discussed elsewhere in this issue it was only by the poor performance of his subordinates and by sheer bad luck that Grant did not take Petersburg and Richmond in June of 1864.

Once again Lee had saved the Confederacy the loss of its capital and once again he had extended the period of suffering of his army and the Confederacy as a whole. The Army of Northern Virginia did not surrender until April 9th 1865 but it was dead for all purposes once the Petersburg siege had begun. Lee's last campaign was over.

In this campaign Lee showed perhaps more skill than ever before. His opponent was of a higher calibre than any he had yet faced and the new style of warfare practised by Grant raised the stakes to the highest level.

Poorly written and researched narrative is the worst form of history that someone can be burdened with reading. Dowdey's two books discussed here are not that style of narrative. They are well researched, detailed and insightful. One has the pleasure of reading a good novel with the added bonus that the subject matter is real. It is only through narrative history that one can gain a firm grasp of the facts and the questions involved.

Too many historians take the narrative for granted and immediately launch into a discussion of the higher issues. It is refreshing to read well presented narrative history and Clifford Dowdey's two books, *The Seven Days* and *Lee's Last Campaign* are certainly that.

The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee and Lee's Last Campaign: The Story of Lee and His Men Against Grant - 1864 are both published by Bison Books; University of Nebraska Press. ◆

The scenarios are based on the Allied naval actions around Rabaul in November 1943. The Allies were attempting to land troops at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. The Japanese were equally intent on preventing the landings. At the start of the battle the Americans had two carriers to the Japanese three but they were reinforced by three more carriers part way through the operation. Both sides have formidable land-based air so it should be hard to score a decisive victory.

JUST RELEASED...

Since the publication of *Issue 21* we have released the following games

***Warlords II Scenario Builder* (IBM)**

***Carriers at War II* (Mac)**

The *Scenario Builder* is proving very popular. As well as the ability to create your own worlds, complete in every detail we have included 24 new scenarios, many with stunning new graphics which you can use in the creation of your own scenarios. Scenarios range from the pseudo historical Europa to Warthogs II, complete with liver flukes as an army type. And for the brave among you there is Roger Keating's feared Star scenario.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Work is still under way on the Macintosh version of *Warlords II* which can be expected in August.

Last issue the party line was that we were working on two projects, "one of which is a military history game; the other isn't". Well we have an update on that, for one of the games anyway. The military history game is a World War II land combat game. Oddly enough the other game isn't. Keep watching this space, next issue I'll be revealing the title of our WWII game. ◆

The Warthogs army set from the Warlords II Scenario Builder
Yes, pigs can fly!

Patch to Warlords II

Disk subscribers will find several files on their disk which enable them to upgrade their current Warlords II to the current version (V1.11). Copy the file upgrade.zip to the Warlord2 directory and type:

UNZIP -o -d UPDATE [Enter]

This will allow you to run any Scenario Builder files and also installs two new terrain types, mud and snow. Razing is also made an option and small improvements have been made to the AI and the movement routines.

ADDSCEN

A new ADDSCEN file has been included. Put this in the Warlord2 directory.

ILLURIA

A new Illuria.szp file has been included on the disk. This should be installed over the old Illuria.szp to make it compatible with the Scenario Builder. Use the new ADDSCEN file to install this scenario.